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This thesis examines the development of UK oil policy since 1964. 
The methodology of neo-classical economic theory is applied to the 
government policy process and various distortions and 
inconsistencies in the process are found. The economic theories 
of politics and of bureaucracies highlight the intrinsic 
deficiencies of the oil policy process and provide the analytical 
framework in which a positive assessment of government oil policy 
is undertaken. Tactical behaviour and strategic bargaining on 
the basis of the characteristics of oil policy are methods by 
which groups and individuals attempt to influence the development 
of policy. It is possible to predict the direction and degree of 
influence various groups have on the oil policy process over time 
and to estimate the economic consequences of government action 
in the North Sea. The thesis emphasises the inevitability of 
distorting pressures on the government policy process in the 
system of democratic government in the UK. Recommendations of 
ways to reduce the distorting impact of government policies in 
the domestic oil sector include providing greater access to 
information than already exists and promoting competition between 
government bureaucracies for the provision of goods and services 
provided by government.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
There are two key objectives of this thesis. UK oil policy since 
the passage of the 1964 Continental Shelf Act is examined and a
positive appraisal of policy is made. The UK government process is
> /r analysed, with respect of North Sea oil, by focusing on the behaviour\
of various groups and individuals involved in the policy process. The 
government is not viewed as a single entity with one set of objectives 
and priorities. Government is a dynamic process and policy influences 
and decisions are made in a constantly changing political and 
economic environment. An assessment of the government policy process 
is necessary in order to provide an understanding of the nature of 
the domestic oil industry and its relationship with the government.
The method by which a positive evaluation of the government oil policy
process is achieved is by employing a theoretical framework provided-
by the economic theories of politics and bureaucracies. The works of
Downs, Breton, Tullock, Buchanan and Niskanen provide the
methodological structure which is adapted and applied to the
development of North Sea oil policy. The notion of an omniscient and
altruistic government is naive and simplistic and is the basis of much
theoretical work advocating government intervention to correct
(1)situations in an imperfect industry. A recurrent theme in this 
study is that the government itself functions imperfectly. A basic 
condition for state intervention in an industry is that the industry 
is imperfect, for example, an oligopolistic industry where all costs 
are not internalized. However, a second condition must also be 
satisfied; that the government is able to improve on the existing 
situation. The role of the government is thus examined in the context
1. Objectives and Methodology
of an imperfect government as well as an imperfect oil industry. 
Individuals and groups within the policy process'possess utility 
functions which they attempt to maximize. For example, the government 
bureaucrat is not necessarily a political neutral and the politician 
is not necessarily willing to subjugate his or her own ambitions for 
the sake of some government objective. Assumptions of bureaucratic 
and political behaviour (i.e. rationally attempting to maximize a 
personal utility function) are analogous to those made of individuals 
in the private sector.
Problems associated with the formulation and development of policy in 
the UK system of representative democracy may be seen to fall into 
two broad areas. First, because of the inherent shortcomings of 
the UK voting system the policy preferences and desires of the voting 
population are not clearly recognized by politicians. Thus, any 
'national interest' objective (if one can exist) as determined by 
voters, is unlikely to be revealed to policy-makers. Second, even if 
the politician is able to identify genuine(i.e. voter determined) 
'national interest* objective, a policy then has to be developed and 
implemented so as to achieve that objective. Various groups and 
individuals within the policy-process, both inside and outside 
government, exert pressure on the development of policy in order to 
further or protect their own interests as they perceive them. Thus 
those active in the policy-process may desire certain characteristics 
of policy rather than aspects of the policy outcome.
Whilst economic theory provides the framework of analysis, political 
economy of North Sea oil is an integral part of the study. It is 
important to note that the government has numerous functions to
3
perform in society to do with social, political and economic 
activities. Politicians may implement a policy for political reasons, 
subordinating economic considerations. This is seldom made clear 
and it is important that the economic implications of government are 
known in order to contribute to the ability of voters in formulating 
their policy preferences.
The intrinsic deficiencies of the government policy-process as 
examined in the context of domestic oil policy thus have an important 
bearing on the government's ability to improve on the functioning of 
the offshore oil industry.
2. Structure
The historical background to the development of UK North Sea oil policy
is outlined in Chapter Two. The discovery of oil on the United
Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) in the late 1960's and 1970's had the
effect of changing the status of Britain from an oil importing nation
to a net oil exporter in the 1980's. In 1982 the UK was producing
over two million barrels of oil per day, roughly equivalent to middle
(2 )ranking OPEC producers. The historical development of the UK oil
sector since 1964 provides the background to policy decisions made 
in the 1970's and 1980's. The timing of various national and 
international events (both political and economic) have had an 
important effect on the UK oil sector in two major ways. First, 
events such as the world oil price increases of 1973-4 and of 1979 
had a direct effect on the economics of North Sea oil. Second, these 
events additionally have an indirect effect on the UK oil sector 
because they alter perceptions of the oil market and the importance
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of UK oil as a political issue. Political events in the UK can 
similarly be seen to affect oil policy. For instance, the changing 
political complexion of the government, macro-economic priorities 
of governments and the timing of General Elections, all have an 
effect on the relationship between government and the oil industry.
Chapter Three provides the theoretical framework for the analysis of 
government and North Sea oil policy. Much of the work in this chapter 
is derived from work presented in the context of the US system of 
government. The various theories of politics and bureaucracies are 
thus selected for, or adapted to, application for the UK system of 
government. Over time, according to various political and economic 
factors, different government departments (for example, the Foreign 
Office, Department of Energy, the Treasury) have varying degrees of 
influence on the development of oil policy. The impacts of pressure 
groups, political rivalries and voting rules on the policy process 
are outlined in this chapter.
The economic methodology set out in Chapter Three is applied to North 
Sea oil policy in the subsequent four chapters. A detailed account 
is given of the evolution of licensing, taxation, participation and 
depletion policies. The economic theories of politics and 
bureaucracies are employed in an attempt to make a positive assessment 
of oil policies in the UK and to highlight various distortions and 
inconsistencies in the oil policy process.
Chapter Eight, the final synthesising chapter, provides an overview 
of UK oil policy. The implications of the analysis are outlined by 
comparing the traditional role of the government in the economy
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to the experience of government involvement in the North Sea oil 
industry. Suggestions concerning the policy process are referred to 
and future policy trends are considered in the context of the 
economic theories of politics and bureaucracies.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
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1 * Introduction
The development of North Sea oil and gas over the last two decades
has, in many respects, been highly successful. Oil companies have
overcome many technical problems of deep sea drilling which had
never before been confronted. The first offshore drilling took place
in Dutch coastal waters in 1961 and following the passing of the
1964 Continental Shelf Act, the first gas in the British sector was
discovered in the West Sole Field in 1965. This was followed by
further discoveries in 1966 of gas in the Leman Bank, Indefatigable
and Hewett Fields. These and further significant discoveries
(enough to support a 'plateau' output of around 4,000 million cubic
(1)feet per day throughout the 1970's and 1980's) led to the conver­
sion of domestic consumers to natural gas. Between 1970 and 1978
UK consumption of natural gas increased from 4,400 million therms
(2)to 16,500 million therms each year. As exploration drilling
moved further northward, towards the end of the 1960's important oil
reserves were discovered. In 1971 BP's Forties Field was declared
commercial as were Auk, Brent and Argyll in 1972; Argyll and Forties
commenced production in 1975. At a time of rapidly increasing world
oil prices in the first half of the 1970's discovery rates peaked and
by 1980 total (proven, probable and possible) recoverable reserves
on the UKCS were estimated to be between 2,200 and 4,400 million
(3)tonnes. Thus, during the 1980's the UK would become a net oil 
exporter producing as much oil as Venezuala, Kuwait and Nigeria.
This chapter attempts to provide a background to the overall 
development of UK offshore oil and the role the Government has 
adopted since 1964. The influence of the Government on the offshore
8
oil industry has been considerable and often controversial. The
policies of successive Governments must be seen as an integral
part of the problem of development of North Sea oil. Not unlike
the experience of other oil producing regions, government policy
has changed considerably from a relative absence of intervention
and a fiscal regime encouraging exploration and development when
reserves were unproven and risks were high, to a policy of
increasingly stringent controls and increasing government
intervention as substantial reserves were declared commercial. In
outlining, the historical development of the relationship between
the government and the offshore oil industry three distinct periods
(4)can be observed. Each period may be characterized by discernible 
policy trends which have affected the economics of domestic offshore 
oil. In briefly highlighting overall policy trends concerning North 
Sea oil this chapter provides the background to subsequent chapters 
examining North Sea oil policy in greater detail.
2. 1964-1974
The 1964 Continental Shelf Act served to extend the oil and gas 
licensing and regulatory powers granted to the government by the 
1934 Petroleum Production Act to offshore areas. The government's 
basic policy considerations at this time were relatively 
uncomplicated. A climate was to be provided which would encourage 
the most rapid and thorough exploration and development of the 
UKCS at a time when the oil companies were naturally cautious 
because of the enormous risks involved and because massive reserves 
were cheaply available elsewhere, notably in the Middle East. The 
Conservative Government was concerned about inciting OPEC, at a
9
time when OPEC was pressing for increased revenue from oil company 
concessionaires, to worsen the terms and harm UK'overseas oil 
interests and the UK Balance of Payments in response to excessively 
burdensome terms imposed by the UK Government on oil companies 
operating in the North Sea. The Government was also considering the 
sizeable benefits from the offshore supplies industry which could 
accrue to UK firms whether or not reserves of oil or gas were found.
A recurring factor throughout this period which had a significant 
effect on the organizational framework in which North Sea activities 
evolved was the government's desire for speed. This desire to 
promote a rapid rate of exploration {due largely to the poor per­
formance of the post-war domestic economy}8  ^ has been c i t e d ^  as 
the primary reason why the UK Government did not contest the division 
of the North Sea between the UK and Norway which resulted in the UK 
obtaining only 35% of the North Sea.
Although the Government's role in the North Sea at this time was 
characterized by a relative lack of intervention, it did make 
decisions as to the structure of control which had far-reaching 
implications. The decision was made to employ a discretionary 
licensing system. In doing so, the Government set the framework in 
which future government intervention and government-bureaucrat 
control could occur. The discretionary licensing system and its 
implications are examined in Chapter Four but it is important to 
note that during this period of relative absence of government 
intervention, the government ensured that the potential for state 
control existed in the early legislative framework.
The First Licensing Round in 1964 allocated 53 licences covering
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348 blocks. The General Election of October 1964 brought the
Labour Party into power and following indications of gas in the 
Southern Basin, the new Government was keen to give exploration 
an added impetus by announcing in 1965 the Second Licensing Round. 
Soon after the announcement of the Second Licensing Round, BP 
discovered gas in what became known as the West Sole Field; this 
was followed in 1966 by further discoveries in the Southern Basin. 
Experience in other areas suggested that it would be unusual if no 
more gas were found and thus in just over two years the southern part 
of the North Sea had changed from a completely unproven area to one 
of considerable significance as a gas producing basin. This 
prompted the Government to institute a major review of future
licensing procedure and of general policy with respect to this new
domestic source of energy. The Labour Party Fuel Study Group in 
1968 proposed the setting up of a National Hydrocarbons Corporation 
to assume sole responsibility for exploration and development in all 
the offshore areas not retained by existing licences. This proposal 
was not followed throughout but it did clearly illustrate the Labour 
Party's commitment to some active state corporation in the North 
Sea foreshadowing the British National Oil Corporation and 
indicating the government's undertaking to increase state partici­
pation in the future. Other forms of participation, as ini.the 
Netherlands, Norway or Denmark were rejected because of the need 
to develop smaller, higher cost gas fields and the continuously 
stressed need for speed.
Following the discovery of the small uncommercial Cod Field in
1969, the huge Ekofisk oil field was discovered in the Norwegian
sector. This, as well as the low gas price, prompted the shift
(7)
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further north and an intensification of the search for oil, and
in 1970 BP discovered the Forties Field in the British sector.
At the same time there was increasing pressure being applied by
OPEC members on concessionary companies. In September 1970 Libya
was successful in increasing its take from oil companies and
other countries began to follow the Libyan lead. An estimated
(8)additional £200m in exchange costs to the UK from oil imports 
had been incurred and there was now greater attention paid to 
promoting secure oil supplies. Together with the uncertainties of 
the Middle East and early discoveries of oil in the North Sea 
there was a third factor which influenced the Government's decision 
to announce a Fourth Licensing Round. Due largely to the small size 
of the Third Round there had been a significant slowdown of 
activity in the North Sea.
Thus at this time the Government was beginning seriously to consider 
the attractions of a new, more involved role for itself in the North 
Sea. However, its two main policy considerations were still to 
secure as quickly as possible the maximum effort of exploration and 
development of the UKCS and to ensure British interests were 
adequately protected. The Fourth Round of licensing was successful 
in speeding up the development of the UKCS (as were increasingly 
fast moving events in the Middle East) and there was some concern 
that the offshore supplies industry could not cope with the increased 
demand of the companies operating in the much fiercer environment 
of the northern North Sea. There had been some criticism of the 
low share, (25-30% in 1972) of the British offshore supplies industry 
in the North Sea and it was significant that during this period of 
high activity British shipyards failed to take advantage of the
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surge in rig orders. Offshore engineering and contracting were 
mainly in the hands of American companies who tended to favour 
familiar and proven equipment from known American suppliers.
To the extent that development in the North Sea had occurred
relatively quickly, the Government's rapid exploitation policy had
been successful (see Tables I and III). Subsequent chapters will
examine the wider implications of this policy but by the early
1970's economic and political conditions had changed. The
Government was keen to increase its take and also its powers of
control. Due to the uncertainties involved and the need to
attract oil companies into the North Sea, in 1964 the government
was in a relatively weak bargaining position and was prepared to
refrain from intervention, enforced no explicit production controls
and maintained a relatively lenient tax system. The only significant
area of government involvement in the North Sea was with respect to
gas. Largely as a consequence of the discretionary licensing
system (see Chapter Four), the government realised that if gas
were to be sold by the oil companies at market prices, economic
rent would be passed to the companies in the form of profit. In
order to capture the economic rent the Gas Council was made the
sole buyer of offshore natural gas, companies were prohibited from
(9)selling direct to industry and from direct exports. The Gas
Council (and its successor, the British Gas Corporation) thus
acquired monopsony and monopoly powers. The gas price negotiated
with the companies was established at a very low 1.2 pence per
therm but it is unlikely that the economic rent was passed on to
the consumer or captured by the government by taxing BGC's profits.
( 11 )Due to the absence of competition, it could be predicted that
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considerable 'X-inefficiency* would develop within the BGC.
3. 1974-1979
In the 1960's the real price of oil was falling. Thus p, defined
as the expected rate of appreciation of the net price of oil, was
negative. Also, because multi-national oil companies predicted
that at some time in the future they could lose control of some
of their oil activities, most notably in the Middle East, oil
company discount rates (i) tended to be relatively high. An oil
producer will attempt to equate the opportunity cost of
production (p) to the opportunity cost of not producing (i) in
order to maximize Net Present Value at the rate of discount. Thus
in the 1960's, p < i and output in the short term increased. In the
1970's as oil producing countries took control of production rates
and prices were expected to rise, the oil producers had longer time
horizons than the companies and the relationship reversed; p > i.
There was an incentive for oil producers to hold back production in
the short term as, given their discount rate, oil producers could
expect to maximize NPV by investing in oil in the ground rather
( 12 )than extracting it in the short term. At the same time there 
was an influential view that as consumption of oil increased, fuel
(13)shortages would develop. Although this argument seems to ignore
the effects of oil price increases on oil substitutes and the 
interaction of demand and supply as prices change, there was 
considerable support for some sort of 'energy-gap' theory.
Nevertheless, the quadrupling of the world price of oil in the winter 
of 1973-4 had a significant effect on the UK Government's perception
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of North Sea oil. Apart from from the balance of payments effects, 
the most serious problem for Britain was perceived to be the 
potential loss of secure supplies of oil. Even with the 
Government's shareholding in BP it could not persuade BP to favour 
Britain in its allocation of oil. There were significant policy 
implications for North Sea oil. The licensing terms did not give 
the government explicit control over either the rate of extraction 
or the destination of the oil once it had been landed in the UK.
Thus by 1974 a combination of events resulted in the reversal of 
the rapid exploitation policy. Bureaucratic pressures and 
political pressures from both within the UK and internationally 
necessitated fundamental changes in government offshore oil policy. 
These multifarious pressures will be explicitly examined in later 
chapters.
Following the fall of the Heath Government the new Labour
Administration instituted a review of oil policy which produced an
(14)influential White Paper. Because of higher oil prices the
existing tax and royalty arrangements were not considered adequate
and it was estimated that unless these conditions were changed the
government would never take much more than one half of the oil
company profits, and about one half of the post tax profits would
(15)be remitted overseas. Thus the government was keen to increase
its take and because of higher oil prices the government's priority 
of rapid exploitation was now being superseded by other considerations.
In the White Paper the government outlined its two principal 
objectives. Firstly, 'to secure a fairer share of profits for the 
nation and to maximize the gain to the balance of payments', and
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secondly, 'to exert greater public control' so as to 'safeguard'
1 f 16)the national interest . In order to achieve these objectives
the White Paper proposed five measures, three of which related 
directly to state participation in the exploitation of oil 
resources on the UKCS. It would be a condition of future licences 
that, if required to do so by the government, the licensees should 
grant majority participation to the state in all fields discovered 
under these licences. The Labour Government believed that majority 
state participation in existing licences provided the best means 
for the nation to share fully in the benefits of North Sea oil 
without 'unfairness' to the licensees as the state contributed its 
share of the costs, including past costs. A British National Oil 
Corporation would be set up through which the Government would 
exercise its participation rights. BNOC would represent the 
government in the present consortia, and would take over the NCB's 
interests. BNOC would play an active part in the future exploration, 
development and exploitation of the UKCS and would have powers to 
expand its activities downstream and abroad. The other measures 
the government proposed in the 1974 White Paper were for a Finance 
Bill which would impose an additional tax on the companies' profits 
from the UKCS. Also the government would extend its powers to 
control physical production and pipelines: to 'take power to 
control the level of production in the national interest'. Further­
more, the government would require licensees to provide more
(17)information about their activities than was at that time obligatory.
Thus the 1974 White Paper clearly stated the Labour Government's 
general policy intentions with respect to the North Sea. In 
parliamentary debates following the publication of the 1974 White
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Paper, Eric Varley (the Secretary of State of Energy) and John 
Smith (Under-Secretary) justified the government*^ participation 
policies and the establishment of BNOC.
Although the 1964 Continental Shelf Act had already established
state ownership of North Sea reserves, it was still Labour Party
policy to honour its commitment stated in its 1974 election
manifesto. This was 'to ensure not only that the North Sea and
Celtic Sea oil and gas resources are in full public ownership, but
that the operation of getting and distributing them is under full
( 18)government control with majority participation1. Thus BNOC was
to be the vehicle by which the socialist principle of national 
ownership would be implemented. The 1974 Labour Government had 
therefore emphasized the importance of North Sea oil as a political 
issue. It had become a major part of the Government's proposed 
parliamentary programme and election platform. North Sea oil 
policy was now subject to all the pressures and uncertainties that 
attach to an important element of government policy, to a far 
greater degree than it had been in the 1960's.
In the debate on the second reading of the Petroleum and Submarine
Pipelines Bill (which was officially to establish BNOC) in April
1975, it was significant that Labour members frequently referred
to the Bill as being a truly socialist bill, 'if one accepts, as
Labour Members do, that it (state intervention in any industry) is
a proper function of the nation, there is surely no better use than 
(19)that of oil1. The Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act, in
setting up BNOC, must be seen primarily as an act which attempted 
to further the state's influence in a major area of the economy.
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Critics have tended to view BNOC's proposed 51% participation as 
the first step towards wholesale nationalization.- It is probably 
more accurate to say that 51% participation was included in BNOC's 
brief in order to satisfy the left wing of the Labour Party and 
was never intended to be rigidly adhered. This is an example of 
intra-party rivalry affecting the policy process and will be 
examined in greater detail in subsequent chapters.
A second and less doctrinaire objective of government policy with
respect to BNOC and North Sea oil was to 'acquire our own direct
knowledge of the difficult techniques of oil and gas production,'
Both major parties agreed on the necessity to enhance the
government's access to information and its ability to interpret
that information. The two parties differed in that the Opposition
felt that this could most efficiently be brought about not by the
setting up of a vast and expensive state corporation but by
establishing some sort of regulatory agency. The government's
view was that access to information was only one of the functions
(2 1)BNOC would fulfil. The Conservative proposal, of the UK Oil
Conservation Authority,(UKOCA) would be 'a small body, of no more
than five members, though with power to take on technical assessors
(22)for particular studies'. UKOCA was to be based on the Energy
Resources Conservation Board of Alberta (and would thus act only 
as an impartial watchdog) and was not considered by the government 
as an alternative to BNOC. Tony Benn (the successor to Eric 
Varley) justified the need for active and large-scale participation 
on the grounds that first-hand experience is vital to gain the 
necessary expertise and information in all North Sea activities.
The much quoted argument is that North Sea oil is too important to
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the economy as a whole, firstly to be left to free market forces,
and secondly to base crucial policy pronouncements on information
derived indirectly: 'one cannot live off decisions of that
(23)magnitude and be dependent on the advice of others'.
A third government objective closely associated with the need for
information was the need for government control over North Sea
oil development and disposal. These were principles accepted by
both parties but the method by which they were to be achieved
differed between the parties. Extensive powers were given to
the Secretary of State for Energy to regulate production in order
to promote and protect the government's notion of 'national
interest'. The government intended that once self-sufficiency
had been reached in the early 1980's, strict production controls
would be enforced and the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act
would provide the means by which future controls could be
implemented. Thus policies of rapid exploitation now seemed to
be completely in the past, especially as the Conservative Party
agreed with the need to have government depletion controls, also
seeming to disregard the effect of market signals on oil companies'
production profiles. In response to oil company complaints of
increasing uncertainty, Eric Varley announced guidelines covering
the implementation of the Minister's powers on production controls.
Thus the so-called 'Varley Guidelines' outlined by the Energy
Secretary were an attempt to assure the oil companies that the
extensive powers on depletion rates given to the Minister in the
Petroleum and Submarire Pipelines Act would not 'undermine the basis
' (24)on which they have made plans and entered into commitments 
However, the guidelines did not achieve this, largely because
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uncertainties remained and the guidelines could be interpreted 
in various ways. There was doubt about the base'figure to which 
the percentage production cut limits applied and confusion as to
whether governments would discriminate between fields or hold back
- _ . (25)new developments.
Mr Varley's guidelines were as follows:
(a) On finds made up to the end of 1975 there would be no delays 
imposed on the development plans. If delays were to be imposed 
on the development of finds in or after 1976 the government 
would act to prevent companies from making premature 
investments.
(b) On finds made up to the end of 1975 there would be no cuts in 
production before 1982 or until four years after the start of 
production, whichever was later.
(c) On finds made after 1975 on an existing licence no cuts would 
be made in production until 150% of the capital investment in 
the field had been recovered.
(d) When using their depletion powers the government would consider 
technical and commercial factors associated with individual 
fields which would generally limit cuts to 20%. The industry 
would be consulted on the period of notice to be given before 
any cuts would come into effect.
(e) In deciding on production cuts the government would take account 
of the needs of the UK offshore supplies industry.
Further government controls on oil company activities, as stated in 
licence agreements, included the provision that all North Sea oil 
and gas should be landed in the UK even if it was to be subsequently
20
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exported. This would have the effect of increasing transport
costs for a company whose field is not on a pipeline to the UK 
mainland and therefore could have exported its oil directly by 
tanker. The government also ruled that two-thirds of North Sea 
oil should be refined in the UK. This rule was not strictly 
adhered to both because of the potential Balance of Payments loss, 
and because it would have depressed the price of oil domestically 
as refinery capacity would not be able to cope. Although these 
controls were left open to considerable discussion between the 
government and oil companies they were symptomatic of the 
government's desire to increase its sphere of influence in all 
aspects of the North Sea oil industry.
A further objective of state participation as seen by the Labour 
Government was that it was an effective way of increasing oil 
revenues. The 1975 Oil Taxation Act's effect was to split profits 
70:30 in the government's favour and with BNOC's 51% participation 
this ratio would shift to 85:15 after the Fifth Licensing Round. 
Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) was introduced largely in response to 
a popular perception of 'windfall' profits accruing to oil 
companies as a result of the 1973-4 world oil price increases.
PRT was set at a flat rate of 45% of income net of royalties and 
operating expenses. To guarantee the companies a minimum return 
on investment capital PRT was not imposed until the original 
capital expenditure plus an Uplift of 75% was earned. This Uplift 
was designed to compensate for interest payments on loans which 
were not deductable. In 1978 the government proposed an increase 
in PRT to 60%, the oil production allowance (of 1 million tonnes, 
set in 1975) was reduced to £ million tonnes per year and the
21
Uplift was to be reduced to 25%. The 1979 Conservative Government 
actually implemented most of the proposed tax changes; however, the 
Uplift was only reduced to 135%. (see Chapter Seven). The chapter on 
Licensing Policy (Chapter Four), analyses the relationship between 
the discretionary licensing system and the tax system through which 
the government hoped to capture the economic rent that had been 
transferred to the oil companies due to the discretionary system.
A .Thus with the establishment of BNOC the Government's role in the 
North Sea altered considerably. Confusion and uncertainty increased 
as the precise role of BNOC was unclear as was the specific 
relationship between the government and BNOC. It was important to 
the government to have the ability to maintain flexibility in order 
to be able to adapt and adjust to an ever changing economic and 
political environment. Politicians of both major parties favoured 
the development of a fully integrated energy policy (national and/or 
international) within which oil policy would play a central part.
The Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act can be seen as the Act
which laid the legal and institutional foundations upon which the
£government's oil policy could develop and which had adquate scope
K
within which the government could respond to unforeseen circum- 
(27)stances. One of the consequences of this institutional rather
than specific forward planning was that BNOC did not have clear-cut
(28)long term objectives. In its First Report BNOC outlined its 
wider aims and viewed its position as combining the functions of 
an instrument of national policy, of a commercial enterprise and 
of an advisor to the government.
The original intentions with regards participation arrangements
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had been for a voluntary 51% participation, with 3NOC paying 
for past and future expenditure on a 51% basis. 'This proved 
totally unacceptable to the oil companies who saw 51% as complete 
control. Following lengthy discussions with the companies a 
compromise was reached based around the Department of Energy's 
desire for information and knowledge and also a say in how the 
companies disposed of the oil they produced. Thus participation 
was re-defined to mean that BNOC was to be treated as a 
partner in that BNOC would have access to information but would 
have no equity share. 51% oil was conceded to BNOC on the 
understanding that BNOC would hand back to the companies all 
financial and other benefits (i.e. the oil would be sold to BNOC 
at the market price) . BNOC would be a member of the operating
I
committees that manage fields but 'there was no question of
(29)exercising a 51% vote'. It was from this general basis that
Lord Kearton conducted participation negotiations with individual 
companies.
The establishment of BNOC on 1st January 1976 came at a time when 
production of oil on the UKCS was rapidly increasing (see Table II). 
Between 1976 and 1979 BNOC also expanded its activities; in its 
first official year of existence BNOC's capital expenditure amounted 
to £396m out of which £287m was used to acquire the North Sea 
interests of the National Coal Board and Burmah Oil. By the end 
of 1976 BNOC was a licensee in 22 production licences covering 59 
blocks or part blocks, extending to more than 9,000 square kilometres 
of the UKCS. BNOC also had equity interests in one producing gas 
field (Viking), five oil fields under development (Thistle, Ninian, 
Dunlin, Statfjord and Murchison) and associated pipeline and
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terminal facilities. BNOC was also operator for the Thistle Field 
development and for nine exploration blocks. By'the end of 1976 
the Corporation employed 388 people
With Government support BNOC expanded its North Sea activities
considerably during the period 1976-9. In 1978 BNOC had started
trading in equity, participation and third party crude oil,
reaching an average level of 170,000 b/d in sales to third parties
by the end of the year. BNOC was an equity partner with over 80
companies including each of the world's seven majors. In addition
to its equity interests BNOC had secured participation agreements
with 62 companies, had an equity participation for exploration work
in over 50 licences, and was involved in 21 oil fields in production
(31)or under development in the North Sea. BNOC showed a gross 
profit of £30m and an operating profit for the year of £llm after 
taking account of site restoration costs, depreciation of general 
exploration costs and selling and administrative expenses. The 
profit attributable to the year's operations, before taxation, was 
£2.3m and the net loss for the year after writing off brought forward 
interest and financing costs, and charging deferred taxation, was 
£3m. The majority of this £3m was derived from fields already 
under development in 1976 and 1977. During 1978 BNOC became the 
largest world trader in North Sea oil. The establishment and 
development of BNOC (see Chapter Five) was a major policy objective 
of the Labour Government and was central to the government's 
overall policy objectives concerning North Sea oil.
24
4. 1979 to the Present Day
The new Conservative Government of 1979 was expected to bring 
about a significant change in the role of the Government in the 
North Sea. Conservative Party criticism of BNOC had intensified 
throughout 1978, based mainly on the assertion that the activities 
of BNOC were accelerating the departure of US companies and thus 
causing serious delays in oil production and a sizeable loss in 
government revenue. In addition, BNOC was criticized for 
undermining the confidence of other companies which regard the 
'majors’ as natural industry leaders. Labour Government and BNOC 
arguments in response to these criticisms were that the large 
multi-national oil companies would be leaving the North Sea 
irrespective of BNOC's actions as remaining oil field projects 
became less financially attractive compared to opportunities 
elsewhere in the world. Thus the high cost marginal fields would 
be left for the smaller, less capable companies and BNOC would 
have to have acquired the experience and skill to fill the gap 
left by the departure of the majors.
Whilst the establishment of BNOC was central to the 1974-9 Labour 
Government's oil policy, its privatization was central to the oil 
policy of the 1979 Conservative Government. Privatization of BNOC 
was to be a political statement, designed to indicate clearly the 
Government's commitment to reducing the influence of the government 
in the economy. This commitment to the dismantling of BNOC led 
to a great deal of speculation and uncertainty over the new 
Administration's oil policy.
The Government announced its intentions with respect to BNOC
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including plans to sell off some of its assets; to divide it into
an exploration and development and a trading company; and plans to
widen the ownership of BNOC, possibly by means of a North Sea oil
(32)stock. These changes did not immediately occur. The economic
theories of politics and bureaucracies (Chapter Three) highlight the 
difficulties in large-scale policy changes and the opposition within 
the groups involved to change which may diminish their power. More­
over, the structure and activities of BNOC (Chapter Five) had been 
such that there were numerous technical obstacles to its break-up.
There are various reasons for the delay in privatizing BNOC. BNOC 
was useful to the Government as a policy instrument in the North Sea.
It had, as a conscious strategy, protected itself from Conservative 
Party ideology by working with the Government as an expert and willing 
'ally'. 1979-80 was a time of political upheaval in the Middle East 
and of considerable oil price increases. A Government owned public 
corporation in the oil sector protecting the 'national interest' was 
politically important to the Government as a vote-maximizing policy.
In addition, the revenue from North Sea oil that accrued to the 
Treasury from BNOC proved to be invaluable to the Government and its 
wider economic objectives. The delay in BNOC's privatization may 
also been seen as a personal failure on behalf of the Secretary of 
State for Energy, Mr David Howell. This would partly explain his 
replacement by Mr Nigel Lawson who, in 1982, three years after the 
Conservative Party's election victory, did create a new company, 
Britoil, leaving BNOC with only its function as an oil trading company. 
The creation of the privately owned Britoil and the rationale behind 
the Government activities concerning BNOC are examined within the 
framework of the economic theories of politics and bureaucracies in 
Chapter Five.
In 1979 expectations of government oil policy were simplistically
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formulated largely by the present Government's consistent non­
interventionist pronouncements. With respect to'"BNOC and with 
other aspects of oil policy changes were slow to occur. That BNOC 
remained as a public company even as an oil trader was significant. 
The Government was aware of the political importance of some form 
of state controlled company in the oil sector. BNOC's usefulness 
to the Government was well illustrated after OPEC's London Meeting 
in March 1983 when the UK Government, via BNOC, crucially priced 
North Sea oil at a level which would not encourage Nigerian 
retaliation.
Further expected policy changes were similarly slow to come about.
The oil taxation system became more onerous over time. Changes
included the increase of PRT to 70% and then to 75%, a
supplementary oil tax (SPD) was introduced and later abolished and
APRT was introduced (later to be phased out). These measures
illustrate the Government's desire for short-term revenue and its
willingness to compromise ideological and economic objectives for
(33)wider political considerations. In 1982 minor oil tax 
concessions were introduced and in 1983 the Government made 
significant tax changes, chiefly affecting new development projects 
(see Chapter Seven). The 1983 tax changes were announced in the 
context of intense industry pressure for change and the slowdown 
of activity on the UKCS. Falling oil prices in early 1983 also 
contributed to the Government's action to promote exploration and 
development activity in the North Sea by oil tax changes.
Prior to July 1980 depletion policy was concerned with maintaining
(34)Government powers and overseeing company production plans. In
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the summer of 1980, Mr Howell announced Government plans to delay 
some development projects and regulate production in 'the national
/ / n r \
interest1. BNOC's Clyde Field project was reported to have
been delayed as a result of Government depletion policy. Short 
term priorities of the Government are a feature which has influenced 
the development and implementation of offshore oil policy over time. 
BNOC, as a public corporation, was persuaded to delay the Clyde 
development project for two years largely because capital expenditure 
would have increased the PSBR. Clyde was eventually given 
development consent in 1982 when capital costs would be incurred 
by the privatized Britoil. As with other aspects of offshore oil 
policy (notably with respect to BNOC) the Government subsequently
(37)revised its plans and in June 1982 Mr Lawson announced that 
there would be no production cutbacks imposed on oil companies 
before 1985.
(38)The 'Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act 1982 which created the private
sector company, Britoil, also reduced the monopsony/monopoly role
of the BGC. The Act removed the obligation of companies to sell
natural gas to BGC and allowed consumers to purchase gas from any
supplier. In some circumstances (for users of 2 million therms a
year or less) the consent of the Secretary of State is required
for gas to be supplied by a company other than BGC. For users of
more than 2 million therms a year the Secretary of State's consent
is not required and for users of less than 25,000 therms a year
and who are within 25 yards of a BGC main, gas may be supplied
by a private company if BGC does not object to the consent given
(39)by the Secretary of State. A second change to BGC brought
about by the Act was the opportunity for private companies to
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negotiate with BGC for the use of BGC's onshore pipeline system 
for the transmission of gas.
Furthermore, as part of the Conservative Government's policy of 
privatization (and of raising short term revenue), the Energy 
Secretary, Mr Peter Walker, instructed BGC to sell its 50% share 
in the Wytch Farm o i l f i e l d I n  addition, BGC was ordered to 
transfer its holdings in five offshore oilfields (Beryl, Hutton,
NW Hutton, Montrose and Fulmar) and its interests in eight offshore 
licences. The measures outlined above with respect to BGC were of 
considerable political value to the Conservative Government in an 
election period. The Government could be seen to be encouraging 
competition and to be reducing the powers and activities of a 
nationalized industry. In addition, Treasury objectives for short 
term revenues were achieved.
The Eighth Licensing Round included an auction 'experiment' but it
seems that the pressures within government strongly in favour of
the administratively extensive discretionary licensing system
will result in the continuation of the discretionary method. The
sizes of licensing rounds instituted by the Conservative Government
have been irregular but their timing has been, since the Sixth
Round, at more regular intervals. Special treatment for BNOC has
ceased but the nationalistic consideration to give British firms
(41)preferential treatment in licence alocation has remained.
Licensing policy is fundamental to other aspects of offshore oil 
policy, notably with respect to oil taxation. Chapter Four 
examines licensing policy in greater detail. Government consensus 
since 1964 concerning the discretionary allocation system is
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explained largely in terms of the economic theories of 
bureaucracies.
Between 1978 and 1982 oil production from the UK sector of the 
North Sea almost doubled. In 1983 UK oil production is expected 
to be approximately 2.3 million barrels per day, reaching a peak 
of around 2.5 m.b.d. between 1984 and 1986. Government tax 
revenues from North Sea oil are expected to be just under £10 
billion in 1983 rising to over £14 billion in 1987 (see Table III). 
Because of the volatile nature of the world oil market over the 
last decade, the offshore industry is of considerable political 
importance to the Government as well as for its tax revenues.
Various pressure groups and bureaucracies in government and in 
the oil industry also have a considerable interest in oil policy 
and have a role in the development and implementation of that 
policy. Political and bureaucratic pressures and constraints 
may be seen as a common feature throughout the evolution of oil 
policy in the UK since 1964. These constraints and pressures have 
differed in character and relative strength over time as circum­
stances have changed. The non-interventionist policies of the 
1979 Conservative Government have not occurred to the degree that 
was expected in 1978-9. In the context of the economic theories of 
politics and bureaucracies, failure to implement radical 
non-interventionist policies might have been predicted. The boost 
to exploration and development activity resulting from the 1983 
Budget tax changes has been an attempt to maintain offshore activity 
and uncertainty concerning UK Government oil policy since the early 
1970's has not seemed to have diminished in the 1980's.
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TABLE I
UK OFFSHORE DRILLING ACTIVITY
Exploration Appraisal Development
Number of Wells Drilled Each Year
1964 1 ' 0 0
1965 10 0 0
1966 20 8 3
1967 42 16 13
1968 31 8 36
1969 44 8 27
1970 22 2 28
1971 24 4 34
1972 33 8 36
1973 42 19 21
1974 67 33 20
1975 78 37 21
1976 58 28 54
1977 67 38 96
1978 37 25 96
1979 33 15 102
1980 32 22 122
1981 48 26 137
1982 68 43 118
Sources: Department of Energy: 'Development of the oil 
and gas resources of the United Kingdom' 1975 and 1983
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CHAPTER THREE
A SELECTIVE LITERATURE REVIEW
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1• introduction
Since the publication in 1957 of Anthony Downs' "An Economic Theory 
(1)of Democracy" the theory of public choice has expanded into a 
broader and more far-reaching analysis of the economics of 
politics and government decision-making. Work by economists such 
as Bergson, Arrow and Sen stimulated interest in the area of 
normative public choice and normative theorists tended to 
concentrate on the government's objectives being ultimately to 
maximize some social welfare function. Although A r r o w ^  proved 
that given certain conditions a social welfare function will be 
impossible to locate there has nevertheless been a tendency to 
overlook the motivation of individuals involved in public decision­
making and to assume conveniently that their sole purpose is to 
maximize some given social welfare function.
Whilst in discussion of the workings of private markets the self- 
interest axiom is of central importance as the basis of all 
hypotheses, when discussing government activities there has tended 
to be an implicit assumption of governments being staffed by 
altruists whose only concern is serving the ’public interest'. By 
employing economic tools (e.g. monopoly, competition, transaction 
costs) and applying them to politics and political institutions 
Downs, and subsequently other economists, attempt to construct a 
framework within which the decision-making process in a democracy 
can be studied. Thus over the last twenty-five years there has 
been an increasing volume of literature concerned with the 
intermediate stages in the decision-making process, between the 
initial stage of individuals making their preferences known and
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the final stage of a policy being implemented. It is during 
these intermediate stages that discrepancies and Imperfections 
occur which can make the output of governments different from 
the preferences of voters. The economics of politics therefore 
adds to the understanding of government policy in that it makes 
possible the examination of these intermediate stages in the 
decision-making process.
(3)Within this recent literature Breton classifies the writings 
under four broad headings: the theory of decision-rules, the
theory of democracy, the theory of public goods and the theory of 
transaction costs. Although these subdivisions are not mutually 
exclusive his point, that each area has tended to develop with 
little regard to the others, is generally valid. Breton, attempts 
to correct this, most notably the failure of the theory of 
democracy to take account of the existence and role of public goods. 
In tracing the development of the theory of bureaucracy as it has 
grown out of the Downsian theory of democracy a greater insight 
into the shortcomings and limitations of government oil policy is 
developed. This in turn can help to explain why government 
intervention in certain sectors does not achieve its desired 
objectives.
2. The Economic Theory of Democracy
Downs attempts to construct an economic theory of representative 
government around the concept of the government as a monopoly. He 
relates the motives of rational, utilitarian individuals involved 
in the process of government to the political structure of a
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society in this case a democracy. Within the framework of 
analysing the behaviour of rational individuals ars citizens (voters) 
and in government (as politicians but impliVJ'ly as bureaucrats)
Downs constructs two basic hypotheses about the operation of the 
political process in a democracy. From these hypotheses Downs is 
able to derive specific, testable propositions.
The central thesis adopted by Downs is that the activities of 
political parties in a democracy are analogous to those of 
entrepreneurs in a profit-seeking economy. Whilst entrepreneurs 
are often assumed to attempt to produce those goods which they 
consider will gain the most profits in order that their personal 
objectives and desires may be satisfied the politicians adopt what­
ever policies they believe will gain the most votes for similar reasons.
Thus Downs 1 first major hypothesis is that political parties in a 
democracy formulate or adopt their policies so as to maximize their 
votes. As a result the behaviour of political parties in their 
response to changing economic conditions, and their actions in 
changing those conditions can be analysed in the same way as can 
the actions of other economic agents. The considerable importance 
of this analysis is thus self-evident when considering the extent 
of the government's impact in a mixed economy not only as a policy­
maker but as an employer, producer, consumer, etc.. To facilitate 
the analysis of the implications of this thesis Downs assumes that 
every citizen rationally attempts to maximize his utility income, 
including that portion of it derived from government activity; 
this is Downs' second major hypothesis. Because members of 
political parties are motivated by the intrinsic rewards of holding
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public office Downs argues that they will therefore formulate 
policies as a means to holding office rather than seeking office 
to carry out pre-determined policies.
According to Downs, the ultimate constraint on the activities of
governments is the cost of information to the citizen and also to
the government which itself is generally operating 'in a fog of
(4)uncertainty*. On an individual level the citizen would be 
acting irrationally by acquiring information as the marginal cost 
of gaining the relevant information would greatly outweigh his 
marginal, but well informed, benefit resulting from the 
infinitesimal effect of his single vote. There is-also the further 
constraint of the competitive political process in a democracy 
between the incumbent and opposition parties.
The Downsian theory has had significant implications for the
development of positive public choice theory (i.e. of non-market
decision-making). Downs' 'enthusiasm' for the simple majority
(5)voting rule has led to criticism by Tullock as it can lead to
( 6 )logrolling and the serving of small interest groups. Tullock 
has consistently maintained that the Downsian theory does not 
adequately deal with either of these phenomena. In his 1959 
article, Tullock uses an example of one hundred farmers each 
requiring repairs to his own road in order to illustrate an 
important shortcoming of the simple majority voting principle.
With no vote-trading each road repair is defeated by 99 votes to 
1. With logrolling each farmer pays more in taxes for the repairs 
of the other roads than he obtains for the repairs to his own road. 
This, according to Tullock, is due to the problem of 'revolving
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majorities'. Each individual farmer thinks he is paying one- 
hundredth of the cost of the total repairs and receiving one 
fifty-first of the total benefit. However, some of the other 
fifty farmers he has made a deal with, in order to reach a 
majority, will be offered deals by the 49 farmers originally left 
out of the first deal. Thus as many as 100 bills will be paid 
when each farmer is calculating from the basis of only 51 bills. 
Thus Tullock shows that the simple majority voting principle may 
lead, via a system of 'revolving majorities', to over-investment 
and the super-optimal size of government.
(7)Downs rejects the idea that these outcomes above are a con­
sequence of logrolling and majority voting and maintains that 
Tullock's conclusions (that government activity which benefits 
minorities will receive disproportionate allocations of resources 
in comparison to the benefit to society as a whole; taxes of 
general impact will include exemptions favouring special groups 
and the government budget will be too large as individual voters 
will rationally support a level of government spending which is 
irrational for society as a whole) results from Tullock's seriatim 
assumption whereby voting takes place on a continuous stream of 
proposals. Downs* criticisms of Tullock's example of the one 
hundred farmers are that the seriatim assumption would not hold 
up in the real world and also that the tendency for the government 
to oversupply legislation giving a disproportionate benefit to 
special interest groups would be more than offset by the tendency 
to undersupply general interest legislation due to the free rider 
problem and the complementary lack of incentives for voters to 
become informed. Tullock has nevertheless been consistent in his
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preference for a two-thirds majority vote for important issues 
even though each individual does not have an equally weighted 
vote.
A further important conclusion reached by Downs and derived from 
his party-motivation hypothesis is that democratic governments 
tend to favour producers more than consumers in their actions.
Because of the strong common objectives of producers, combined 
with the costs of gathering information, a group of individuals, 
as producers, will be able to articulate clearly their policy 
preferences to the government who will themselves be keen for any 
indication of public preference and will thus pay more attention 
to the desires of producers than to consumers whose interests are 
more diverse and, due to the cost of information, more obscure.
This idea can be extended to explain, at least partly, the importance 
of political pressure groups in general. Generally, pressure groups 
are relatively small, well-informed organizations with a very strong 
common conviction on one aspect of government policy.
(8)Buchanan and Tullock approach the problems of logrolling and
the optimal voting rule in some considerable detail. It is part
of this analysis that they come to promote the idea of 're-inforced
majorities' for deciding major issues. The simple majority rule is
generally not optimal according to a Pareto solution and it ignores
strengths of preferences. Because the majority rule enables the
individual in the dominant coalition to gain benefits from
collective action without bearing the full marginal costs properly
attributable to him, the simple majority rule will result in a
relative overinvestment in the public sector if the standard
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Paretian criteria are accepted.
(9)Tullock maintaxns that in virtually all real world voting 
situations either implicit logrolling (when a whole complex 
package of policies is offered including policies which would only 
have minority appeal in order that individuals would vote for the 
whole package on the basis of his strong preference for one or 
two policies even though he might be opposed to other policies in 
the package) or explicit logrolling takes place and while this may 
have beneficial results it can also have defects.
Tullock clearly illustrates the benefits of logrolling by using 
a simple example. In this similar example there is a society of 
twenty voters confronting a collection of policies to be paid for 
by a tax of £1 on each member of the society, and each individual 
will benefit exclusively from the policies. If one policy costs 
£20 to implement and only one individual accrues a benefit worth 
£35 the bill, without logrolling, would be defeated by 19 votes 
to 1, although it is preferable for the bill to be passed. With 
logrolling, assuming there are similar policies for other voters, 
it would be passed. However, it could be the case that logrolling 
has undesirable consequences. If, in the same system, the return 
to the individual is £15, the individual would be keen to trade 
votes on ten other issues which would thus net him £4 on the 
agreement. Thus a bill would be passed costing society £20 for a 
policy worth only £15. Tullock's 'radical' solution to this 
problem (although he acknowledges that there is no way to ensure 
that only those bills which benefit society get passed with 
logrolling) is to dispense with the simple majority rule and
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FIGURE 1
THE COST OF DEMOCRATIC DECISIONS
Source: G Tullock, ’The Vote Motive', (London; IEA,1976)
p.52
42
introduce re-enforced majorities.
Buchanan and Tullock's ( 11) analysis of various voting rules
using 'game theory' gives rise to the idea of the existence of 
some optimal voting rule. By summing the external costs (which 
are the costs to individuals resulting from the passage of bills 
which are detrimental to individuals under different voting rules) 
and the bargaining costs (the more people needed to pass a bill 
the greater will be the costs of negotiating, i.e. investment of 
time and energy) the total cost incurred by society under various 
voting rules result. In Figure I the horizontal axis shows the 
voting rules that might be adopted, with a one person dictatorship 
at the left and unanimity at the right. The total cost, therefore, 
can be derived with its lowest point being the optimal voting 
rule. The optimal voting rule will only by coincidence be at the
maintains that although Downs' theory gives reasonable predictions 
for two parties it is not so good for more than two parties and also 
that most political choice decisions are not one dimensional.
intra-party rivalry as a constraint on the activities of a political
the obvious drawback of having voters' preferences equally 
scattered over the area portrayed. If one party mistakenly takes 
up position A, then the vote maximizing reply is position B. All 
those voters whose optima lie to the left of line I will then vote 
for B, but for voters at the left end of the issue space this 
represents only a small gain. If the second party takes position B
Tullock uses a similar analysis to that of Riker (13) to introduce
(14)party. Figure 2 employs the concept of 'issue space' which has
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FIGURE 2
VOTE MAXIMIZATION AND INTRA-PARTY REVOLUTION
B 1 Centre B A
II
Source: G Tullock, ’Towards A Mathematics of Politics',
(Ann Arbor; University of Mic^gan Press, 1962)
44
it can still gain a majority and out of all those who had voted 
for B, about two-thirds of them will prefer B'. -Thus as a result 
of intra-party rivalry B' would be adopted instead of B.
The switch from B to B' is a change from a position which gains a 
little for a large group of people to a position which ensures a 
larger gain for a smaller group. A party with a well established 
organization of professional politicians in power might choose 
the B strategy whilst an extremist wing, trying to take control 
of the party, would favour policy B'. This type of intra-party 
revolution could result in those party members favouring policy 
B being forced out of the party; a scenario not dis-similar from 
events in the Labour Party in the early 1980's.
(15)Using a similar two dimensional diagram Tullock is able to 
show that in a three party system the parties will not all tend to 
cluster around the centre (as they would in a two party system) but 
will tend to move away from the middle making the policy differences 
between them greater than in the two party system. In a two 
party system with both parties trying to adopt a central position, 
the acquiring of information concerning voters' preferences is 
crucial as one party could be defeated even though it has adopted 
all but one of the policies of the opposing party. Generally the 
incumbent party is better able to gather information, for example, 
due to resources available in the Civil Services.
(16)Breton, like Downs, maintains that it is the actual institutional 
framework employed in a representative democracy that 'shields' 
politicians from knowledge of the preferences of citizens. This
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occurs due to three characteristics of the framework of democracy:
(i) democratic rules (i.e. voting rules);
(ii) the length of the election period;
(iii) the degree of full-line supply (i.e. how direct the voting
system is).
Breton questions the validity of the base hypotheses from which
Downs constructs his model. Breton argues that more and more media
time is allocated to informing the public about political news and
this is especially true in an election period when the cost of
acquiring a minimal amount of political information to the
individual is virtually zero. Breton is also dissatisfied with
the constraints Downs puts on the activities of political parties.
Whereas Riker and Tullock also considered the possibility of an
intra-party revolt as a constraint, Breton maintains that the
Downsian constraint of the competitive party system intuitively
does not seem very strong when general elections only take place
perhaps every four or five years. Breton therefore crucially
introduces public and non-private goods (non-private goods are
defined as goods which may not be available to everybody but have
the property that the amount available to one individual does not
(17)reduce that available to others by an equal amount) as a
constraint on the behaviour of politicians in a way that is 'very
similar to the constraint that a production function imposes on the
maximization of profits by entrepreneurs supplying private goods
(18)in competitive markets'. Breton's method of analysis combines
and develops much of the work of Buchanan and Tullock on the 
theory of decision rules and Downs' work on the theory of 
democracy,and introduces the theory of public goods into this
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framework and the role of bureaucracies in controlling and 
influencing the supply of public goods and policies.
( 1 9 )On the demand side, Breton defines ’the degree of coercion' 
as the difference between the 'amount' of public policies desired 
and the amount provided. The larger the difference the greater 
is the degree of coercion and, ceteris paribus, the greater is 
the likelihood that an individual will attempt to affect his own 
position by influencing politicians. It is as a result of 
government coercion and individuals' response to it that govern­
ments are informed of citizens' preferences and desires. The 
individual will only indulge in political participation if the 
coercion applied to him exceeds his personal 'coercion threshold'. 
The individual will then attempt to eliminate coercion by working 
for change in government expenditure policies and/or in fiscal 
policies. This process could result in political support for the 
Opposition, the formation of pressure groups, broader social 
movements, the private provision of non-private groups, migration, 
voting, etc.. Although Downs did implicitly appreciate the role 
of political lobbyists Breton examines their behaviour in some 
detail.
Using the example of the United States Medical Association, Breton 
argues that people join pressure groups not only because of 
government coercion but because the pressure groups' intrinsic 
need to survive necessitates their encouraging people to join. A 
pressure group will then support or oppose some policy if, for 
a majority of their members, government coercion exceeds their 
coercion threshold. Thus a pressure group will be more effective
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the more homogeneous its members are in their personal preferences.
Although each citizen's coercion threshold is determined by himself 
or herself the actions taken by an individual independently in 
order to reduce government coercion could affect others. For 
instance if an individual 'votes with his feet' in response to 
government coercion and thus leaves the area, the tax burden on 
everyone remaining will increase pushing those at the margin over 
their coercion threshold forcing them into political participation 
of some sort. There would also be different thresholds for 
different forms of participation. For instance the threshold above 
which an individual is moved to sign a petition or enter into some 
relatively passive form of participation would be considerably 
lower than the threshold above which an individual decides to 
join an active pressure group or move home.
Political participation involves various costs, of organization 
(i.e. costs of recruitment, bargaining and administration) and 
of communication (i.e. costs of propaganda and transport) and as 
these costs vary there will be a change in the kind of political 
instruments employed and of the intensity of their use.
The politician supplying government output will attempt to 
maximize his utility function:-
V  = up A , a m) (p = 1 , . . . P )
(m = 1,...M)
where p denotes a given politician
T: denotes the probability of re-election
am denotes variables associated with the politicians
personal ambitions, e.g. financial reward, kudos, etc.
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This function will be maximized subject to some level of T 
below which that variable cannot be allowed to fall. For 
example, the role of the opposition party in Britain is not 
straightforward because, except at election times, the 
competition between the incumbent party and the opposition is 
limited. In the absence of effective competition the 
governing party will not do everything it can to satisfy the 
preferences of citizens as weak competition implies a low 
probability of defeat. Technical constraints (in addition to 
the physical constraints imposed by the production technology 
governing the combination of factors of production) on the 
maximization of this utility function are the extent of 
government coercion pushing individuals into political 
participation. Breton outlines four activities the government 
can employ by which to limit the coercion it imposes on 
citizens:
(i) discriminatory policies which an be tailored to small 
groups;
(ii) discriminatorily enforced laws;
(iii) indulgence in implicit logrolling;
(iv) seeking to alter preferences of citizens.
3. Niskanen's Theory of Bureaucracy
With the introduction of the supply of public goods on the 
behaviour of politicians, Breton considers the theory of 
bureaucracies as an integral part of his theory of representative 
government. Breton's recognition of the importance of the 
bureaucrat and the bureaucratic structure of the governmental
49
system in the UK is a significant advance on previous works. 
Breton explicitly examines the conflict of interests between 
the politician (whose actions are already unlikely to reflect 
accurately the preferences of voters due to the numerous 
imperfections involved in any system of representative democracy) 
as the supplier of public policies, and the bureaucrat who will 
attempt to influence and shape the decisions made by the 
politicians in order to satisfy his own objectives.
When analysing the implications of government policy in the 
North Sea with regard to the economic efficiency of an industry 
it is important to be aware of the background in which that 
policy was formulated and implemented. It is therefore 
necessary to examine the economic theory of representative 
democracy in order to take account of the distortions and 
inconsistencies resulting out of the system of democratic 
government as they affect the politician in the government. It 
is also necessary to consider the economic theory of bureaucracy 
as the bureaucrat has a crucial relationship with the 
government and the politician and with industry.
The long standing relationship a government department would 
have with an industry could result in the development of a 
'special relationship' which the politician, because of the 
transient nature of the job, would not have. This can be
(22)simply illustrated by modifying an example used by Tullock.
A politician having to decide on a method of licence allocation 
for North Sea oilfields will be affected by the pressures and 
distortions imposed on him by the political process (such as
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from the majority rule, cycling, logrolling, pressure groups, 
etc) which will affect the policy adoption process and the policy 
implementation process. The politician then has to employ a 
government department for research, information and the 
execution of the policy; and thus the bureaucrat will approach 
the subject with a view to protecting or furthering his personal 
objectives and will attempt to influence the politician for 
that purpose.
The power of the government bureaucracy stems from the
characteristics of its relationship with its sponsor, in this
( 2 3 )  ( 2 4 )case the government. Work by Downs and Niskanen form
the basis of much of the work on the economic theory of
bureaucracies and Niskanen's model is used in this chapter as
the base point from which further contributions are introduced.
( 2 5 )Niskanen sees the relationship between the bureau and its 
sponsor as a bilateral monopoly. However, because there is 
generally a significant difference in the information available 
to the sponsor and to the bureau, the sponsor often cannot 
exploit its position as a monopsony due to lack of information. 
The sponsor is also not a profit seeking enterprise and officers 
within the sponsoring organization (i.e. politicians in the 
government) have many functions to perform and are therefore 
essentially only part-time overseers and supervisers of the 
bureau's activities. The bureaucrat on the other hand often has 
a stronger relative incentive to obtain information (and is able 
to work full time in doing so) and is able to obscure or withhold 
information from the sponsor if it is in the bureaucrat's
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interests, as he sees them, to do so. Niskanen combines these 
factors to derive the crucial assumption of a passive sponsor 
which knows the budget it is prepared to grant for a given 
quantity of services but does not have the incentive or the 
opportunity to obtain information on the minimum budget necessary 
to supply the services.
As with Downs' economic theory of democracy Niskanen makes 
assumptions as to the behaviour of the bureaucrat (i.e. a 
rational utilitarian) analogous to a profit-maximizing 
entrepreneur. A bureaucrat will attempt to maximize the size 
of his budget as a result of these behavioural assumptions. 
Although the personal efforts required to manage a bureau will 
be greater the larger the bureau is (or the larger the bureau's 
budget is), an increase in the budget will increase the effort 
required by a less than proportionate amount. The bureaucrat's 
instinct for survival will also lead him to maximize his budget 
as his personal work-load will lessen if he can provide 
increasing budgets for his subordinate bureaucrats to offer in 
salaries and contracts. Furthermore, the nature of the 
relationship between the sponsor and the bureau, in that the 
sponsor expects the bureau to expand and seek new programmes,often 
necessitates the bureau's seeking a larger budget.
In pursuit of this maximand (to maximize the budget) Breton 
lists some of the techniques the bureaucrat may employ:
(i) overestimating benefits and underestimating costs of 
projects (not only through natural project enthusiasm 
but as a conscious policy)
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(ii) favouring a rate of discount in estimating the present
value of benefits and costs which will make large projects 
appear more profitable than they really are;
(iii) supporting the introduction of elaborate machinery to 
deal with rising costs;
(iv) re-defining problems to keep them up to date;
(v) favouring the correction of 'wrong* policies rather than 
abolishing them;
(vi) supporting projects that require transfers in kind rather 
than money as the former have a higher labour employment 
per unit;
(vii) favouring economic planning.
The ultimate constraint on these activities and on the size of 
the bureau is that the total output of services that the sponsor 
expects the bureau to provide does not exceed a given budget. 
However the very nature of the output makes it difficult to 
quantify what precisely is expected. As the bureau exchanges 
its total service for a total budget the demand function facing 
a bureau is not a relation between price and quantity but between 
the marginal value of a service and the level of the service. 
Because the bureau is a monopoly, its marginal cost function 
is the marginal expenditure of the bureau at each level of 
service; it does not supply services at its marginal cost.
Thus Niskanen's model is based on two crucial assumptions - that
bureaucrats maximize the size of their budgets and that they
are monopolists who are able to impose their objectives on
( 2 7 )their sponsor. Using Niskanen's notation, the potential
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budget available to the bureau during a defined period is shown 
by the budget-ouput function:-
equation (1) B = aQ - bQ2 0 <: Q < —^
and the cost-output function is:-
equation (2) C = cQ + dQ2 0 Q
with the constraint
B ^ C
where, B denotes Budget 
C denotes Cost 
Q denotes Quantity 
The bureaucrat will attempt, to maximize the expected approved 
budget subject to B > C. Thus putting equation (1) equal to 
equation (2) will give the cost constrained output level:-
output leve1:-
aQ - bQ2 cQ + dQ2
aQ - cQ dQ2 + bQ2
Q (a - c) Q2 (d + b)
a - c Q2
d + b Q
i not constrained by B > C there
B - aQ - bQ2
0 = a - 2bQ
2bQ
Qs
- a 
_ a
2b
a - c
Q* = ______
d + b
The oversupply of bureaucratic output may be clearly seen 
diagrammatically in Figure 3. In a Pareto optimal position the 
bureaucrat would operate at output Qo where B 1 = C ’ . However,
54
FIGURE 3
THE EQUILIBRIUM OUTPUT OF A BUREAUCRACY
B' denotes the marginal benefit of the policy to the sponsor 
C* denotes the marginal cost of the policy to the sponsor 
F = E
oeqQ* = obfQ*
Source: D Mueller, 'Public Choice', (Cambridge; Cambridge
University Press, 1980), p.161
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the bureaucrat seeks to operate at Q* where area E equals area F 
and the bureau captures the equivalent of all the consumer 
surplus gains of output Qo. If the sponsor's 'demand' schedule 
is so far to the right, or inelastic, that the benefit of the 
bureau's output to the sponsor falls below zero before F = E 
the bureaucrat then operates at output Qs, where the sponsor is 
satiated and the constraint that total budget equals or is 
greater than total costs does not apply.
Thus in Figure 3 where the bureau is a competitive : purchaser
of factors and provides a single service at low levels of demand
(represented by the marginal valuation function, B 1) the
equilibrium output of the bureau will be in the budget constrained
(28)region where oeqQ* = obfQ*. Niskanen describes this bureau's
output, at Q* , as having no 'fat' as the total budget( d + b)
just covers the total costs. For the higher demand condition,
B's, the constraint B > C does not apply and the output of the 
bureau will only be constrained by demand. Thus output will be 
where the marginal value of the bureau's output (as perceived by 
the government, not the public) is zero, Qs = - . Here the 
total budget is larger than the minimum total costs of that 
output (i.e. the area of the triangle formed by the B's curve 
and the two axes is larger than the area of the polygon oeiQs).
At this upper equilibrium level of output, Qs, there is 'fat' in 
the bureau, it will have no incentive to be efficient and will 
attempt to expand its expenditure in order to exhaust its approved 
budget.
Niskanen extends this basic model of bureaucratic output dropping
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some of his assumptions. If a bureau is able to exercise factor 
price discrimination both the budget and the output will tend 
to be higher than with no factor price discrimination. However, 
the upper equilibrium output level constrained only by demand 
is the same with or without factor-price discrimination. This 
is due to the bureaucrat not exploiting the opportunity for 
factor price discrimination as it could not increase its budget 
by doing so and because the bureaucrat will not want to lose 
the support of those sponsors (government offices, politicians) 
who represent those factor interests. This is another area 
where pressure groups are important in influencing government 
output, here by applying pressure indirectly on the bureaucrat 
via the democratic voting process. Groups with a high relative 
demand for the output of a bureau and the owners of factors used 
in producing the output will capture the net benefits 
(equivalent to area E) and hence will be strong supporters of 
the bureau's higher than optimal output, Qo.
The most damaging criticism of Niskanen's model is based on
the fundamental assumption of the bureaucrat attempting to
maximize the size of his budget and being able to do so because
of his characteristics as a monopolist. The politician (as
the sponsor) is unlikely to be totally passive. Breton and
( 2 9 )Wintrobe drop the assumption of the bureaucrat being a 
simple monopolist. They s u g g e s t t h a t  the power of a bureau 
with respect to the sponsor is not a result of the bureau being 
a monopoly but is more greatly dependent on its ability to 
distort and conceal information from its sponsor and closely 
related to this, how technical and specialized that information
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is. Breton and Wintrobe's second suggestion is that individual
bureaucrats are not monopolists and in their consideration of their
career prospects they are aware of the sponsor's evaluation of
their performances. To an extent this conflicts with their
first suggestion in that the very nature of the bureau/sponsor
relationship makes it very difficult for the sponsor to assess
(31)the performance of the bureaucrat. Mueller backs up this 
criticism of Niskanen's bureaucratic maximand noting that 
objectives of the bureaucrat (for instance salary, power, prestige, 
etc.) are not all necessarily positively and monotonically 
related to the size of the budget.
Thus the bargaining power of a bureau stems from its ability to 
withhold information from the sponsor and also on the extent 
that the information is highly technical noting that the 
politician is likely to be a lay-person in that field. Breton and 
Wintrobe thus consider the outcome of the sponsor being able to 
exert some kind of control over the activities of the bureau.
In Figure 3 the politician desires output Qo at a budget cost of 
oegQo and the bureau desires output Q* with a budget of oeqQ*
(equal to obfQ*). The difference between the budget the 
bureau succeeds in obtaining and that desired by politicians is 
equivalent to the amount of consumer-surplus captured by the 
bureau (area F = area E) and this is Breton and Wintrobe's 
measure of 'control-loss 1 (defined as the cumulative 
discrepancy between the actions of subordinates and the desires 
of superiors). Breton and Wintrobe introduce the use of 
antidistortion devices which will, at some cost, reduce the 
amount of control-loss; thus the sponsor will employ the 
mechanism up to the point K (Figure 4), where the marginal cost
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of the device equals the marginal benefit. The area OHJ (Figure 
4) is equivalent, in monetary terms, to area E in Niskanen's 
diagram (Figure 3). At K, total control costs equal OLIK and 
the reduction in the budget (at output Q*, Figure 3) is OHIK.
Now the optimum budget for the politician/sponsor given the 
use of some control mechanism, is oegQo (Figure 3) plus 
the money equivalent of KIJ (Figure 4). Conversely, the 
optimum budget can be seen to be the budget cost of output Q* . 
on Niskanen's diagram minus the money equivalent of OHIK on 
Breton and Wintrobe's diagram (Figure 4).
If the cost of the antidistortion device is prohibitive, the 
marginal cost of employing the control mechanism is always 
greater than the marginal benefit from its use than the outcome 
is consistent with Niskanen's model and the bureau captures the 
consumer surplus. The potential effectiveness of control 
devices depends on the source of inefficiency within the bureau. 
To eliminate the oversupply of output the sponsor needs to 
acquire information about the bureau's actual cost curve. If 
the inefficiency results from X-inefficiency the sponsor must 
have the information about the bureau's cost curve, plus an 
estimate of the true minimum cost of supplying the service which 
is thus a more costly operation.
There seem to be observable inconsistencies between 'actual'
bureaucratic behaviour and the Niskanen model. It may be the
case that the bureaucrat can further his career by reducing the
size of his budget and such cases would tend to limit the
application of the Niskanen model to certain types of
(32)bureaucracies. Breton and Wintrobe maintain that more
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FIGURE 4
THE INTRODUCTION OF A CONTROL DEVICE
Costs and 
Benefits
Source: A Breton and R Wintrobe, 'Journal of Political
Economy', February 1975, p.200
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important is the tendency towards an automatic increase in 
government expenditure (and therefore the budget" size of 
government bureaucracies) resulting from progressive taxation, 
economic growth and inflation. Breton seems here to contradict 
himself. If the behaviour of bureaucrats is examined within 
the overall theory of representative democracies this automatic 
increase in government revenue and expenditure should make no 
difference as there would come a point where a political party 
could gain office by adopting a policy of reducing public 
expenditure. Assuming a majority of the electorate do not 
consider this point (Breton's coercion threshold) has been 
reached public expenditure and the size of bureaucracies will 
continue to increase - but not automatically.
4. A Model of-the Supply of Public Output
( 3 3 )Breton builds a model to determine the equilibrium supply 
of public output by combining both supply and demand conditions. 
On the demand side there is the democratic process and the 
effects of various voting methods and other distortions (costs 
of information, coercion thresholds, 'cycling' or the 'paradox 
of voting', logrolling, etc.) that may occur in this process 
which all contribute to affect policy formulation. On the 
supply side there are the constraints on the activities of 
politicians from political competition, intra-party rivalry, 
conflicts with bureaucrats and conflicts with the politician’s 
own self-interest objectives. Breton combines these factors to 
construct a theory of bureaucratic supply, but by introducing 
a non-passive sponsor who is likely to employ some control
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mechanism the bureaucrat's maximand is no longer simply to 
maximize the size of his budget but more broadly to maximize 
his wealth (which is not necessarily positively and monotonically 
related to the budget size). If the politician is in a 
'powerful' position the costs of political participation are 
low and more voters than are needed by the politician for 
election have made known their preference in his favour. Thus 
the output of public services will be determined by the influence 
and power the bureaucrat has over the politician and to what 
extent their personal objectives differ.
In Breton's diagram (Figure 5) as p* (the cost of political 
participation) falls and more citizens are coerced into political 
activity Np (representing the number of people who vote) will 
rise. As Np increases over Nr (the number of votes needed by 
the politician for election) the politician becomes more 
'powerful' in that he has a greater degree of freedom to adopt 
policies which may be contradictory to the desires of some 
sub-sets of his voting supporters as long as he satisfies a 
minimum of Nr. However, although the politician has the mandate 
of the voters to implement a certain policy, P, if P is not 
consistent with the policy, B, desired by the bureaucrat, 
bargaining will take place between the politician and the 
bureaucrat as to whether P or B or some compromise policy will 
be implemented.
For Np/Nr < I the politician in power does not know which policies 
to adopt in order to be elected as not a sufficient number of 
people are using the various instruments of political action.
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FIGURE 5
COSTS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
1 Np/Nr > 1
Source: A Breton, 'The Economic Theory of Representative
Government', (Chicago; Aldine, 1974), p.181
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Thus search activities will take place and the incumbent politician 
will probably be in possession of more information than the 
opposition candidate. The incumbent politician will attempt to 
lower the cost of political participation by lowering peoples 1 
coercion thresholds and by lowering p*, Np/nr will rise.
To locate an equilibrium output of a bureaucracy one would have 
to integrate fully Breton's wealth maximizing bureaucratic model 
into a theory which takes account of the demand for government 
output and the relationship between the politician and the 
bureaucrat. If, where Np/Nr > I, the politician's preferred 
policy, P, (assuming only one policy and not a complete package 
of policies) implies an output of public services of Qo on 
Niskanen's diagram (Figure 3), assuming cost contrained 
conditions. The bureaucrat would desire an alternative policy 
consistent with output at Q* (assuming the bureau is dealing 
with only one policy and that policy could be equated to a 
budget level) or would attempt to increase the output implied 
by policy P to Q*. With strong voter support the politician 
could attempt to employ control mechanisms so as to minimize 
control-loss. However, if the policy is not a government 
priority (the public backing for it is limited) and the technical 
information available to the bureau and not to the government 
is extensive, then the bargaining power of the bureaucrat vis-a-vis 
the politician would be considerable. The extent that the 
output of the bureau is more than Qo (and less than Q*) when 
the government employ control devices depends on their bargaining 
strengths and then (assuming the bureaucrat is in a strong position) 
on whether the bureaucrat prefers to take the excess budget in 
the form of larger output or in the form of higher costs on the
64
inframarginal units of output. This in turn will depend on the 
sources of the inefficiency and how effective the controls are 
in reducing the inefficiencies.
The degree to which control devices do work thus depends on the 
source of the bureau's inefficiency and the relative strengths 
of the bureaucrat's and politician's bargaining positions. The 
present government, with a large parliamentary majority and a 
high priority of reducing government expenditure has been seen 
to go to considerable lengths in attempting to reduce 
bureaucratic inefficiency within the public sector. The fact 
that governments do employ control instruments (i.e. they are 
perceived to be not too costly to justify their use) implies a 
further criticism of Niskanen's monopoly assumption.
In criticizing Niskanen's theory of bureaucracy, Breton and
(34)Wintrobe argue that competition between bureaucrats within 
an organization exists and is likely to prevent the oversupply 
of bureaucratic output. The nature of UK government bureaucracies 
is such that it is very difficult to measure both bureaucratic 
output and input. Within a bureaucracy efficiency and competence 
are likely to be judged according to the objectives of the 
bureaucracy as a whole. If the overall objective of the 
bureaucracy is for increases in budget size, then subordinate 
bureaucrats are likely to attempt to fulfil this objective. 
Moreover, it is not competition for jobs between bureaucrats 
that is a constraint on the maximization of budget size but 
competition between bureaucracies for the supply of policy 
that is likely to be the constraint.
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For the purposes of this thesis it is necessary to consider these 
factors above which affect policy formulation and implementation.. This 
involves both the Downsian type theory of democracy and Niskanen's 
theory of bureaucracy and their respective modifications and 
extensions. In analysing the performance of an industry in 
terms of economic efficiency using scenarios with differing 
assumptions as to the extent of government intervention, it is 
necessary to examine the process by which government intervention 
takes place and the effects of the numerous conflicts and 
imperfections which act to distort and confuse government action.
This process is of especial importance when examining government 
policies purporting to increase economic efficiency or to 
protect the ’national interest1. Casual observation should 
reveal that if in order to achieve the economically efficient 
allocation of resources the political party would have to under­
take a vote-losing action, that policy is unlikely to be 
implemented. Even if it is undertaken, by the time the policy 
is subjected to various pressures and influences within the 
democratic process it is likely that the final policy which is 
implemented will be significantly different from the one 
originally advocated. Thus it seems naive to assume that as soon 
as an individual moves from organized market activities to some
kind of government position he 'shifts his psychological and
(35)moral gears' and becomes an altruist.
When discussing specific government actions, in this case with 
respect to North Sea oil, a distinction has to be made between
8• I m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  N o r th  Sea O i l  P o l i c y
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two broad types of policy 'distortions'. Firstly, there is 
the distortion between an election promise and the implemented 
policy which results from 'internal' political influences. For 
example, a popular political policy is to control production 
rates in the North Sea. Although the ecomomic wisdom of such 
a move is open to considerable doubt successive governments 
have adopted this policy apparently because of its superficial 
attraction to voters. The experience of the present government 
has been that it has not felt it can always fulfil this 
election 'obligation' (although there have been some development 
delays, e.g. Clyde) because it would conflict with other 
priority government objectives. These 'internal' pressures 
would develop from various groups both within parliament and 
from outside. There are many groups who would like to see 
North Sea oil revenues used in a certain way (for instance, for 
job creation programmes, reducing the PSBR, investment in 
manufacturing industry, etc.) and in the case of this example 
all will be trying to influence the government not to reduce 
production levels and government revenue. Secondly, there 
arises the situation when the government, on attempting to 
implement a policy, meets a distortion effect from the 
government department through which the mechanics of the policy 
are worked out. It is in this area that the theory of bureaucracy 
can increase understanding of the governmental decision-making 
process (and is also relevant to the behaviour of the bureaucrat 
in a multinational oil company). If the policy diametrically 
opposes the interests of the bureaucrat, the bureaucrat will 
attempt to block its passage either before its adoption (by 
lobbying the government) or afterwards (by non co-operation).
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Alternatively, a policy could be 'used' by the bureaucrat in 
such a way that would satisfy the government and further the 
interests of the bureau. An example of this could be the 
government's desire for a regulatory agency to oversee oil 
industry activities in the North Sea being absorbed into the 
Department of Energy rather than by the establishment of a 
small, quasi-independent agency as proposed by Conservative 
Opposition Members in the BNOC debate (i.e. The United Kingdom
/ nr \
Oil Conservation Authority).
Thus, when discussing the economic performance of an industry, 
(albeit an industry characterized by many imperfections) and 
contemplating the effects of varying degrees of government 
intervention it is important to take account of the political 
process of policy formulation and implementation which itself 
is highly imperfect.
CHAPTER FOUR
LICENSING POLICY
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The following chapter attempts to examine the system of licence 
allocation adopted by the UK government in 1964. The decision to 
employ a discretionary system in preference to some kind of 
competitive auction has significant implications with regards the 
offshore oil industry and its relationship with the Government.
The rationale behind this decision is highlighted with the aid of 
the economic theories of politics and bureaucracies. In order to 
analyse the implications of the discretionary licensing system as 
it has worked in the UK, each licensing round is examined as are the 
stated government objectives and criteria concerning each licensing 
round. .
The first section of this chapter will concentrate on a comparison 
of the discretionary allocation system and the competitive auction 
system. The economic and political consequences of each system are 
considerable and they can be seen to have largely determined the 
pattern of development of North Sea oil. The second and third 
sections of the chapter concentrate on the terms and conditions of 
each licence round. The size and timing of the licence rounds and 
the objectives of the various groups involved, either directly or 
indirectly, in the licensing process are examined and explained. To 
an extent these sections of the chapter augment Chapter Two in that 
the early licensing rounds trace the development of the offshore oil 
industry. Government statements concerning licensing policy and 
the conditions imposed in the licensing system were the main 
indicators of Government policy on North Sea oil throughout the 1960’s. 
However, although the consequences of the discretionary licensing
1. In t r o d u c t io n
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system influence most other aspects of North Sea oil policy in that 
the precedent of Civil Service control is set, the consequences of 
the discretionary system are most relevant to Chapter Seven on 
taxation policy.
The concluding section briefly compares different types of auctioning 
systems and attempts to sum the effects of the UK licensing system 
on the exploitation of North Sea oil.
2. Auction and Discretionary Allocation Systems
In a competitive auction each bidder gains by giving up more expected 
economic rent to the point where all the expected economic rent has 
been captured by the government. Although the extent of the economic 
rent cannot be known in advance, provided the bidding is truly 
competitive, the auction system will extract the expected rent. For 
the purposes of this analysis, economic rent is defined as the excess 
of the value of the resources above all relevant costs (including 
risk). The realised rent may be more or less than the expected rent 
but the possibility of either supernormal profits or a loss should tend 
to cancel each other out. Over time as bidders acquire information 
and expertise the difference between expected and realised economic 
rent would tend to diminish. Thus the auction system of allocating 
licences, by employing the price mechanism, enables the government to 
capture the maximum economic rent as well as ensuring economic 
efficiency in that the successful bidder will be the lowest cost 
bidder!*7
In a discretionary allocation system licences are awarded on the basis
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of a set of criteria established by the government. These criteria 
may include political or bureaucratic considerations and may be 
discriminatorily enforced. The reasons why, in 1964, the Conservative 
Government chose to adopt a discretionary system in preference to 
an auction system, in spite of the latter*s economic advantages, 
may be explained at least partly by the economic theories of politics 
and bureaucracies.
In 1964, prior to any indications as to the extent of oil reserves on 
the UKCS, the government's overwhelming priority with respect to the 
exploitation of North Sea resources, was for speed. The reasons for 
this objective are explained in Chapter Two. However, the method by 
which it was facilitated was by establishing an environment in which 
oil companies would be encouraged to commit vast resources to an 
unproved area. The discretionary system, by not extracting the rent 
from the oil companies, allowed the companies to operate in relatively 
favourable conditions. It is therefore not surprising that the oil 
companies favoured the discretionary system as it amounted to a tacit
(2)subsidy from the government in return for a rapid exploitation policy.
A further political ambition which was an important consideration to 
the government because of its vote-maximizing potential was that of 
nationalism. As will be explained in this chapter, the government 
was keen to be publicly seen to discriminate in favour of UK oil 
companies and industry. Whereas the competitive auction system would 
grant a licence to the lowest cost producer, the discretionary system 
could be employed as a vote-capturing policy illustrating the 
government's concern for a 'national' resource and for domestic 
industry.
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P.pblic perception of government activities is an important policy 
determinant (see Chapter Three). The discretionary regime could be 
used to create the impression of the government being in control of 
the activites of multi-national oil companies and protecting the 
’national interest'. In a discretionary system the government 
could impose conditions in order to maximize political support. A 
related point is that the discretionary system created the perception 
of the government aiding smaller independent oil companies who would 
have been out-bid in a competitive auction. The preceding argument 
seems to understate companies' abilities to obtain finance from the 
money markets or to enter joint venture projects. If large oil 
companies have greater funds for bidding they similarly would have 
greater funds for exploration and development; exploration would not 
be affected
Because of the nature of the UK system of democratic government (see
Chapter Three), government bureaucrats have considerable power within
the policy process. Government bureaucrats would have been strongly
in favour of a discretionary allocation system for various behavioural
reasons highlighted in Chapter Three. The administrative responsibility
of the discretionary system is the concern of government bureaucrats.
A discretionary system necessitates considerable work in appraising
licence applications on behalf of the administrators of the system.
The acquisition of information and knowledge is of crucial importance
(4)to the government bureaucrat and it has been contended that in an 
auction system the lack of information would inhibit the proper 
functioning of the system. In an auction system the leasing agency 
would need a certain amount of information (e.g. to determine the 
size and timing of auctions) but competition between bidding companies
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would ensure government capture of the economic rent; information 
to the auctioning agency is not crucial. For the government 
bureaucrat to allocate licences according to various political 
criteria, the bureaucrat would need considerable information.
Licence applicants are invited to submit work programmes and for 
these programmes (designed to indicate the prospective licensee's 
competence) to be analysed, the bureaucrat must possess highly 
specialised knowledge. With information on the offshore oil industry, 
which is crucial in order to implement the discretionary system, the 
bureaucrat fulfils important objectives. Technical knowledge enables 
the government bureaucrat to influence politicians and political 
parties because of the dependence of the politician on the bureaucrat 
for advice and guidance in a highly specialized area. Implementation 
of licensing policy requires considerable work, specialists have to
( 5 )be attracted into the Department of Energy thus increasing the
budget and influence of the department. Through the discretionary
system the government bureaucrat retains considerable administrative 
(6)power which, because of his superior knowledge relative to the 
politician, may be employed to further his own interests.
Over time, as the system becomes more familiar to both the government 
bureaucrat and the oil companies, expertise and knowledge of the 
system is accumulated. Bureaucrats in the government and in oil 
companies would be strongly opposed to changing the system because 
of the threat to their positions and influence acquired over time. 
Politicians similarly are unlikely to change the system because of 
the implicit admission of adopting a 'wrong' policy in the first 
place.
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The administrative powers bestowed on the Department of Energy by 
the discretionary system also enabled the government to establish 
a framework of control. The oil companies were answerable to the 
government in that if their performance was inconsistent with 
government attitudes and preferences the companies could lose the 
opportunity of a licence award in the next round. The oil 
companies had to prove their worthiness according to the criteria 
of politicians and Civil Servants.
Thus because the discretionary system transfers economic rent to
the licenseee, the government 'will attempt to 'buy' something for 
(7)the economic rent' such as requiring a rapid rate of exploration
(as compared to the rate determined by the market), requiring
reserves to be sold to the government at a lower than market price
(8)(i.e. natural gas and the Gas Council) or by increasing taxation. 
Each of these methods has been used by the UK government in the 
North Sea. In the Eighth Licensing round, the Department of Energy 
considered the efforts of oil companies in involving UK organisations 
in research and development of offshore technology. Thus the 
government was also attempting to 'buy' research and development 
spending for the UK.
3. The First Four Licensing Rounds
The first Licensing Round in 1964 allocated 53 licences covering
348 blocks, out of an offer of 960, to 23 licensees (see Table I).
The UK participation in the acreage was 30% including 3% to the
(9)public sector (the Gas Council). The five criteria announced by the 
Conservative Minister of Power were basically designed to promote the
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rapid exploration and exploitation of any North Sea resources.
Although this could not be done without the involvement of foreign,
mainly US, oil companies, the two principal domestic oil interests,
BP and Shell, were favoured in the distribution of the blocks. The
first criterion was a general statement of intent 'to encourage the
most rapid and thorough exploration and economical exploitation of
petroleum resources on the continental shelf' The second
criterion, 'that the applicant for a licence shall be incorporated
in the UK and the profits of the operations shall be taxed here', had
the specific purpose of enabling the full taxation of profits. The
third criterion, 'where the applicant is a foreign owned concern,
how far British oil companies receive equitable treatment in that
country' may have excluded a few foreign firms but was probably more
concerned with protecting British oil interests abroad in countries
which had companies operating in the North Sea. The fourth criterion,
'we shall look at the programme of work of the applicant and also at
the ability and resources to implement it', had the specific objective
of precluding speculation in the selling of licences by excluding those
who did not have the financial and technical ability to carry out an
( 11 )active programme of exploration and drilling. When combined with
the first criterion this gives rise to an implicit form of competitive
bidding, (thought not in the form of cash). The fifth criterion,
'the contribution the applicant has already made and is making towards
the development of resources of our continental shelf and the fuel
economy generally', was the criterion that most favoured established
domestic oil companies as any British company could make some sort of
case for itself as having made a contribution to the 'fuel economy
( 1 2 )generally'. Kenneth Dam notes that the 30% of the blocks that 
were awarded to British interests included a more than proportional
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The criteria are open to wide interpretation by those administering 
the licensing round. This increases the administrative power of the 
government bureaucrat as the conditions of licences may be interpreted 
to coincide with bureaucratic objectives. Coercion may be applied 
by the government bureaucracy in order to achieve its objectives. 
Because of the considerable amount of information the bureaucracy 
would need to collect in order to interpret and assess 'the programme 
of work of the applicant and also ... the ability and resources' that 
are available to the oil company, the bureaucracy could in the longer 
term attempt to steer government policy. That these criteria are 
vague and open to considerable interpretation similarly coincides 
with political objectives of the various ministers. Policies may 
be altered or added to at later stages without contradicting earlier 
publicly stated intentions. Furthermore, the greater the discretionary 
powers bestowed on departmental ministers the greater is their 
personal influence and prestige. Vague and flexible policy intentions 
allow ministers to respond to political change whilst at the same time 
fulfilling the need for a policy issue to be publicly known.
During the mid-1960's North Sea oil policy was not the crucial 
political issue it subsequently became in the 1970's. Nevertheless, 
cert^an political and bureaucratic requirements were fulfilled 
through the policy process. Political and bureaucratic objectives 
can be seen to have been protected by government licensing policy.
The domestic oil industry, as a political pressure group, can also 
be seen to have protected its interests (i.e. the fifth criterion).
The Treasury and Inland Revenue's interests are catered for in the
sh a re  o f  the  most sou gh t  a f t e r  b l o c k s .
second criterion, although this would be a normal procedure. To an 
extent the Foreign Office would be involved in the activities of 
domestic oil companies with overseas interests. Thus it is clear 
that at this very early stage in the development of North Sea 
operations the major interested parties were careful to protect their 
interests for the future. With respect to government bureaucrats the 
allocation of North Sea licences was an end in itself. Whether or 
not resources would be discovered government bureaucracies would 
still be required to gather information, advise politicians, negotiate 
with oil companies and administer policy. These activities would 
fulfil Niskanen-type bureaucratic objectives of maximizing budget 
size and influence by employing some of the tactics outlined in Chapter 
Three.
Information as to voter preferences concerning a policy issue is 
crucial to the politician or political party faced with various policy 
options. In a two party government system if neither party is con­
fident in gauging voter preferences there will be a tendency towards 
consensus. Because of the dangers of losing votes to the opposing 
party each party attempts to minimize this risk by formulating a 
policy which is closely aligned to the other party's policy (see 
Chapter Three). Licensing policy in the 1960's was not a major 
political issue, the tradition of government involvement in the 
economy had been firmly established in the UK since the war and with 
the exception of the US,all oil producing states employed some sort 
of discretionary licensing system. The cost to the individual voter 
to become informed on the licensing issue was prohibitive relative 
to the gains the voter would receive by acquiring information. The 
government, although unclear as to voter preferences, was not prepared
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to incur the costs of informing voters (i.e. pushing voters across 
their ’coercion threshold' - see Chapter Three) because North Sea 
oil was a low policy priority in terms of vote capturing potential. 
Thus the Labour Government, in announcing the Second Licensing 
Round in 1965, did not fundamentally change the terms of the 
licences but, in differentiating their policy, did add two new 
criteria.
Firstly, the government would now consider the contribution applicants 
had made to the UK balance of payments. Secondly, and more 
significantly, the government intended to facilitate participation 
by public enterprises.in the development and exploitation of the 
resources of the.UKCS. This referred to the National Coal Board 
and the Gas Council. It is difficult to ascertain the weighting 
given to each licensing condition and this secrecy protects 
government bureaucracies from criticism and from public accountability 
However, in the Second Licensing Round in which 1102 blocks were 
offered and 37 licences granted covering 127 blocks, the public 
sector share rose from 3% to 6% (not including options and assignments 
- see Table I). The NCB could only engage in offshore activities 
following the NCB (Additional Powers) Act of 1966 after which it was 
able to take up offers from Conoco, Gulf and Allied Chemical (who 
had been keen to acquire some public sector connections following the 
government's declared intentions of expanding public sector 
participation). The NCB was thus able to buy a 50% interest in all 
Concoco's licences, 40% in some of Gulf's and a carried interest in 
the Allied Chemical licence. The Gas Council increased its 
participation interests from 31% to 50% in the group made up of Amoco, 
Amerada and Texas Eastern. Thus total British interest was 37% of
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the total area, from 30% after the First Round.
The major change in licensing policy was the greater emphasis on 
state participation in offshore activities. With respect to future 
licences granted in the Irish Sea it would be obligatory for 
applicants to provide for participation by the Gas Council or the 
NCB through direct partnerships, options or other acceptable arrange­
ments. It was hoped that this would give the Gas Council more 
experience as operators so it would have greater technical knowledge, 
greater control over gas supplies and would be able to keep abreast 
of the latest developments enabling it to be more active on the UKCS. 
The rationale behind this decision was that in future licensing 
rounds added preference would be given to groups involving the Gas 
Council, the NCB and other British interests. This, to an extent, 
foreshadowed what the Labour Party intended to do in future rounds.
In effect, the Gas Council and the NCB were given an option to take 
a share in licences after they had been granted. The Labour 
Government’s actions after the Second Round are an important indication 
of their overall attitude to the North Sea. Two important political 
objectives were fulfilled by the Labour Government in the Second 
Licensing Round. Firstly, although the terms of the licences remained 
basically very similar to those of the previous Conservative 
Government, the two new conditions were intended to show the electorate 
that Labour's policy was different from its predecessors. This 
objective was achieved by the second new criterion (referring to state 
participation) which had the effect of introducing a traditionally 
socialist objective into offshore oil policy. The second political 
objective achieved by the Labour Government is related to, but distinct 
from, the first objective. By introducing the participation criterion
(13)
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the Labour Government was pre-empting criticism from within the 
Labour Party as to the socialist nature of licensing policy.
In the Third Licensing Round in June 1970, 37 licences were granted 
covering 106 blocks out of 157 offered. Although the total UK 
participation had remained about the same at 36% (from 37% in the
(14)Second Round) the public sector share was now 13%. Thus a 
significant trend had been established in the first three rounds of 
maintaining the UK share in licences and increasing the public sector 
share. The Third Round, instigated by the 1969 Labour Government, 
again increased the emphasis given to public- sector participation.
The Labour Party's emphasis on participation can partly be explained 
by intra-party rivalry. A recommendation in 1967 (by the Labour 
Party National Executive Committee) suggested the formation of a 
National Hydrocarbons Corporation to control production of oil and 
gas in unlicensed offshore blocks. The actual policy outcome was a 
decision to allocate licences to a newly created Hydrocarbons 
subsidiary of the Gas Council. This illustrates political bargaining 
within the Labour Party and concessions made to the left wing of the 
Party. There was also a degree of implicit competitive bidding in 
the Labour Government's licensing policy. Because licence 
applicants for Irish Sea acreage would only be considered if provision 
was made for participation by either the Gas Council or the NCB 
private groups could be expected to offer these nationalized industries 
very favourable terms in order to secure a licence.
Subsequent to the Second Licensing Round the Labour Government 
instituted a review of licensing policy in order to consider the various
(15)methods of licensing available. Although the final policy outcome
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was similar to previous licensing (except with added emphasis on 
participation by nationalized industries) the policy review did fulfil 
certain bureaucratic objectives. The updating and appraisal of policy 
is a desirable activity in itself with respect to government 
bureaucracies. Information is acquired and, as the workload increases, 
budget size also tends to increase. The government bureaucrat, due 
to the imbalance of information, is able to influence the politician 
with respect to the size and timing of licensing rounds. By employing 
a discretionary policy arbitrary powers of ministers and senior Civil 
Servants may result in decisions, being taken on political or bureau­
cratic criteria which are detrimental to the offshore industry. In 
the mid-1960's there was a five year period between the Second and 
Third Licensing Rounds. This may partly be explained by the desire 
to acquire geological knowledge of the UKCS and the political desire 
to encourage the domestic offshore supplies industry. A further 
factor is bureaucratic control. Licensing rounds at regular intervals 
and of predetermined size could reduce uncertainty with respect to 
oil company planning. However, this would detract from the government 
bureaucracy's position as the overseer and protector of offshore oil 
and gas reserves on behalf of the government and of the country. The 
government bureaucracy's interest may be satisfied by the public 
perception of the bureaucracy being solely able to control policy 
implementation. Furthermore, politicians would consider the size and 
timing of licensing rounds in a political vote-maximizing context.
The first two rounds in consecutive years resulted in 90 licences 
being issued. This was a sizeable licence issue and largely accounted 
for the delay between the Second and Third Rounds. During the 1960's 
licencing policy was used by politicians in order to implement their 
overall rapid exploitation policy and as in the late 1970's when
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licensing policy was used to slow down development (relative to 
the market determined rate) these are policy decisions based on 
political rather than economic judgement.
Following the awards of licences in the Third Licensing Round the 
government perceived a change in factors affecting North Sea oil 
policy. Oil had been discovered by Shell, Phillips and BP in areas 
leased in the second and third rounds. These finds required further 
appraisal work in order to determine the extent of reserves. The 
Ekofisk oil field on the Norwegian Continental Shelf was discovered 
in November 1969 and by mid-1970 evidence 'suggested the presence
/  -j r \
of a significant oil producing basin'. A further factor was
the Libyan Government's success in increasing its take from oil 
company concessionaires in September 1970. At the same time there 
was concern at the slowdown in drilling activity in the UK sector and 
acreage surrendered as a result of the first and second licensing 
rounds could now be offered again. These factors encouraged the 
government to institute a Fourth Licensing Round in 1971 and the main 
policy criteria were, as in previous rounds, speed of exploration
(17)and development and ensuring the representation of domestic interests.
The government decided to continue to use the discretionary method of
allocating licences. This decision was taken largely on the basis of
the past, perceived success using the discretionary method in terms
of the speed of development and the increasing British interests that
had come about in both the public and private sectors. The government
(18)believed that because they wanted to give added impetus to North 
Sea activity an auction would not have been satisfactory as one third 
of the area in the Fourth Round was unexplored and the less attractive
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acreage would be neglected. It was also felt that because so many 
conditions and provisos would have to be integrated into the 
auction it would be unlikely to determine the market value of the 
t e r r i t o r y M o r e  recently, it has been s u g g e s t e d t h a t  the 
drawbacks of changing systems 'mid-stream' and wasting cumulative 
experience of past discovery regulatory procedure would be 
detrimental to the government and the industry. Also US companies 
would have had a distinct advantage because of their experience of 
competitive tenders. A further factor affecting the government's 
decision to continue with the discretionary licensing system was 
that it was felt that the benefits from the rapid development of 
the UKCS and the reduction of UK dependence on foreign oil
( 2 1 )outweighed the likely immediate financial benefits of an auction.
In terms of the economic theories of bureaucracies, however, a
significant reason for not changing to an auction method of licence
(22)allocation would have been opposition from government departments.
The Civil Service's desire for control and ability to 'steer' 
government policy would make it unlikely that such a policy change 
would occur. Nevertheless, the Fourth Round included an auction 
experiment. This was designed to acquire experience of the 
functioning of an auction and the acreage chosen was intentionally 
a range of attractive and less attractive areas. Information on the 
workings of an auction would have been desirable for the 
government bureaucracy in order that it could maintain flexibility 
and knowledge of policy alternatives. Because of official opposition 
to a complete change of policy to a competitive auction system it 
was unlikely that, however successful the experimental auction had 
been, it would have replaced the discretionary system.
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(i) the Southern Basin of the North Sea;
(ii) the Northern Basin of the North Sea; a few exploratory wells 
had been drilled and there was some optimism as to the 
possibility of finding oil;
(iii) the Western Approaches to the Celtic Sea;
(iv) the area to the west of the Orkneys and Shetlands.
Both areas (iii) and (iv) were largely untested. Under the
discretionary system four hundred and twenty-one blocks were offered
and 267 were licensed; with British participation of 44%. In
addition, under the experimental auction system, 15 blocks were
offered, all of which were licensed; with a British participation of
22%. Total British participation had thus increased to 43% of the
total area. The auction was a financial success raising a total of
£37m. Of the 15 blocks auctioned, 9 blocks fetched less than Elm,
5 fetched £51,000 or less and the lowest successful bid was £3,200.
The highest bid was made by Shell/Esso who paid £2Ira for a ’golden'
block. That this bid by Shell/Esso was £13m higher than the next
(23)bid reflected the lack of geological knowledge at the time.
A significant consequence of the auction experiment was that 
because the discretionary method failed to capture the economic 
rent for the government some system of recouping the rent had to 
be devised. Government attention turned to this issue. The 
development of a North Sea taxation system designed to collect the 
rent from oil is examined in Chapter Seven.
In  th e  F o u rth  L i c e n s in g  Round b lo c k s  w ere  o f f e r e d  in  f o u r  a r e a s :
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The Fifth Licensing Round was announced in August 1976, five
years after the announcement of the Fourth Round. This delay was.
largely a result of the considerable changes that had occurred
both in the domestic oil market and in the world oil market.
These changes, i.e. the oil price increases of 1973-4, perceptions
of shortage, increasing discoveries on the UKCS, combined to
politicize North Sea oil. In order to maximize the vote-capturing
potential of North Sea oil political parties were concerned with
developing major oil policies (see Chapter Three). The Labour
Government outlined its policy intentions with respect to North Sea
(24)oil in a White Paper in 1974. The White Paper announced an
important new policy consideration which significantly altered the
criteria by which licences were granted. It was intended that in
future licences 'the licences shall, if the Government so require,
grant majority participation to the State in all fields discovered
(25)under those licences'. As discussed in Chapter Five, the original 
intentions of the government for participation to be based on some 
sort of 'carried interest' system were unacceptable to the oil 
companies. The 'carried interest' system enables the state to 
'carry-over' its interests in a field during the exploration stages 
of an oilfield project. If the field is then considered commercially 
viable the government can exercise its option to participate. The 
percentage of the costs paid by the government can vary greatly 
between fields depending on individual participation agreements.
The government is therefore 'carried through' the high risk stage 
and does not commit capital to ventures which turn out to be 
non-commercial. This initial policy objective was more likely to
4 . The Second Four  L i c e n s i n g  Rounds
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be a negotiating tactic by the government to be used as a base 
from which bargaining would take place.
The 1974 White Paper also announced the Government's intention to
establish a state oil company (BNOC) 'through which the Government
(2 6)will exercise their participation rights'. The establishment
of BNOC was the crucial element in the Labour Government's oil 
policy. Ideologically it fulfilled a traditional Labour objective 
for state intervention in key industries and it clearly 
differentiated Labour oil policy from Conservative policies. BNOC, 
under the stewardship of Lord Kearton, was responsible for the 
participation negotiations with oil companies operating in the North 
Sea and had the backing of the Department of Energy, keen to expand 
its control and the Government, keen for a discernible policy to 
be implemented. The Government's bargaining position was 
strengthened by popular support for the policy. Frustration on 
behalf of voters faced with higher oil prices and the perception of 
'windfall' profits accruing to multi-national oil companies enabled 
the Government to take political action.
Although the Government was in a relatively strong bargaining
position it was nevertheless heavily dependent on the oil companies
(even with BNOC in existence) for the exploitation of UK North Sea
resources. By applying too much pressure on the oil companies to
reach participation agreements with BNOC the Government was risking
the oil companies' departure from the North Sea. Whilst these
negotiations were taking place there was concern over activity in
(27)the UK North Sea slowing down. Between 1974 and 1976 few new 
production projects were announced and platform construction
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facilities in Scotland were facing shut-down because of the dearth 
of new orders. Thus there were constraints on the Government’s 
ability to force oil companies into participation agreements and 
this difficulty largely accounted for the lengthy participation - 
negotiations (some of which were still continuing in 1979 and 
1980). The protracted participation negotiations largely
esq)lain the delay in the announcement of the Fifth Licensing Round. 
Many large oil companies had not reached satisfactory agreements 
and the Government could not afford to prohibit them from further 
licence awards? at the same time the Government did want to make 
it clear that they were determined to finalise suitable participation 
agreements. Perhaps the most serious confrontation between the 
Government and the oil companies was with Amoco whose refusal to 
enter a 'voluntary' participation agreement resulted in their being 
totally excluded from the Fifth Round allocation of licences.
The Fifth Licensing Round, when eventually announced, was of
relatively small size. In 1972, 282 blocks were awarded whereas in
1976 only 71 blocks were offered and licences issued for 44 blocks
(see Table I). A further factor announced by the Government
concerning the size and frequency of licensing rounds was that
because of the 'violent fluctuations in work-load for the offshore 
(28)supply industry' following the Fourth Licensing Round the
future licensing rounds would be more frequent, regular and smaller 
than they had been previously.
The crucial change in the conditions attached to licence awards in 
the Fifth Round was that BNOC (or BGC) received a 51% majority 
interest in all blocks. The results of the Fifth.Round were
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announced in February 1977 and BNOC was the operator on 4 blocks.
The Labour Government changed some of the terms of licences,
again with the objective of differentiating Labour's oil policies
and justifying the establishment of BNOC. Labour Ministers were -
critical of past Conservative licensing policies; as Mr Varley
said, "A licence may last for forty-six years. Exploration
programmes are required for the first six years. A licensee then
surrenders half the territory - he chooses which half - but on the
area he keeps he need do no more exploration for the remaining
forty years" However, Mr Varley's statement seems to ignore the
market signals that the licensee will be continually receiving.
If the licensee considers that the expected price of oil will be
such as to justify further exploration, development and production,
then it is unlikely that an area will be neglected for forty years.
The new surrender provision seems to have been designed to encourage
licensees to discover as quickly as possible the most promising
(31)areas of the licence area. Under the Fifth Round, the initial
licence period is for four years with an option for the whole area
of a further three years and for up to one third on the area for
thirty years. Rental payments were also increased for the Fifth
Round and the basis from which royalty calculations were made was
changed. From the Fifth Round the 12^% royalty was levied on the
tax value of the crude oil rather than on the (lower) wellhead
value as in previous rounds which had allowed a deduction for the
(32)costs of conveying and treating petroleum.
Thus the Fifth Licensing Round clearly shows how aspects of the 
economics of politics have affected the development of licensing 
policy and participation. The bargaining process between the
(29)
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Government and the oil companies illustrates how a changing 
political environment may alter the Government1 stability to implement 
a policy. With respect to participation, altered political 
considerations were an important factor in the development of the. 
policy - before the bargaining process determined its final form. 
Popular support for government action, because of the growing 
importance of energy issues and the extensive coverage in the media, 
strengthened the Government's position in participation negotiations 
and the original decision to adopt a discretionary licensing system 
enabled the Government to incorporate the new conditions of licences 
into the system.
In the Sixth Licensing Round announced in August 1978, oil companies 
wishing to apply for licences would be given the 'opportunity' to 
offer BNOC more than 51% equity in their blocks. Also companies 
could 'offer' to carry BNOC for all or part of its exploration and 
appraisal costs. Thus any operator expecting to receive additional 
UKCS acreage from the government would have to give BNOC more than 
51% equity and reduced exploration costs. The discretionary licence 
system also allowed the Department of Energy to grant BNOC licences 
outside the licensing rounds, again illustrating the Government's 
determination to support BNOC and the Department of Energy's 
willingness to implement policies under circumstances when its 
influence and power would be expanded.
Further conditions introduced in the Sixth Round were to consider
the efforts of applicants in improving training in offshore work
(33)with the aim of giving more skilled jobs to UK citizens. The 
Government attempted to aid small companies in the North Sea by
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stating that the operator for a licence at the exploration stage
would not necessarily be the same as the operator at the
development stage. This would make it possible for small
companies without the financial resources to undertake development,
to play a more important part in exploration and then farm-out
(34)their interests. Increased regulation of licence issue increases
the power of bureaucrats in the Department of Energy and at the 
same time coincides with the overall political ideals of the Labour 
Party then in Government. Policies tending to be nationalistic 
or understating economic efficiency (and the ability of small 
companies to raise capital on the financial markets) were politically 
popular and received support from government bureaucrats.
With the Sixth Licensing Round, as with other aspects of domestic 
oil policy, the Government significantly tightened its control of 
North Sea activities. Oil companies implicitly had to compete 
for blocks by giving BNOC equity interests of more than 51%, by 
giving BNOC options to purchase or sell oil and by 'carrying' BNOC's 
interest.^
For the first time there were applications for all blocks available
but Exxon made no applications at all and Shell, Chevron and Conoco
all restricted their bids, presumably to make clear their
disapproval of UK offshore oil policy. The Department of
Energy's attitude seemed to be that as long as companies continued
to apply for licences it would be possible to tighten up the terms
yet further. However, Civil Servants in the Department of Energy
were conscious of pressure from UKOOA who were stressing the need
(37)for a milder tax and regulatory system. Expectations in the
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offshore industry of a relaxation of Government control were resting 
on a sympathetic Conservative Government entering office in 1979.
The proposals for a Seventh Licensing Round were announced in 
December 1979 and the Conservative Government formally invited 
licence applications in May 1980. The Conservative Government 
achieved electoral success at least partly becuase of its non­
interventionist policy proposals. In the Seventh Round the 
Government was keen to apply this overall policy to North Sea 
licensing. BNOC and BGC were to have the same opportunities to apply
for licences as the private sector companies, but they would not have
(38)a mandatory majority interest in future licences. A further
significant change in the Seventh Licensing Round was that in an area
defined by the Government, companies were able to apply for blocks
of their own selection. Successful applicants for these areas were
required to make an initial payment of £5m. The Government again
changed the terms of licence surrender so that at the end of six
years the licensee could retain half of the area originally licensed.
Although BNOC no longer received a 51% equity share in licences,
awards were still conditional on prospective licensees agreeing to
give BNOC the option to take 'up to 51% of each co-licensee's share
(39)of any petroleum produced from the licensed area' at the market
price.
In response to the Seventh Round, 125 applications for licences were 
received, which was the largest number received by the Government 
since licensing began in 1964 Forty-two blocks were awarded in
company-selected areas and another 48 in other areas, thus raising 
an initial payment of £210m in total.
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The Eighth Round announced in September 1982 was intended to boost
activity in the North Sea. It was received by afi oil industry
highly critical of the offshore tax system. Immediate reactions
in the industry were concerned with the likely impact on future .
activity in the North Sea of any continuation of the existing tax
(41)system. Thus the Eighth Round afforded oil companies an
opportunity to lobby the Government and to influence public opinion 
concerning their dissatisfaction with the offshore tax regime. The 
bargaining process between government and industry continued and 
licensing rounds are an important means by which this process can 
take place.
A feature of the Eighth Round was the offer of 15 blocks for 
auction. Of the remaining 169 blocks, 131t<J&re in 'frontier' areas 
and 35 in the Southern Gas Basin. The blocks . • auctioned^&re in
mature oil areas of the central North Sea; thus the Government 
expectsia good response in terms of revenue raised for the Treasury 
preparing an election-year budget. The decision to auction a 
selected number of blocks may thus have been based on short-term 
considerations with the Treasury, a bureaucracy with its own 
objectives.
In the Fifth Round the Labour Government announced its intentions 
for regular licensing rounds in both timing and size. The Seventh 
Round signified the end of this policy with respect to the regular 
size of rounds. It is evident that the licensing rounds are 
sensitive to political change which affects the objectives, 
priorities and rationale of the discretionary allocation of licences. 
Thus uncertainties accrue from the governmental system in the
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discretionary system which are in addition to the inherent 
uncertainties in the oil industry.
The results of the Eighth Round were announced in May 1983, although 
the outcome of the auction part of the Licensing Round had been 
made known earlier. In the Eighth Round the Government auctioned 7 
blocks out of the 15 on offer, raising over £32m (thus providing 
useful short-term revenue for the Treasury). In addition, licences 
were awarded by the discretionary system for 63 blocks out of 169 
on offer. Thus a total of 70 blocks had been awarded in the Eighth 
Round, which was below the government's aim for between 80 and 85 
blocks to be allocated.
5. The Auction Decision
The preceding analysis illustrates the extent to which the government 
may attempt to use licensing policy in order to control the offshore 
industry. The decision to adopt, in 1964, a discretionary licence 
allocation system conferred considerable administrative powers on 
government bureaucrats. Uncertainty with respect to the size and 
timing of licensing rounds can be partly explained by successive 
governments1 willingness to use the licensing system to regulate 
the exploitation of North Sea oil. Licensing is seen as an integral 
part of governments' overall North Sea policy objectives. The rapid 
exploitation policy of the 1960's was encouraged by the licensing 
system which transferred the prospective economic rent to the 
licensees.
In the 1970's the politicization of the oil market encouraged the
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Labour Government to extend the influence of the state into the 
offshore industry, in line with Labour Party idedlogy. The 
licensing system was used as a bargaining tool to persuade oil 
companies to enter into participation agreements with the newly 
established state oil corporation. The delay in the announcement 
of the Fifth Round and its relatively small size may be attributed, 
at least partly, to the lengthy participation negotiations. The 
Sixth Round was one aspect of an overall government policy showing 
a continuing trend of tighter control. The Seventh Round, instigated 
by a Conservative Party in office illustrated a 'ratchet effect' of 
government policy whereby the previous government's policies of 
intervention began to be reversed; but not to their initial states.
Preferential treatment given to British interests, and most notably 
to BNOC (up to the Eighth Round) is a constant theme throughout 
the licensing rounds. This is essentially a judgement taken on 
political criteria.
Licensing rounds have been used for strategic bargaining by the 
government and the oil companies have similarly responded by using 
the system as a bargaining tool. Dissatisfaction with the North 
Sea tax regime resulted in exploration and development delays and 
the reluctance of oil companies to accommodate Government 
participation plans has resulted in some companies not taking part 
in licensing rounds. Bureaucrats in government and in oil companies 
have accumulated expertise and experience and thus can manipulate 
the system to protect and further their interests. A radical change 
in licensing poliy has therefore been consistently opposed by 
industry and government.
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Opposition from Brindex and UKOOA to an auction system is
predictable on the basis of the economics of politics and bureaucracy.
As stated, arguments that independent oil companies could not
compete with the large multi-national oil companies fail to consider
( 4 3 )the ability of companies to enter joint-venture operations and
(44)to raise capital on the money markets. That auctions add to the
financial problems of front-end loading is similarly doubtful. A
royalty bidding scheme could spread payments over a project's
(45)lifetime and cash bids may be paid over time in instalments.
However, percentage royalty bidding may have a disincentive effect 
on the development of high-cost marginal fields and may cause the
premature abandonment of fields because royalties are a tax on
* (46)production.
The problem of collusion in an oligopolistic market is relevant to
licence bidding in the North Sea. Evidence however, is 'consistent
with the hypothesis that the market (for offshore oil leases) is
(47)highly competitive.'. This would seem to be affirmed by the fact 
that in the Seventh Round, 204 companies were involved in 125 
licence applications and licences were awarded to consortia 
comprising 157 companies (see Table I).
Perhaps the overwhelming problem associated with an auction system 
of licensing is one which accrues from the UK system of representative 
government. The world oil market is characterized by periodic shocks 
and considerable political and economic uncertainty. With a system 
of bonus (cash) bidding, in the event of an oil price increase 
similar to those experienced in the 1970's, public perceptions of 
oil company 'windfall' profits could encourage political parties to
(42 )
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attempt to capture votes by introducing new or additional oil tax 
legislation.^8  ^ To an extent this was the case in the US with the 
1980 'Windfall Profit Tax on Crude Oil'. Thus with a system of 
licence auctioning uncertainty may remain due to politicians 
(and political parties) attempting to maximize their utility 
functions within the system of governmental democracy. As 
explained in Chapter Three, it is crucial for political parties to 
develop policies concerning issues which receive considerable media 
attention and political parties in power must be seen to be taking 
action. The risk of failing to maximize the vote-capturing 
potential of a policy thus often necessitates the implementation of 
policies largely for political rather than economic reasons.
Thus the institutional structure of government in the UK may cause 
uncertainties in an auction system of licensing. However, these 
uncertainties are considerably less than those present in a 
discretionary system. The main reason for this is the extensive 
power and influence of bureaucrats in a discretionary system. A 
bidding system would be administered by government bureaucrats but 
their functions would be limited to clearly defined areas and would 
not add significantly to uncertainties already present in the oil 
policy process.
TABLE I
UK OFFSHORE LICENSING ROUNDS 1964-83
* Each Block is approximately 
250 sq. Kilometers
Round Date Blocks* Offered Applications Received Licences Awarded
Area Number No.
Received
No. of Blocks 
Applied For
No. of 
Companies
No. of 
Blocks
No. of 
Licences
No. of 
Companies
First 1964 N. Sea 960 31 394 61 348 53 51
Second 1965 N. Sea 
Irish Sea 
English Channel
1102 21 127 54 127 37 44
Third 1970 N. Sea 
Irish Sea 
Orkney/Shetland 
Basin
157 34 117 54 106 37 61
Fourth
(i) Discretionary
1971/2
N. Sea 
Irish Sea 
Celtic Sea
421 92 271 228
282 118 213
(ii) Auction N. Sea 15 31 15 73 :
Fifth 1976/7 N. Sea; Irish Sea 
Celtic Sea 
Orkney/Shetland 
Basin
English Channel/ 
S.W. Approaches 
West of Scotland
71 53 51 133 44 28 64
Sixth 1978/9 N. Sea
W. Shetland Basin 
Cardigan Bay/ 
Bristol Channel 
S.W. Approaches
46 55 46 94 42 26 59
Seventh 1980/1 N. Sea
W. Shetland Basin
Orkney/Shetland
Basin
English Channel 
S.W. Approaches
Specified 
area of 
Northern 
N. Sea;
80 elsewhere
125 97 204 90 90 157
Eighth
(i) Discretionary
1982/3 N. Sea
W. Orkney Basin 
E. Shetland Basin 
Unst
Fair Isle 
Forth Approaches
169 40 76 94
70 49 38
(ii) Auction Bristol Channel 15 20 8 47
J
i' IV; ■ i
Ii
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CHAPTER FIVE
PARTICIPATION
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The purpose of this chapter is to examine the UK government's 
attempts to influence the domestic oil industry through the creation 
of a national oil company (NOC), the British National Oil 
Corporation (BNOC). Employing the methodology of Downs, Niskanen 
and Breton, the debate leading to the establishment of BNOC is 
analysed with specific reference to the bureaucratic and political 
pressures which have helped to determine the role of BNOC. The 
second section considers the function of BNOC after 1976 when its 
existence altered the framework of decision-making in the North Sea. 
The election of a Conservative Government in 1979 resulted in 
considerable speculation as to the future of BNOC; the final section 
of this chapter attempts to examine the conflicts of interest arising 
out of this change of administration and the implications with 
respect to the future role of BNOC. Thus the structure of this 
chapter tends to follow the stages of the government policy process 
from the perception of a political need for a policy to the 
implementation of that policy. The various factors affecting the 
policy process are not necessarily exclusive to each stage and each 
stage does not, of course, have a beginning and end which can be 
pinpointed to an exact time or event.
The economic theories of politics and bureaucracies (see Chapter 
Three) facilitate the analysis of the various forces involved in 
the government policy-making process. By applying these theories 
to the government/BNOC relationship an insight into the environment 
in which government policies evolve can be gained. It is hoped that 
within this framework predictions of future trends pertaining to
1. In t r o d u c t io n
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the role of BNOC can be forecast. The overall objective of this 
chapter is to identify the forces and pressures which are inherent 
in the government policy process so as to examine the likely 
outcome of attempts to intervene in the oil market.
The decision taken in the early 1960's to employ a discretionary
rather than competitive bidding form of licensing established an
important precedent with regard to the government's role in the
North Sea (see Chapter Four). The discretionary system allowed
(1 )the government to put direct pressure on oil companies more 
effectively than an auction system would have done. In effect, oil 
companies would be answerable to the government in that if their 
performance was not 'good enough' they could lose the opportunity of 
a licence in the next round; companies had to prove their worthiness 
to the satisfaction of the government. The government was careful 
to create an institutional framework whereby it could at some period 
in the future intervene directly or indirectly in the North Sea. 
However, it is important to note that the transfer of economic rent 
to the oil companies, which took place because of the nature of the 
discretionary allocation system, was being recaptured through the 
tax regime (see Chapter Seven). Thus state participation via BNOC 
was overwhelmingly concerned with control and achieving a greater 
degree of central management in the economy.
Two vital pre-requisites for effective government control in the 
North Sea are firstly an overall picture of the desired energy 
scene and a concept of the specific problem at hand. Secondly, 
expertise and information within the government itself are 
necessary. The 'overall picture' implies that the government should
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have an energy policy and within that policy BNOC should have a
definite function to perform. Even if the principle of an energy
(2 )policy is desirable or feasible there is the added problem
caused by the democratic system of government whereby it is quite.
possible that at least every five years a new government will
institute a fundamentally different policy from the one already
in existence. Moreover, the importance of the government possessing
expertise and information superior to that of BNOC (the organization
to be controlled) is that otherwise there is a real risk of the
roles being reversed and BNOC steering the government, (according to
(3)Grayson this has happened in Prance and Italy with respect to 
SNEA and ENI). Again, even if the government does possess superior 
knowledge it must then have the ability to implement measures which 
will combat the numerous and complex problems and disturbances 
thrown up by the controlled organization (BNOC). There is a further 
and crucial aspect to this relationship between the controller and 
the controllee which is the objectives of BNOC itself and BNOC's 
ability to withhold and select information if it is in the 
Corporation's interests (as it sees them) to do so. This acts as 
a constraint on the ability of the government to control BNOC and 
as a constraint on the ability of the government to maintain 
flexibility and adaptability. This is one of the areas in which 
the theory of bureaucracy can make a contribution to the understanding 
of government involvement in the North Sea.
The debate over the establishment of BNOC suggests that BNOC was
not meant to be a means to an end but more likely, an end in itself.
(4)As Rhenman and Norman argue, policy problems today are concerned
with the choice of a strategy that can adapt to a continually
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changing environment. It has been largely because of this that 
planning in the North Sea has been institutional 'and pragmatic 
- which itself has created uncertainty. This chapter is not 
directly concerned with whether BNOC is an 'effective' organization, 
rather the concern is whether any such organization is able, 
within the democratic framework, to provide a positive contribution 
to the government and/or to the industry in a way that is not 
overwhelmingly political. BNOC's reactions to changing circumstances 
are analysed and the political nature of BNOC's strategy is 
considered.
2. The Policy Debate
The 1973-4 international oil 'crisis' heralded a new phase in the 
UK government's offshore oil policy. Apart from the balance of 
payments effects of the quadrupling of the price of oil, the most 
serious potential danger to the UK, and to many other industrial 
countries, was perceived to be the loss of secure supplies of oil. 
Even with the government's shareholding in BP it could not persuade 
BP to favour the UK in its allocation of oil. This experience 
raised serious questions with respect to North Sea oil as the 
licensing terras did not give the government significant control 
over either the rate of extraction or the destination of the oil 
once it had been landed in the UK. It was in this atmosphere of 
world crisis that considerable pressure was exerted on the government 
to instigate fundamental changes in offshore oil policy. Energy and 
especially North Sea oil, had become an important political issue 
and political parties were keen to be seen to be active in this area.
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The Labour Government's 1974 White Paper was produced, 
significantly, only after the North Sea had become a major 
political issue. The preceding decade was characterized by the 
relative freedom from government intervention of the oil industry. 
The 1973-4 oil 'crisis', the discovery of sizeable oilfields in 
the North Sea in the early 1970's and the publication of the PAC 
Report (Chapter Seven) had the effect of pushing North Sea oil 
to the centre of the political stage. Individuals became 'aware' 
of the economic potential of North Sea oil. As the cost of 
acquiring information to the individual diminished (because the 
debate was taken up by the media) individuals' desire for 
information increased (when the importance of North Sea oil 
became increasingly apparent); their coercion threshold was 
lowered (see Chapter Three). The combination of these factors 
meant that it was in the interests of the political parties to 
formulate an oil policy which would attract the most political 
support. As North'.Sea oil became increasingly sensitive, 
politically, there was an increase in the potential political 
gains of being seen to be taking action. The dependence on OPEC 
oil and the 'excessive' profits being made by oil multi-nationals 
(MNC's) were prime areas where government action could result in 
political gain.
As oil prices rose the existing tax and royalty arrangements were 
not considered adequate and it was estimated that unless the 
conditions were changed the government would never take much more 
than about one half of oil company profits and about one half of 
the post-tax profits would be remitted overseas^ (see Chapter 
Seven).
(5 )
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It was therefore in this political climate that the Labour
Government published the 1974 White Paper and the 'energy debate1
which was given popular political support, began in earnest.
(7)According to Downsian theory politicians are generally unaware.
of individuals' policy preferences due largely to the lack of
incentive to the individual to become informed and to make that
informed preference or opinion known. As previously discussed
(8)(Chapter Three), Breton maintains that it is the very nature 
of the democratic system that 'shields' politicians from citizens' 
preferences (i.e. due to logrolling, information costs, the 
election period, etc.). However, once there is a perceived need 
for, in this case, a domestic oil policy, then in the formulation 
of that policy other factors (i.e. bureaucratic interests, intra­
party rivalry, pressure groups, inter-departmental rivalry, etc.) 
become important. It was at this second stage that the government's 
principal objectives and considerations were outlined in the 1974 
White Paper (see Chapter Two).
(9)The proposals on the 1974 White Paper were significantly 
different from the policies finally implemented by the Labour 
Government. This discrepancy is due, in part, to political and 
bureaucratic pressures which are an intrinsic part of the 
democratic process in the UK. By outlining these pressures it is 
hoped that a greater understanding of the limitations of the 
government policy process will result. The distorting effects 
within the policy process are not necessarily shortcomings of 
the system. It may be that these pressures act as safeguards 
restraining the 'enthusiasm' or 'excesses' of governments, (Chapter 
Eight argues that this is a mistaken argument). However, the
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point is that a discrepancy does exist between policy intentions 
and the final policy outcome and secondly, betwe'en the intended 
results of that policy and the actual results - and to a certain 
extent these discrepancies are inevitable.
Labour policy pronouncements and proposals concerning the 
establishment and role of BNOC made in 1974 and 1975 can be seen 
as part of a bargaining process between government and the oil 
companies. Initial Labour Government intentions for 51% 
participation (see Chapter Two) can be seen in terms of strategic 
behaviour within the policy process. It is unlikely that 51% 
participation was ever considered by the government as a rigid 
requirement.
This view is supported by the fact that even before BNOC was
officially established on 1st January 1976, Lord Kearton . (the first
Chairman of BNOC) was referring publicly not to 'participation' but
to the less emotive concept of 'partnership' This is
( 11 )consistent with Riker and Tullock's idea of intra-party rivalry
as a constraint on government output. If the straightforward 
'socialist' action of 51% participation as was originally proposed 
was implemented by the government there would not only be 
considerable opposition from the oil industry but also political 
opposition in Parliament and in the country. Although the 
government would remain in office it would run the risk of adverse 
and embarrassing political publicity and it would also allow the 
Opposition the chance to adopt a more popular policy (i.e. the 
constraint of political competition). As the government is not 
quite sure of voter preferences anyway, it is keen to minimize
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risk and take the safest option, while at the same time placating 
its own left wing by political rhetoric. The 'safest option' in 
a two party system would thus be one which tends towards the 
position of the other major party, converging on the centre. The 
constraint of intra-party rivalry (of Tullock and Riker) is more 
convincing than Downs' party competition argument but they are 
not entirely independent of reach other. Given a government with 
a safe majority and an election period of five years, once in 
office the government will for a time be more concerned with revolts 
from within its party than with Opposition attacks. However, 
internal dis-unity may provide the ammunition for Opposition attacks 
and the cumulative effects of this over a period of years may 
add to the likelihood of defeat at a General Election. Of course 
if the government relies on the support of a minority group in the 
House of Commons then party competition becomes of crucial 
importance.
In Tullock's example, Figure One, it is suggested that in a two
party system the two parties (L and C) would tend towards each
other near the centre of the distribution of voters, thus
approximately splitting the voters 50:50. For the purpose of this
paper, although the result is interesting, the crucial implication
is that the politician (or in this case the political party) is
attempting to adopt a policy in order that his chance of re-election
will be maximized and not a policy that is likely to maximize the
( 1 2 )'national interest'. Thus, in establishing a national oil
company (NOC), the Labour Government was careful on the one hand 
not to move too far away from the centre of the issue space diagram 
and risk party competition and on the other hand was careful to
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Figure One
VOTE MAXIMIZATION AND INTER-PARTY COMPETITION
Policy
Source: G Tullock 'The Vote Motive 1
(London: IEA, 1976), P.21
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consider its own left wing so as not to risk a breakaway group 
(see Chapter Three).
A second and less doctrinaire objective of government policy, as
outlined by John Smith (then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of
State for Energy) with regard to BNOC, was to 'acquire our
own direct knowledge of the difficult techniques of oil and gas
(13)production'. Both major parties agreed on the necessity to
enchance the government's access and ability to interpret oilfield
information. The two parties differed in that the Opposition felt
that this could most efficiently be brought about not by the
setting up of an NOC but by establishing some sort of regulatory
agency. The government's view was that access to information was
(14)only one of the functions that BNOC would fulfil. Therefore
the Conservative proposal of the UK Oil Conservation Authority
(UKOCA), which would be a 'small body, of no more than five
members, though with power to take on technical assessors for
(15)particular studies', based on the Energy Resources Conservation
Board of Alberta and thus acting only as an impartial watchdog,
was dismissed. Mr Benn (the successor at the Department of Energy
to Mr Varley) justified the need for active and large-scale
participation on the grounds that first-hand experience is vital
to gain the necessary expertise and information in all North Sea
activities. The much quoted argument is that North Sea oil is
too important to the whole economy, firstly to be left to market
forces and secondly, for crucial policy pronouncements to be
based on second-hand information: 'one cannot live off decisions
( 1 \of that magnitude and be dependent on the advice of others'.
The Labour Government saw its role in the North Sea as one of 
'controlling' rather than 'regulating' the industry. It is thus
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necessary for the controlling system to be able to steer the
controlled system using various instruments and techniques. It
follows that the controlling body must have more information and 
expertise than the system to be controlled, otherwise there is a- 
danger that the roles will be reversed so that it is BNOC which 
steers government policyE^
Thus the need for control over North Sea oil development and 
disposal was a principal objective accepted by both major parties. 
However, the method by which this was to be achieved differed 
greatly between them. Extensive powers were given to the 
Secretary of State for Energy in the 'Petroleum and Submarine 
Pipelines Act' to regulate production in the 'national interest', 
the only constraints being the guidelines outlined by Eric
M O )Varley by which the implementation of this authority would be 
governed, setting limits on the timing and extent of production
restrictions (see Chapter Two).
A significant characteristic of the 1974 White Paper which tends 
to recur in later government policy documents is the extensive 
powers given to the Energy Secretary in order that the Minister 
may safeguard the 'national interest'. This authority given to 
the Minister and hence to his senior advisers in the Department 
of Energy is essentially concerned with the personal power and 
political standing of the Minister.
(19) .Niskanen implies that politicians and government bureaucrats 
attempt to solve 'problems' by redefining them and favouring the 
expansion of policies and powers to deal with them. The 'national
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interest* objective is open to various interpretations and can 
include a variety of goals; at the same time it Is a politically 
appealing concept. Increased government control gives more 
power to the government bureaucrat and more prestige to the 
Minister in that Department. The licensing decision laid down 
the foundations upon which the government could intervene in 
the oil industry when it saw fit. In the process of adopting 
a policy N i s k a n e n a r g u e s  that bureaucrats will favour economic 
planning because the influence - and size - of the department 
will increase as will its budget and all the personal benefits 
this implies. Much of the justification for BNOC does not stand 
up to the criticism levelled at it unless it is accepted that the 
'national interest' criterion can be achieved by government 
intervention. The two Downsian assumptions with regard to the 
motivation of politicians (i.e. that they seek to maximize votes 
and they formulate policies by which to hold office) suggest 
that politicians will not attempt to impose policies that are in 
the 'national interest' unless the policy is also in direct 
accordance with the politician's self-interest. The Labour 
Government's view in 1975 that state intervention and control 
in the North Sea was by definition in the national interest 
because it was a socialist move does not explain the final 
characteristics of the policy. The original proposal of a policy 
may have been concerned with party ideology but the practical 
institutional problems are such that in order to implement a 
policy compromises with the bureaucracy and the industry have to 
be made.
One of the functions of BNOC, in common with many other European
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NOC's, is to forward the 'good' of the whole country, not
just the oil sector. For instance, by creating employment in
politically sensitive areas, increasing government revenue and
strengthening the pound. The inescapable consequence of such
a wide framework of reference is that BNOC will be prevented
from taking decisions on purely financial and commercial
criteria. It is hard to justify BNOC as a sole licensee and
operator not acting commercially, 'for example, for it (BNOC)
(22)to explore and locate reserves and yet not develop them' and 
at the same time acting in the national interest.
Objectives with respect to pipelines, safety, good oilfield 
practise and the need for information and regulation, were 
acceptable to the Opposition. However the Conservative Opposition 
and the oil lobby (represented collectively by the UK Offshore 
Operators Association and individually by company executives) for 
different reasons, argued that the bureaucracy involved, the 
expense, the extensive personal powers of the Energy Secretary 
and the extent of BNOC's role in the North Sea (especially with 
regard to participation) were unnecessary. Patrick Jenkin, then 
Shadow Energy Secretary, criticized BNOC for attempting to be 
both 'like an investment holding company - passive, watchful, 
steering, monitoring and supervising' and an 'active, entre­
preneurial body which would aim to compete fairly with existing
( 2 3 )companies'. This is a serious and genuine criticism of the
role of BNOC in that, from the outset, there seemed to be a conflict 
between its activities as a competitive, commercial oil company 
and as a partner of the private companies gathering confidential 
information and with a specially intimate relationship with the
(21)
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government. BNOC was created to deal very closely with the 
government and although its precise relationship- with the 
government was difficult to delineate there was considerable oil 
company opposition to the special privileges given to BNOC.
This opposition had an effect most noticeably with respect to 
participation negotiations, but also in other areas such as the 
loosely-adhered-to rule of landing oil and the refining of up 
to two-thirds of North Sea oil in the UK. These rules gave the 
Government the legislative powers for intervention and control 
to occur in the future.
The oil companies had a significant role to play, as pressure
groups, in determining government policy with regard to the
(24)establishment and functions of BNOC. Downs maintains that
governments tend to favour the interests of producers over those
of consumers. This is due to political parties being sensitive
to any well-informed, well-articulated opinion that is voicing a
preference. Producer pressure groups generally have strong
common objectives, good organization and are able to approach
senior politicians and bureaucrats. Consumers1 interests are
much more diverse and thus generally less organized and effective
(25)as pressure groups. Breton adds to the strength of this 
argument by suggesting that producer organizations (e.g. UKOOA) 
have an intrinsic need to survive which necessitates their seeking 
causes to champion, and being seen to do so by their members (see 
Chapter Three).
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3. The Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act 1975
The Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act, which became law on 12th 
November 1975, together with the 1975 Oil Taxation Act, implemented 
the powers and policies proposed in the 1974 White Paper; but was 
subjected to the effects of bureaucratic pressures, lobby groups, 
intra-party and inter-departmental rivalry in its passage through 
Parliament. The Act did not give BNOC a direct regulatory role 
(which Lord Kearton maintained it never wanted, and the Department 
of Energy was keen to keep) which was to be solely the job of the 
Department of Energy, which, with the Secretary of State for 
Energy, would keep in very close contact with BNOC. The Corporation 
would have less autonomy than most other nationalized enterprises. 
The close links between BNOC and the Department of Energy and the 
fact that the Department's influence was not diminished (or 
transferred) by the existence of BNOC meant that the Department 
retained its regulatory functions and did not actively oppose the 
establishment of BNOC. BNOC was empowered to search for and 
exploit petroleum resources anywhere in the world, to take over 
the government's participation interests, to buy and sell 
petroleum and trade in its derivatives, and to build, hire or 
operate refineries, pipelines and tankers. BNOC would 
immediately take over the NCB's petroleum interests, thus bringing 
it into partnership with oil MNC's such as Gulf and Conoco, and 
this also gave BNOC immediate stakes in the Thistle, Dunlin,
Hutton and Statfjord oil fields. The financial structuring of 
BNOC was highly controversial and was affected by inter-department 
rivalry largely between the Treasury and the Department of Energy 
as to where the control should be. This is not an uncommon
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problem with regard to nationalized enterprises m  general.
BNOC could borrow money from the Government or with the consent
of the Energy Secretary, from any other bodies at home or abroad.
This amount should not, 1 in normal circumstances1, exceed £600m
(28)and the Energy Secretary was only able to raise it to £900ra; 
BNOC's profits would be paid into the newly formed National Oil 
Account (NOA) along with royalty proceeds. Thus together with 
its exemption from Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT), BNOC would have 
an investment capability of over £2b, made up from £900m from 
the NOA, £500-£600m from royalties and £500-£600m from its 
exemption from PRT /  ^ ^
Thus the structuring of BNOC gave the Energy Secretary very great 
powers, not only with respect to the financing of BNOC via the 
NOA, but also with respect to depletion policy. The purpose of 
the 'Varley Guidelines' was to reassure the oil companies as to 
the extent that the government would exercise depletion controls. 
Nevertheless, the government's intentions were far from clear and 
the Energy Secretary had virtually unlimited powers to control 
depletion rates, again in the vague interests of the national 
good. The oil MNC's, as a powerful pressure group, objected 
strongly to the personal powers of the Minister and attempted to 
limit his powers during the passage of the Bill. The original 
clause which gave the Minister power to specify maximum and 
minimum production rates was withdrawn but the Energy Secretary 
still had extensive powers in the area of production (see Chapter 
Two). Generally, few changes were made during the passage of the 
Act that did anything to placate the fears of the oil companies. 
Producers were instructed to submit programmes detailing their
(27)
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capital investment plans and maximum and minimum annual production 
rates for oil and gas.
The Energy Secretary had the power to reject programmes if they - 
were not in the 'national interest' or were considered not to be 
consistent with 'good oilfield practise'. Both these criteria 
can be interpreted so as to encompass almost any conceivable 
circumstances that the Minister may include. Additionally, even 
if the programme is approved by the Energy Secretary, he can give 
the producer a 'limitation notice1 which specifies limits within 
which the Secretary can, by using a further notice issued after 
some designated period, direct him to produce. Another notice 
may require either a speeding up of the producer's depletion 
plans, in the case of a 'national emergency', or a slowing down 
in order to protect the 'national interest' rt*"8
Added to the Minister's crucial powers on production the Minister 
had control of all aspects of North Sea submarine pipelines.
This had great potential importance as companies would have to 
ask for permission to use existing pipelines, thus giving the 
government leverage over companies in order to persuade them to 
follow government policy.
Further powers to the Minister accrued due to BNOC's exemption 
from PRT. The Government looked upon this as a legitimate method 
of providing finance for BNOC as the money would simply be 
directed to a different government department and the purpose of 
PRT anyway was to ensure the nation, was receiving a 'fair share' 
of North Sea profits. Thus BNOC's exemption from PRT was,
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according to the government, 'an internal administrative measure
(31)to simplify transactions,within the government'. Criticism 
from the Opposition was predictable: it would create a
distortion of investment criteria between two partners, in a 
single field, with a single licence, who have to arrive at a 
common decision in selling oil downstream. In competition with 
other companies BNOC could be tempted to shade its prices in a 
way that would be unfair to its competitors. Thirdly, exemption 
from PRT could be used as a way of concealing the size of the 
borrowing requirement needed to finance BNOC. Although the annual 
accounts of BNOC would be drawn up to show what would have been 
the effect of paying PRT, the main criticism was that it would in 
effect be a bogus profit by-passing normal parliamentary control 
exercised via the Treasury and it would give more power to the
»• • 4- <32>Minister.
Exemption from PRT compounded another fear of the oil industry; 
it would make financial comparisons between BNOC and other 
companies more difficult. This was a further area where the 
imprecise, vague role of BNOC resulted in confusion due to its 
conflicting activities as a competitor and partner in the North 
Sea. By giving BNOC general and non-commercial functions to 
fulfil, gauging its success on purely financial or commercial 
criteria or with comparisons with other oil MNC's is inadequate. 
Thus one of the political 'benefits' of NOC's wide framework of 
reference is that judging their performance becomes very 
difficult.
The wide ranging personal powers bestowed on the Energy Secretary
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by the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act are generally
(33)consistent with the techniques (outlined by Niskanen) employed 
by bureaucrats and in this case politicians, in increasing their 
influence and power. At this stage there is only limited
I
conflict between bureaucrats and politicians because their 
ambitions are broadly similar. The passage of the Act was 
relatively trouble-free because it was in line with Labour Party 
ideology, there was strong popular support for the government to 
be seen to be taking some sort of action in the energy sector and 
the Act increased the stature of the Department of Energy. The 
combination of these factors meant that Conservative and oil 
company objections were relatively ineffectual. Consequently a 
Conservative Government could be expected to have greater 
difficulty in formulating an alternative policy (or changing an 
existing one) because reducing the influence of Central 
Government - which is an important aspect of Conservative Party 
ideology - could, but not necessarily would, contradict the 
ambitions of an individual minister and, more likely, would meet 
with opposition from the Department of Energy whose activities 
would be reduced or restrained. These conflicts would arise 
before considering the opposition from the newly formed 
bureaucracy of BNOC and conflicts with other macro-political 
priorities. To an extent, as will be discussed below, the 
Conservatives have encountered these problems since 1979.
In BNOC's case, there was still accountability exercised through 
the NOA but there was greater discretionary power in the hands 
of the Minister than is usual for nationalized enterprises. The 
Minister, at the end of each financial year, had to report to
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the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) who in turn reported to 
the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the House "of Commons.
Concern over BNOC's use of royalty money was voiced in 1977 by 
the CAG as royalty monies became available to BNOC without 
parliamentary control. If BNOC was to rely on the royalty monies 
instead of on outside borrowing, then BNOC would be subject to 
control not by Parliament but by the Energy Secretary in its use 
of these funds. If BNOC had not been given privileged access to 
the royalty monies in the NOA it would have had to borrow from the 
National Loans Fund (NLF) like any other public corporation, in a
manner subject to conventional parliamentary control. Also, this
sizeable source of financing was technically a forward sale of 
oil and not a borrowing, thus it did not count against the 
borrowing limits monitored by Parliament. A further shortcoming 
of BNOC's financing-accountability system was that although the 
CAG had direct access to the NOA he only had indirect access to
BNOC's internal accounts and records.
Following the PAC's 1977 report BNOC announced that their funds 
would be split 60:40 between equity and non-equity monies. The 
royalty cash from the NOA, to which BNOC's retained profits would 
be added, would be equity funds until they reached 60% of the 
total, after which they would be divided between equity and non­
equity funds so as to keep to ratio 60:40, taking into account any 
other long term borrowings or outside non-equity finance. The 
result was that BNOC was put on a financial footing broadly similar 
to that of a private sector oil company.
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With the formal establishment of BNOC on 1st January 1976 the
third stage of the government policy making process is reached.
The factors influencing the final outcome of the policy are not
exclusive to this stage and the actual beginning of this stage
would have been sometime in 1975. A prime consideration with
respect to the establishment of BNOC was the need to maintain
flexibility in order to be able to adapt and adjust to a changing
economic and political environment. The Petroleum and Submarine
Pipelines Act laid down the legal and institutional foundations
upon which the government's oil policy would be implemented, leaving
adequate scope within which the government could respond to
(34)unforeseen developments. One of the consequences of this was
that BNOC did not have explicit long term objectives.
A characteristic of this stage of the policy process that 
differentiates it from the formulation of policy stage is that with 
the existence of BNOC there is an added set of relationships and 
interests to consider. The relationships between BNOC and the oil 
MNC1 s and between BNOC and the government had the effect of altering 
the structure and nature of the offshore oil industry. BNOC 
employees now had their ambitions and objectives with respect to 
BNOC's future which were distinct from ambitions and objectives 
of government bureaucrats and politicians who created BNOC.
(35)In its first report BNOC outlined its wider aims and saw its 
position as combining the functions of an instrument of national 
policy, of a commercial enterprise and of an adviser to the
4. BNOC 1976-9
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government. Within this ambitious framework BNOC sought to become 
an efficient manager of its equity interests in o'ffshore 
petroleum exploration, development and production. It also aimed 
for the effective disposition of the petroleum available to it 
from equity interests and from participation arrangements. More­
over, BNOC intended to develop its expertise particularly in the 
area of the development and use of resources on the UKCS and to 
be able to advise the Secretary of State on all oil matters.
BNOC's immediate objectives in late 1975-6 were firstly, to obtain 
a competent staff and secondly, to work out participation 
arrangements with the oil companies.
As has been explained (see Chapter Two) the government's original 
intentions with respect to participation had been abandoned in 
the face of oil company opposition. Lord Kearton. had to construct 
a method of participation which the oil MNC's could tolerate and 
which still conveyed enough of the 'spirit' of participation to 
satisfy Labour politicians concerned with socialist ideology.
Thus what subsequently remained of participation was based around 
the need for government bureaucrats in the Department of Energy 
to acquire information and also for a say in how the oil companies 
disposed of the oil they produced.
Participation was re-defined to mean that BNOC was to be treated 
as an equitable partner in that BNOC would have access to 
information but would have no equity shares. 51% oil was conceded 
to BNOC on the understanding that BNOC would hand back to the 
companies all financial and other benefits (the oil would be 
purchased by BNOC at the market price). BNOC would be a member of
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the operating committees that manage fields but 'there was no
/ o  (Z \
question of exercising a 51% vote'. Lord Kearton described 
the arrangement as BNOC having a 'meaningful' vote which he 
defined as being a role where BNOC's voice would carry weight but- 
BNOC would have no power to direct the pattern of development or 
veto decisions. However, under the Petroleum and Submarine 
Pipelines Act the government still had the power to review and 
reject development programmes.
Lord Kearton supported this somewhat vague arrangement as the
principle around which individual participation negotiations could
take place. The early controversies illustrated Lord Kearton's
practical and pragmatic approach to his job of establishing BNOC
as a serious and powerful NOC. He stressed that BNOC would have
access to, and control over, 51% of the oil and it would be able
to argue its case from the inside, thus having more influence and
giving a greater and faster contribution than it would have done
from the 'outside' with little knowledge or information. The
'new' definition of participation from which individual agreements
could be worked out would give BNOC an opportunity to gain
acceptance and credibility in the eyes of the North Sea oil 
(37)companies. This was of crucial importance to BNOC when seen in
the context of their longer term ambitions. In these early stages
of BNOC's existence their immediate ambitions and those of the
government were in close accordance and this accounted for much of
(38)the early success of BNOC. Evidence from other European NOC's
has shown that unless an NOC has the backing of a committed 
government in its early years the NOC will tend to lack direction. 
The Labour government backed BNOC enthusiastically and Lord Kearton
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had a strong personality with both experience in dealing with 
politicians and a proven business ability. Although BNOC met 
opposition from the oil MNC's with respect to participation the 
combined efforts of the government and BNOC were able, eventually,- 
to reach agreements with all the North Sea companies.
Whether or not BNOC would fulfil the prediction that it would
develop into a self-perpetuating bureaucracy which would attempt to
'steer' government policy rather than be steered by it was not
apparent at this stage. The activities of BNOC were uncontroversial
in that they were in line with government expectations. However,
by looking at BNOC strategy over the first five years of its
existence there appear to be noticeable trends consistent with the
hypothesis of BNOC seeking independence from government control
( 3 9 )and acting as an oil MNC. A participation deal agreed with BP 
illustrated Lord Kearton' s determination to establish BNOC as a 
fully integrated oil company with avenues open to it, if it should 
choose, to expand downstream. The agreed formula with BP included 
provisions for collaboration on downstream activities, and also 
for the provision of training facilities for BNOC staff. Whilst 
this was in line with the government's objectives for BNOC it was 
also consistent with BNOC's longer term strategy to become 
independent.
A genuine source of apprehension on behalf of the oil companies 
was with respect to the precise role of BNOC which was still some­
what vague. Lord Kearton's job in establishing BNOC was conducted 
in a cautious manner as he had to encourage the oil MNC's into 
participation agreements, whilst at the same time future development
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could not take place at the desired speed if the (US) MNC's 
were 'forced' to leave the North Sea; thus no two' participation 
deals were the same. The oil MNC's thus still had considerable 
bargaining power and were prepared to oppose the implementation 
of the stated government policy as long as possible. It is 
significant that the first participation deals with BNOC were 
all with relatively small companies which were generally in some 
sort of financial difficulty or needed government assistance in 
another way (i.e. deals involving United Canso, Deminex, Champlin 
Petroleum, Berry Wiggins, Consolidated Gas Fields and Tricentrol)i^8^
Within the framework of BNOC's government-imposed long term 
objectives there was some confusion as to the immediate role of 
the Corporation and how it would reconcile two apparently conflicting 
functions. As a partner with the oil companies it would have 
access to restricted, confidential information and at the same 
time would be attempting to act as a competitive rival in the 
market. Over time, of these two functions, it became apparent 
that whilst the government supported this duality of roles, BNOC 
- once it had become firmly established - was overwhelmingly 
concerned with the latter objective. It is in this area that 
Niskanen's theory of bureaucracies can be applied to the relation­
ship between the government and BNOC; this will be examined below, 
following a description of BNOC's activities.
The Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act had given BNOC the legal 
and institutional potential to expand into virtually any sector of 
the international oil industry. The direction its activities were 
to expand into were subject to ministerial ratification but the
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onus was largely on Lord Kearton to concentrate on such areas as
he saw fit. In 1976 his 'overwhelming priority' was to gain
access to more oil, that is, to increase BNOC's equity share in
(41)the North Sea to between 30% and 40%. BNOC's desire to move
through the 'learning curve' as rapidly as possible, in order 
that it might act as an equal with its private company partners, 
was seen as justifying its presence on operating committees, thus 
allowing BNOC personnel to build up their expertise in their 
specific sphere of operation and in the oil development business 
in general. The acquisition of the NCB's and Burmah's North Sea 
subsidiaries was another way by which BNOC gained experienced 
staff. Thus these activities, whilst in direct accordance with 
government ambitions for BNOC, were also enabling BNOC to fulfil 
its own objectives.
Lord Kearton was careful to point out that BNOC was in no way
acting as a regulatory agency and the Department of Energy alone,
for example, decided to whom to grant licences and upon what
criteria their decisions would be based. However, Lord Kearton
made it clear that he felt the government was right to come to
BNOC for advice and this naturally seemed to the private companies
to put BNOC in a privileged position. Lord Kearton admitted that
in some cases the Department of Energy had asked BNOC's advice
(42)on the variation in a licence and whether or not they would
be interested in it themselves, and BNOC had accepted their offer. 
Thus to an extent the oil companies' fears were justified.
A further example of BNOC's privileged position arose out of the 
terms of the Fifth Licensing Round in the form of a disagreement
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between BNOC and the UKOOA. Whereas North Sea operators had
to wait for allocation rounds, BNOC had the rightr to apply for 
any unlicensed block at any time. New BNOC partner companies 
saw this as putting them at a serious disadvantage. If an oil 
or gas reservoir was discovered in one of the new UK blocks and 
it was thought likely to stretch into an adjacent but unlicensed 
block, only BNOC could bid for that block immediately. Thus 
the partner companies who helped finance the find would lose out. 
Thus even at the implementation stage of the policy oil company 
pressure groups were still attempting to change the policy or 
at least delay its implementation until a possible change of 
government. Their success was limited (although they did achieve 
various concessions in the participation negotiations) largely 
because the decisions to give BNOC extensive powers and to 
increase the ability of the Department of Energy to control North 
Sea activities had already been taken and had the backing of the 
government, the Department of Energy, BNOC itself and apparently 
the voter (since they seemed to fit prevailing public opinion)-.
(43)
Details of specific policy points were still unclear but since 
the government, BNOC and the Department of Energy all had the 
same short term objectives, the oil MNC's (with a sympathetic 
Conservative Opposition) could do little other than adopt a 
position of non co-operation and delay.
These t a c t ic s  o f non co-operation were employed by the o i l  
companies most no ticeab ly  in  p a rt ic ip a t io n  n eg o tia tio n s. Lord 
KeartoA44J conceded th a t h is  team of negotiators sometimes had to 
w ait months for an o i l  company rea ctio n  to a government proposal
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and although this would have, in part, been due to oil company 
negotiators having to report in detail to their s'uperiors, and 
oil companies operating in consortia having conflicting 
interests, it seems that these delays were symptomatic of the oil. 
companies' general opposition to BNOC.
Negotiations with US oil MNC's were particularly sensitive because
if terms were too unfavourable these majors could decide to leave
the North Sea creating a vacuum which BNOC was not yet able to
fill. The government would also have to consider possible
retaliatory measures taken against UK companies (specifically BP)
operating in the US. The government could decide to exclude oil
companies from future licensing rounds if the Department of Energy
felt the oil companies were being too unreasonable - again
discretionary power on behalf of the Ministry was considerable.
Amoco's refusal to enter a 'voluntary' participation agreement
resulted in their being totally excluded from the Fifth Round
(45)allocation of licences. A further consideration, which is much
harder to substantiate, is the possibility that oil MNC's who 
created 'unacceptable' obstacles to reaching agreements on 
participation could suffer a more general loss of government, 
sympathy. This loss of 'goodwill' could manifest itself in any 
future negotiations with the government on oil-related areas where 
the Minister exercised arbitrary powers or rules were open to 
interpretation. These companies could, for instance, be 
discriminated against in the allocation of blocks in a licensing 
round, but this is impossible to substantiate because of the nature 
of the allocation procedure.
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In the fifth licensing round BNOC was given a 51% share in all 
forty-four blocks allocated and was to be the operator on four of 
them. In August 1976 seventy-one blocks, or part blocks, were 
offered and in February 1977 twenty-four offers of licences were - 
made. In the four blocks where BNOC was the operator it would be 
operating on behalf of Shell and Esso, BP, Hamilton Brothers and 
Kerr KcGee. BNOC had to bear 51% of the exploration costs on 
approximately 9,000 square kilometres of sea bed and before any 
licence was issued the prospective licensees had to conclude with 
BNOC an operating agreement acceptable to the Secretary of State. 
These activities necessitated BNOC seeking considerable finance, 
which it obtained from commercial US and UK banks.
This was a highly significant episode in the development of the
Corporation. BNOC set up an American corporation called Britoil
which borrowed the cash ($825m in all) to pay in advance for
quantities of North Sea oil pledged by BNOC from the third quarter
of 1978 until mid-1981. BNOC was obliged to deliver enough oil
to pay the interest on the loan and between 1981 and 1985 BNOC would
deliver oil in sufficient quantities to pay off the principal as
(46)well. This deal enabled BNOC to obtain finance with no 
government guarantees and BNOC claimed the terms it was given as 
a borrower were as favourable as any international oil company, 
illustrating the confidence the financial institutions Lad in BNOC.
Of the total, $675m was at rates fractionally above Citibank's 
prime rate; the rest was 1% above the London inter-Bank rate, 
giving an average then of 7i%. At the end of 1977, BNOC's 
financing costs were equivalent to an interest rate of less than 
8% representing a saving of over 6% compared to the borrowing from
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the NLF. At the time of finalising the deal (in mid-1977) BNOC 
was borrowing just under £350m from the NLF at around 14^%. The 
new dollar loan allowed BNOC to pay off these government loans and 
reduce its immediate interest costs.
5. The Application of Niskanen's Theory of Bureaucracy to the 
Development of BNOC
In examining BNOC's performance in the context of Niskanen's theory 
of bureaucracies, there are basic differences which have to be made 
clear. BNOC's relationship with the government is a relationship 
with both a government department and with government politicians.
It has previously been stated that the nature of the relationship 
between a government department (the bureaucracy) and the politicians 
(the sponsor) will lead to distortions due to conflicts of objectives. 
It would thus seem to contradict this if it was now assumed that 
BNOC is the 'bureaucracy' and the government, comprising both 
politicians and civil servants, is the single sponsor. To begin 
with it is sufficient that the government department and the 
government can be assumed to be, for simplicity, one sponsoring body. 
This assumption will be relaxed subsequently. This problem again 
emphasises a significant consequence of the creation of BNOC; an 
additional institution is established within the policy process with 
its own set of objectives and characteristics.
As has been stated (Chapter Three) the power of a government 
bureaucracy stems from the nature of its relationship with its 
sponsor, the government. The creation of BNOC was a major political 
event and BNOC was explicitly designed to have an especially close
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relationship with the government, more so than other public
enterprises. Although individual civil servants 'may spend a
considerable amount of time dealing with the affairs of BNOC, the
higher level civil servants (like politicians) have numerous
functions to perform and have many other areas that need their
attention. Employees of BNOC however, are working full time in
the interest of themselves and BNOC. This argument is not as
forceful as in Niskanen’s case of the politician being only a
part-time overseer of a department's activities. In 1977 the
(47)Department of Energy was reported to have forty-one officers 
of principal level and above involved in North Sea oil and BNOC 
matters, of which eighteen were experienced in North Sea oil 
business. Nevertheless, the relationship can still be viewed as 
similar to Niskanen's - one of a bi-lateral monopoly with BNOC 
having access to considerably more expertise.and information than 
does the government. If the government is seen not as a single 
entity but as a government bureaucracy and a government politician 
then although the government bureaucrat will be more able to 
acquire information and have a stronger relative incentive to do 
so than the politician, BNOC is nevertheless in a very strong 
position with regard to the amount of, and standard of, information 
it passes on to the government department. Even then however, the 
department may attempt to withhold information from the politician 
if it is in its interests to do so.
The financial structuring of BNOC gave it the opportunity to acquire 
funds from the Energy Secretary or from commercial banks. Obviously, 
to begin BNOC was dependent on the government for cash but the 
government was keen to support BNOC and was sympathetic to its
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demands. Moreover, given that BNOC was recruiting high-skilled 
labour it was in a position to make a strong casef for itself to 
the government. It is important that negotiating would have been 
carried out in a favourable atmosphere as the government was keen . 
for BNOC to establish itself quickly alongside the oil MNC's.
Thus the relationship between BNOC and the government would be 
seen in terms of a Niskanen-type sponsor/bureaucracy relationship, 
but with significant differences. The most important difference 
is that in this case the sponsor cannot be seen as a homogeneous 
entity with one set of characteristics and objectives based on a 
single rationale. Of less importance is the fact that BNOC was 
able to seek finance from any source. BNOC could only negotiate 
for commercial loans once it had proved its .credibility. This 
initially it could not do without government support and thus BNOC 
was totally dependent on the government for funds in the first two 
years of its existence.
Criticism by Breton and Wintrobe of Niskanen's model is also
evidence here. The government could not in BNOC's case be viewed
as a passive sponsor beacuse accountability was exercised through
the NOA. Two points are significant here; firstly, that the Energy
Secretary had extensive personal powers over BNOC's finances and
secondly, without privileged access to royalty monies in the NOA,
BNOC would have had to borrow from the NLP and have been subject
to conventional parliamentary control. If there had been no NOA,
the government would be able to acquire some knowledge of the
operations of BNOC via the PAC and also through the Department of
( 4 9 )Energy and this would act as a constraint on BNOC. Breton has
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argued that the existence of controls must mean that they work 
at least partially. This is not necessarily true" as the greatest 
need of a politician is to be seen to be controlling the excesses 
of, in this case BNOC, and political 'safety' can be acquired by 
the existence of controls and not by their effective use. To 
gauge the efficiency of BNOC the CAG would have needed very detailed 
information on all aspects of BNOC's activities and would have had 
to set precise objectives to be able to judge BNOC's success.
Because of the wide framework of reference imposed upon BNOC, 
financial and commercial comparisons became almost impossible. A 
profitable public corporation is a valuable political asset, 
especially for a Labour Government, and if BNOC was seen to be 
making a sizeable contribution to government revenue it might have 
tended not to be scrutinized as closely as if it had been losing 
money.
Niskanen assumed the bureaucrat to be a rational utilitarian who, 
because of the nature of the sponsor/bureaucracy relationship, 
rationally attempts to maximize the size of his budget. The 
government/BNOC relationship had similar characteristics of a 
well-informed bureaucracy and a 'semi-passive1 sponsor. However, 
assuming a rational utilitarian manager in BNOC, his maximand 
would not have been to maximize the size of the budget received 
from the government because other factors in the manager's utility 
function would not necessarily have increased as BNOC's budget 
increased; or more specifically, other factors would probably have 
had a higher ranking in his utility function. Increasing its size 
and growth rate were prime concerns of BNOC but it was how this was 
to be achieved (and the reasons why) and the implications of
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alternative methods of financing that were important.
The political role of BNOC has been emphasised in this Chapter.
BNOC was a product of Labour Party doctrine and its structure • 
reflected the Labour Party's belief in the need for the central 
government to influence the economy. From the very inception of 
BNOC the Conservative Opposition made it clear they were strongly 
against the principle of an NOC and would dismantle the Corporation 
when they came to power. Thus BNOC executives in some form were 
overwhelmingly concerned with the survival of BNOC and the security 
of their jobs in the face of substantial political uncertainty. A 
second factor with regard to the motivation of BNOC executives is 
that, with the exception of political appointees at Board level, 
BNOC executives and managers would have had similar ambitions to 
those in private sector oil companies and would have had a natural 
aversion to the socio-political considerations imposed on them 
by central government. It is thus the assertion here that once 
BNOC had consolidated its position as a credible oil company the 
combination of these factors resulted in its being rational for 
BNOC executives to seek managerial independence which they were 
able to do, and were motivated to do, due to the nature of BNOC's 
relationship with the government.
Methods by which this ambition of managerial independence could be 
achieved were n u m e r o u s O n e  of BNOC's earliest priorities was 
to attract expert labour, skilled in the technical aspects of 
offshore oil. Skilled labour joining BNOC meant that BNOC's 
bargaining position with the government was strengthened and at 
the same time BNOC's standing in relation to the oil MNC's improved.
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A corollary of this point is that skilled labour may be less keen 
to join an NOC than they would an independent oil' company.
However, there seems little evidence to support this view and it 
is possible, as Lord Kearton maintained, that the reverse is true.
The most important technique by which BNOC could acquire 
managerial independence was by becoming financially independent of 
the government. The $825m borrowed from commercial banks gave 
BNOC a degree of independence from the government and at the same 
time was an added complication in any future Conservative effort 
to break up BNOC.
The power of Niskanen's model stems largely from the characteristics
(51)of the bureaucracy. Niskanen defines a bureaucracy as being a
non-profit organization financed (at least partly) by a grant from 
its sponsor. The BNOC/government relationship differs 
fundamentally from the Niskanen model because BNOC was an income 
earning organization and able either to finance itself through 
retained profits or by seeking a loan from an independent financial 
institution (i.e. not its sponsor, the government). Although BNOC 
needed ministerial ratification for many of its activities it was 
not operating under the same conditions, with the same restrictions 
as Niskanen*s government bureaucracy.
The structure of the international oil industry is such that there
(52)is a trend for NOC's in general towards multinationalization.
With respect to BNOC multinationalization fulfilled two prime 
objectives: it decreased the opportunity for government inter­
vention and it added to the complexities of dismantling BNOC.
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Similarly, long term supply agreements and joint ventures - with 
foreign companies particularly - added to the difficulties of 
government control and there might also be technical difficulties 
with respect to auditing the accounts of foreign subsidiaries.
The greater the politicization of BNOC and the closer its links
were with the government the more it would fall in line with the
Niskanen model. The 'national interest' objective could be
employed to justify virtually any non-profitable project
entered into by BNOC. Nevertheless, Niskanen's model still has
serious implications for activities within BNOC itself and the
desires of managers to increase their own stature by attempting
to expand their departments or budgets or projects due to their
relationship with their superiors. This would lead to inefficiency
and the oversupply of output. For instance, because of the
concentration of specific skills in investigating a project's
usefulness, a team of experts could be able to persuade a superior
of the considerable potential 'value' of a particular project; i.e.
they would be able to make out a convincing case for its being in
the 'company's interest1 to adopt the project. This is more
than an 'unconscious' project enthusiasm; it is a conscious
decision taken by a manager in order to maximize his own utility
function which could be achieved by increasing the budget
allocated to him or his department. This is not peculiar to BNOC
(53)but could exist in any large organization. Management slack 
is consistent with behavioural theories of the firm as well as 
Niskanen's closely related theory of bureaucracy.
A manager, not a top level Board member, will attempt to maximize
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a personal utility function consisting of, according to Williamson 
salaries, staff, discretionary spending for investments and 
management slack absorbed as cost. The major constraint is 
that revenue generated must still be greater or equal to the minimum 
revenue demanded. Increases in salary are consistent with increases 
in staff but the manager's desire to increase the number of his 
direct subordinates will also be related to his own job security, 
prestige and managerial flexibility. Discretionary spending for 
investment reflects the ability of managers to direct resources to 
their own control, not on the basis of wholly commercial criteria.
The results of these behavioural factors are similar to the 
consequences of Niskanen's model (i.e. inefficiency and oversupply 
of output) but their sources is different and not specifically 
concerned with the bureaucrat's relationship with the sponsor and 
the bureaucrat's attempts to maximize his budget. Williamson's 
predictions of management slack are backed up, with respect to 
BNOC, because of the privileged position of BNOC under the Labour 
Government. Here BNOC was, to an extent, protected from the forces 
of competition by the government and thus BNOC managers were able 
to satisfy their self-interest objectives without the constraints 
of competition. The major constraint was that BNOC had to be seen 
to be fulfilling political functions determined by the government.
Thus multinationalization was a rational objective for the BNOC 
manager because it affected the survival of BNOC and the security 
of the manager's position. Multinationalism could also be 
supported as a strategy on commercial grounds; the economies of 
scale potential in the oil industry, the geography of oil supply
(54)
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and demand, and most importantly for BNOC the spreading of 
technical and political risk.
Relaxing the assumption of a homogeneous sponsor and thus 
considering the government as being made up of civil servants 
(bureaucrats) and politicians whose ambitions often contradict 
each other and cause conflicts and distortions, the oil executives' 
need for decision-making freedom becomes more apparent. Macro­
political objectives of senior politicians might have conflicted 
with the long-term commercial aims of BNOC. If the government had 
been the sole financer of BNOC and BNOC had needed to request 
government money for an investment project the finance could have 
been denied because it conflicted with other government objectives 
and not because of its commercial viability. Because the 
Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act laid down the institutional 
potential for further government action and gave the Energy 
Secretary considerable discretionary powers, political uncertainty 
resulted.
Rivalry between government departments (most noticeably between the
(55 56)Department of Energy and the Treasury) ' can lead to government 
bureaucrats making decisions on the basis of whether they are losing 
some of their 'duties' to another department. BNOC, in seeking 
financial independence, was implicitly assuming that political 
interference (rather than regulation or even control) and the added 
uncertainties this created was likely to become much worse over 
time and at some stage would force BNOC out of existence or reduce 
its independence. Thus BNOC executives, on the basis of their 
rational expectations of the future were predicting political
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intervention and taking pre-emptive measures in order to protect
their own interests. This not only caused difficulties for the
decision-makers within BNOC but was an intrinsic shortcoming of
government energy policy due to the characteristics of government -
(57)and the policy making process. It has been argued that BNOC 
was a necessity because as the big oilfields of the UKCS were 
developed and only less attractive 'marginal' fields remained the 
oil MNC's would tend to leave the North Sea; thus a domestic NOC, 
in the national interest, had to be ready to fill the gap. An 
alternative view is that as the government makes the economic 
environment less attractive for the oil MNC's (e.g. by adding to 
the uncertainties through the creation of BNOC, by a punitive 
tax regime, by depletion controls) the government is actively 
forcing the oil companies to leave (thus justifying the existence 
of BNOC) whereas in other circumstances they would have remained.
6. The 1979 Conservative Government
At the beginning of 1979 the Conservatives were publicizing their 
plans for the future of BNOC which would significantly have 
reduced BNOC's influence in the domestic oil industry. This led to 
a great deal of speculation and uncertainty in the oil industry.
The complexities of the financial structuring of BNOC and the 
substantial efforts made by Lord Kearton to make it as difficult 
as possible to break-up the Corporation, combined with a new 
'appreciation' of the value to the incoming Administration that 
the political revenue BNOC would bring, resulted in government 
procrastination and ambiguity with respect to BNOC.
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By the beginning of 1979 supplies of crude oil on the world market 
were in turmoil with deliveries out of Iran at a Virtual standstill. 
Despite OPEC production being higher in the first half of 1979 than 
in 1978 there was a perceived temporary excess demand for crude 
oil. Thus the volatile and sharply upward movement of oil prices 
during 1979 was at least in part due to uncertainty over supplies 
and the resulting changing expectations of oil prices. This 
uncertainty was accentuated by the decline in the volume of crude 
oil made available to the oil MNC's as sales by producer 
governments and NOC's took their place.
Thus at a time when there was great demand for low sulphur crude 
oil, BNOC, with no refineries of its own, had a healthy flow of 
easily accessible oil and with no restrictive long term trading 
contracts BNOC was thrust into a position in the international 
oil market that was possibly out of proportion to its true standing. 
However, most of BNOC's oil was participation oil which it received 
on the understanding that the original owner would be left no 
worse off by the transaction than if it had sold the oil itself.
In 1979 only about 15% of BNOC's sales were of equity oil on 
which the Corporation takes all the profit. The volume of oil 
traded by BNOC increased from about 300,000 b/d in the fourth 
quarter of 1978 to around 800,000 b/d at the beginning of 1979 and 
over one million barrels per day by the end of 1979.^8^
These trading activities increased the status and prestige of BNOC 
and were factors in the revised view of BNOC's role taken by the 
Conservative Government. In 1979 the financial prospects of BNOC 
were good and together with its increased access to oil supplies
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the Corporation was able to put forward a strong case for its own 
survival. At a time when the US was subsidizing bil imports, BNOC 
argued that it would be foolish to dispose of indigenous oil 
already under state control, simply to achieve a short-term boost, 
to the budget. BNOC gave the government an alternative option 
in directing North Sea oil during a period of uncertain supplies. 
Also, and crucially, the cash generated by BNOC would be a very 
attractive long term prospect to the Conservative Chancellor 
trying to reduce government spending.
The Conservative Government was finding it very difficult to 
reconcile important policy conflicts within its own election 
platform. The Conservatives came to power pledged to decrease 
state intervention, and specifically to dismantle BNOC. In the 
summer of 1979 the Energy Secretary (David Howell) was facing 
considerable political embarrassment in that a major oil producing 
country was suffering petrol shortages. Diverting resources to 
domestic refineries by the government would have resulted in a non- 
optimal allocation of resources and would harm Britain's position 
as a trading nation.
However, the government's prime consideration was the adverse and 
very public effect reducing oil exports would have on the balance 
of payments. Using BNOC as the instrument by which the government 
would attempt to divert oil supplies - whilst at the same time 
considering how to dismantle BNOC - would add to the embarrassment 
of a staunchly non-interventionist government. The choice to be 
made was not solely a political one.
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The pressure to make use of BNOC for political purposes would 
come from within the Party and there would also be pressures from 
within the government to use BNOC revenue for top priority economic 
objectives (i.e. reducing the PSBR). These pressures could involve, 
for example, the Energy Minister having to be prepared to subordinate 
his own personal and departmental objectives to those of the 
government as a whole or to those of another Minstry. A Minister 
would not necessarily be averse to doing this if it was the case 
that by being a loyal government member his standing, and his 
prospects, are enhanced in the eyes of the party leader, party 
hierarchy or the party in general. This argument can be extended 
to include the actions of top-level civil servants. It could 
also be the case that government bureaucrats ( at the most senior 
levels) and Ministers would be prepared to accept a budget reduction 
(the opposite of Niskanen's thesis) if it was in their personal 
interest to do so. Less senior bureaucrats would not necessarily 
have this opportunity to display loyalty and solidarity, and be 
rewarded for it, and would attempt to change the policy or prevent 
its effective passage. Thus although senior bureaucrats and 
Ministers may be able to increase their own standing by reducing 
the budget (and/or the size) of their department, for example by 
making the department a more tightly knit group of high-skilled 
experts, bureaucratic pressures from within would tend to oppose 
this.
The Conservative government did consider it expedient to intervene 
in the oil industry despite its own proclamations to the contrary 
and the adverse economic consequences. BNOC, acting as the oil 
agent of the g o v e r n m e n t w a s  instructed to persuade twenty small
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US and European refiners who were buying 75% of BNOC's oil to 
export up to 50% less. The Energy Department asked the major US 
and UK MNC's also to reduce their exports of North Sea oil.
Thus although committed to re-organize BNOC and to remove the 
special privileges bestowed on it by the Labour Government, the 
Conservatives were not slow to appreciate the usefulness of BNOC, 
to be employed on an ad hoc basis and also as an aid to fulfil
/  / “  1 \
medium term economic aims. In July 1979 David Howell announced 
that BNOC would be effectively split into two organizations and 
the slimmed-down corporation would compete on equal terms with 
the private sector oil companies. The two tier organization would 
have its oil trading activities separated from its role as an 
explorer and producer. Mr Howell justified this decision by 
referring to the shortages experienced during the spring and summer
of 1979 and, again, to the need to provide some assurance of
,. (62) secure supplies.
The method of widening the ownership of BNOC was not settled but
there were definite alternatives being considered by the government.
All BNOC's shareholdings in producing fields or fields under
development could be sold to other oil companies leaving a
drastically diminished company which would have to rely on its
exploration prospects for growth. Alternatively, all of BNOC's
offshore assets could be retained and shares offered on the Stock
Exchange. A major objective of the Conservative Government was
the 'privatization' of BNOC; the government hoped to sell off
interests to the value of around £400m (out of BNOC's total assets
//■
of between £2 billion and £2i billion). The government found
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this very hard to carry out. As the Labour Government received 
opposition from various sources within the political system and 
also from external pressure groups and other interested parties 
with regard to the establishment of BNOC, so the Conservatives 
met with opposition with regard to BNOC's re-structuring.
The task of dismantling BNOC was substantially more difficult 
than was the original task of creating BNOC. The need for an NOC 
in order to protect the nation from the uncertainties of OPEC 
and the (mainly US) oil MNC's is a politically appealing need.
A certain amount of national pride is generated by a British 
NOC competing alongside the US giants, and (to an extent) 
dictating policy to them. A government subsequently in power 
that attempts completely to undo such a policy can be seen to be 
diminishing its own stature by resorting to 'petty party 
politics'. Confronted with such a problem the Conservative 
Government faced difficulties which are again intrinsic to the 
system. Reducing the Central Government's role in the economy by 
definition means that government bureaucrats will lose power and 
influence and many will be made redundant.
Thus there was considerable opposition from the government 
bureaucrats to a Conservative Government attempting to transfer 
a substantial part of the public sector into the private sector, 
in the case of BNOC, the bureaucrats' relative bargaining strength 
over the government was enhanced due to the political popularity 
of an NOC. Non co-operation by civil servants can cause delays; a 
government Minister has numerous other important functions to 
fulfil and therefore must delegate responsibility to junior ministers
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and to senior career-orientated bureaucrats (who may be 
in opposition to the policy). By employing Niskanen and Breton-type 
techniques (see Chapter Three) of withholding and selecting 
information it would be possible to add considerably to the com­
plexity of the task facing the Minister.
A further important source of opposition to the Conservative 
Government was from BNOC itself and the supporters of BNOC within 
the political system. Conservative opposition to the principle of 
BNOC had been well publicized and their actions when they came to 
power were to a large extent, predictable. As has been discussed, 
the primary objective of BNOC between 1976 and 1979 (once having 
proved itself as a competent oil company by taking advantage of 
the Labour Government's enthusiasm for a domestic NOC) was to 
ensure its long term survival by seeking managerial independence. 
Thus a definite strategy was adopted by BNOC in order to protect 
its own interests. Another tactic employed by BNOC was to make 
itself as useful as possible to the Conservatives - most 
significantly with regard to the revenue that would accrue to the 
government.
Thus the forces acting upon the government were such that it was 
unlikely that a Conservative Government would be able to bring about 
all the changes it had originally intended. The idea of completely 
dismantling BNOC was abandoned and various forms of re-structuring 
and privatizing BNOC were suggested. A significant point with 
respect to the privatization of BNOC to be achieved by a bond issue, 
(as outlined by David Howell at the 1980 Conservative Party 
Conference) was the difficulty a future Labour Government would
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have in re-nationalizing BNOC.
The government did remove some of the privileges BNOC had enjoyed 
under the Labour Administration but BNOC were not opposed to this . 
as these privileges had already achieved their purpose in that 
BNOC was able to borrow on the open financial markets. BNOC's 
right to a 51% equity holding in all new exploration acreage was 
removed and BNOC would in future have to apply for blocks on 
equal terms with private companies. BNOC was thought to have too 
many licence obligations on the UKCS and thus the government, in 
disposing of some of BNOC's exploration interests, was putting its 
faith in the private oil companies to continue the exploitation of 
North Sea oil. Consequently, BNOC advertised for offers for farm- 
ins on twenty-three of its licensed blocks.
The government had already ended BNOC's right of first refusal 
when oilfields changed ownership and BNOC was to lose its access 
to cheap financing through the NOA and also its sole right to 
licences outside normal licensing rounds was abolished. Furthermore, 
BNOC lost its right to sit on the operating committees of oilfields 
in which it did not have an equity interest!84  ^ Not unexpectedly 
the government also terminated BNOC's exemption from PRT and its 
advisory role to the Government.
The Department of Energy was generally in favour of these changes 
and would have benefited from them in that there would be a degree 
of transfer of responsibility from BNOC to the Department. BNOC 
itself did little to oppose these changes although Lord Kearton 
consistently maintained that it was unwise to depend on foreign
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multi-national oil companies to develop the UKCS oilfields. The 
attitude of BNOC was that the commercial advantages had now 
become no longer necessary. BNOC would be almost on an equal 
footing with private oil companies and because some changes were - 
inevitable, BNOC's compliance would create goodwill with the 
Conservatives. Although BNOC lost its requirement to advise the 
government on oil matters, there remained a close liaison between 
BNOC and the Department of Energy. BNOC retained its key 
functions as the government's agent for implementing participation 
agreements. The actual changes that had come about were neither 
as far-reaching as the Conservatives had wanted nor did they occur 
with any notable speed.
In the autumn of 1981 David Howell was replaced by Nigel Lawson as 
Secretary of State for Energy. A major priority for Mr Lawson, 
who has been described as being 'as zealous an advocate of 
privatization as is to be found in the present (October 1982)
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Cabinet' was the denationalization of BNOC. Privatization was
a central part of overall Conservative policy and fundamental to 
Conservative Party ideology. The delay in dealing with BNOC was 
increasingly causing political embarrassment to the Conservative 
Government both publicitj and within the Party itself. It was 
of considerable political importance to the Government to privatize 
BNOC and although most privileges given to the Corporation by the 
previous Labour Administration had been withdrawn the principle of 
privatization had not been achieved. Furthermore, the burden of 
BNOC's proposed expenditure (£2000m by 1986) would, at least
partly, have to be met by the Treasury? thus the Government were 
keen for BNOC to acquire private-sector financing.
The Chairman of BNOC, Mr Philip Shelbourne (appointed in May 1980
to replace Lord Kearton1s successor, Mr R Utiger)'was also in
favour of the privatization of BNOC. Thus with the zeal of Mr
Lawson backed by the Prime Minister, the Treasury and Mr Shelbourne,
new impetus was given to the Conservative's commitment to privatize
(6 7 )BNOC. The 'Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act, 1982' provided 
powers for the Government to split off BNOC's upstream activities 
into a subsidiary company which could then be sold, in part, to 
the general public. Ownership of the exploration and production 
company, Britoil, was transferred to the Secretary of State for 
Energy on 1st November 1982. On 10th November, 51% of Britoil's 
issued share capital was offered for sale on the Stock Exchange.
In December 1982 Britoil became a private sector oil company 
with a Government shareholding of 49%.
BNOC remained solely as an oil trading company with functions to
'secure and dispose of UKCS petroleum in a way which contributes
to national security of supply, ... to ensure that the UK economy
receives the maximum benefits from the Corporation's access to
such petroleum ... and to act as the Government's agent in the sale
of oil taken as r o y a l t y - i n - k i n d ' T h u s  the Government
retained considerable and direct influence in the UK oil market.
The political value of the state controlled BNOC was too great
for the government to lose. BNOC's practical use was soon to be
emphasised in the political arena following OPEC's London Meeting
in March 1983. The government was able, through BNOC, to price
North Sea oil at such a level as tacitly to support the OPEC
pricing agreement and prevent OPEC members (specifically Nigeria)
(69)from attempting to undermine the oil price deal.
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The Government intended to raise almost £550m from the sale of 
Britoil shares, plus an £88m debenture repayment.' The method of 
sale of Britoil shares decided upon was through a tender, with 
incentives to encourage participation from 'small' investors. The 
decision for a tender was based largely on political reasoning 
resulting from criticism of the Government following the under- 
pricing of Amersham International. Similarly, various incentives 
given to ’small1 investors (those applying for under 2000 shares) 
were largely due to political considerations. The Government was 
eager to be seen to encourage 'the people of Britain to take a direct 
personal stake in the North Sea'.^8  ^ An additional consideration 
was that the existence of large numbers of small investors may
(71)deter a future Labour Government from re-nationalizing Britoil.
Four main incentives were given to 'small' investors in the sale 
of Britoil shares. First, small investors could opt to buy shares 
at the 'striking price' rather than specifying a bid price.
Second, like large investors, those applying for under 2000 shares 
could pay in two stages, £1 per share on application and the 
remainder on 6th April 1983. Third, a 'loyalty bonus' of one free 
share for every ten held and kept for three years was provided for 
small investors. Fourth, a simplified application form was made 
available in main Post Offices and High Street banks.
Due largely to the timing of the share sale (when there were widely 
(72)reported prospects of a weakening in the world oil price) a
week after the Stock Market launch of Britoil shares, they were
(73)trading at 81p on the part-paid £1. In October 1981 it had been
hoped that the Government could raise between £750m and £1.2b by
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the sale of BNOC's production interests. On 22nd November 1982
Nigel Lawson was able to announce 'Britoil has now been successfully
(75)privatized on eminently fair terms for the taxpayer'. However,
the small investor had not responded in great numbers to the 
Government's encouragement to purchase Britoil shares. Although 
Britoil was free from uncertain political and bureaucratic 
interference, the Government retained certain powers within the 
company. As long as the Government shareholding in Britoil is 
greater than 20% the Secretary of State for Energy is empowered to 
appoint two Directors to the Board of Britoil. In addition, the 
Government possesses the special 'golden' share which may be 
used to control any change in ownership of Britoil. The special 
share was designed to prevent ownership of Britoil passing to 
foreign interests.
The delay in the privatization of BNOC illustrates how Government 
oil policy intentions can be deflected by short-term political 
considerations. The privatization programme was central to 
Conservative policy and the privatization of BNOC was an important 
political symbol of the Conservatives' commitment to free 
enterprise. Mr Lawson was able to achieve considerable personal 
stature in the Conservative Government by implementing the 
privatization policy thus enhancing his career prospects within 
the Party. Following the Conservative's General Election win in 
June 1983, Mr Lawson was promoted to become Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. The personal competence of Mr Lawson, as Energy 
Secretary, with the backing of the Prime Minister, was an important 
factor in the privatization of BNOC. The existence of the private 
sector company, Britoil, showed that an important political
(74)
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objective of the Conservative Government had been achieved.
However, a 'ratchet effect' of government policy may be seen.
The Conservative Government retained a 49% shareholding in 
Britoil as well as the special powers associated with the 'golden', 
share. In addition, the government ensured it had the potential 
for control, (with respect to directing and pricing substantial 
quantities of North Sea oil) through its ownership of BNOC as an 
oil trading company. The Conservatives were unable or more likely, 
unwilling to restore the initial policy situation with regard to 
participation and control (i.e. the situation existing prior to 
the 1974 Labour Administration) with no direct involvement in the 
UK oil industry.
150
CHAPTER SIX
DEPLETION POLICY
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The concept of a government depletion policy, by definition implies 
that the government is unwilling to allow producer companies to 
determine their own production profiles. The implicit assumption thus 
being made by the government is that it is superior in its ability 
(relative to the industry) to identify some optimal production profile 
and it is capable of implementing policies which will result in this 
objective being fulfilled. The overall objective of this chapter is 
to examine the validity of these assertions in practice.
The case for a UK government oil depletion policy is examined in the 
context of government pronouncements and actions since the 1964 
Continental Shelf Act. As in previous chapters, the concepts of the 
economic theories of politics and bureaucracies are employed in 
analysing the reasoning behind the government's formulation and 
adoption of a depletion policy.
Following an introductory description of government attitudes to 
depletion policy up to 1974, there is a brief outline of the economic 
case for government intervention in the oil industry to secure an 
optimal resource depletion rate in the North Sea. Government aims 
are analysed and the economic and political considerations underlying 
the arguments for a depletion policy are highlighted. The third 
section attempts to explain government behaviour since 1974 in the 
context of a political and bureaucratic framework. The fourth section 
examines the period 1974-1980 and finally the major alternative 
policy instruments are considered. By identifying the pressures on 
the government policy process it is possible to examine the development
1. Introduction
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of a depletion policy in the UK which is ’imperfect' and to suggest 
future policy trends in the framework of an imperfect government.
2. The Historical Background (1964-1974)
The decade prior to the 1973-4 world oil price increases was
characterized by a lack of government intervention in the UK offshore
oil industry (see Chapter Two). Both major political parties were keen
to encourage the rapid exploitation of any resources that might be
found on the UKCS. Thus relative to most other oil producing regions
there was an attractive fiscal regime, generous licensing terms and
(2)an absence of explicit depletion controls . In the mid-1960's 
there was considerable uncertainty as to the potential size of any UKCS oil 
reserves. After having discovered gas in the southern basin of the 
North Sea, oil companies' expectations of finding oil were high. 
Expectations of future price and cost trends during the mid-1960's were 
affected by forces working in opposing directions. As exploration 
activity increased in more hostile environments, costs were expected 
to rise and as world demand increased this would tend to force prices 
up. However, these pressures were expected to be offset by the rapid 
development and internationalization of new technology, competition 
between oil companies, cheap Middle Eastern supplies, and shale oil.
Successive governments during this period created an environment in 
which the oil companies would be willing to commit vast resources for 
long periods of time into extremely risky ventures. Although at this 
time there was no oil discovered and therefore to deplete, governments' 
ambitions of rapid exploitation did apply to the future extraction of
(1)
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oil. Governments had concluded that, "the balance of advantage to
the UK lay in exploiting and extracting these reserves of gas and
(3)oil as quickly as possible" . This policy was nevertheless backed 
(4)by legislation which gave the Energy Secretary significant 
potential powers with regard to introducing depletion controls.
By the beginning of the 1970's the UK government began to modify its
rapid exploitation policy in response to a changing world oil market.
(5)The publication of the Club of Rome paper, "Limits to Growth" , 
the shift in power away from the western multinational oil companies 
towards the oil producing states and the discovery of sizeable reserves 
in the northern North Sea, all acted to alter the popular perception 
of the international oil market. Up to this time UK depletion policy 
had not been an important political issue, nor had there been serious 
questioning of the government's intention to promote rapid exploration 
and also rapid extraction. Presumably this policy meant the 
government intended to allow the oil companies to determine their own 
production profiles according to commercial criteria, but it could 
be interpreted as meaning that the government was prepared to speed 
up production to some rate above that preferred by the oil companies.
When substantial reserves of oil were discovered in the North Sea 
the government began to re-examine its offshore oil policy. In common 
with other oil producing regions, once the government became aware of 
the potential economic and political value of its offshore oil a 
gradual trend towards increasing its revenue from, and control of 
North Sea operations, became apparent. Part of this overall policy 
trend was the explicit introduction of discussions of depletion 
controls into the general debate on offshore oil policy. The reasons
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for the timing of this development are central to the formulation 
of domestic oil depletion policy (and to oil policy in general).
3. The Political Rationale for a Depletion Policy
As has been explained in Chapters Two and Three, by 1974 North Sea 
oil had become a major political issue. Numerous national and 
international factors combined at this time to make it politically 
necessary for all the political parties to highlight their domestic 
oil policies. Before examining the effects of various bureaucratic 
and political pressures on the depletion policy process it is necessary 
to outline the theoretical case for government-imposed depletion 
controls. The case for government depletion controls in theory is 
based on the assertion that an imperfect industry is unlikely to bring 
about an optimal depletion r a t e . ^  However, the oligopolistic oil 
industry does not necessarily deplete resources ’too fast'. Because 
many environmental costs of oil production are not internalised and 
are therefore not accounted for in oil prices, there is a tendency 
towards a 'too rapid' rate of depletion. In other words, if oil 
prices are 'too low' due to the presence of externalities not 
included in the oil price, then consumers are likely to demand greater 
amounts of oil than if the oil price reflected the precise costs 
involved. However, there is an important factor to set against the 
tendency for resources to be depleted too fast as a consequence of 
neglected environmental costs. Oligopolies tend to price higher, and 
fix output lower than in a competitve market situation resulting in 
a tendency to deplete oil 'too slowly'.
Secondly, the assertion that market interest rates are higher
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than the social time preference rate, and that therefore producers 
extract oil at a faster rate than society desires, similarly does 
not necessarily cause oil resources to be depleted 'too fast'. High 
interest rates in the economy tend to depress investment generally, 
so that in the oil industry (with low rates of economic growth) 
there will be a slowdown in the rates of depletion.
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It is important to note that it is very difficult to determine the
socially desirable rate of depletion. In addition, it is clear that
there are many problems associated with determining whether the
actual rate of depletion is 'too fast' or 'too slow'. It is
accepted that the UK offshore oil industry is characterized by many
imperfections but that in itself does not justify government-imposed
(7)depletion controls. The following analysis attempts to highlight 
imperfections in the government depletion policy process which 
detract from the government's ability to intervene effectively in 
the oil industry, even if the market rate of depletion would be 
non-optimal.
The UK sector of the North Sea had become, by the early 1970's, a
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region with proven oil reserves. The first (and relatively small)
(8)discovery of oil on the UKCS was as early as 1967. However, it 
was the discovery of the Forties Field in 1970 (estimated total 
recoverable reserves of 261 million tonnes) and Brent Field
(9)(estimated total recoverable reserves of 219 million tonnes) which
began to draw public attention to the wealth creating potential of
North Sea oil. Thus the success of the private oil companies - at
this stage in finding oil - effected the commencement of a gradual
change in the public's consciousness with regard to North Sea oil.
The public began to expect to be informed as to how the government
would handle the development of the oil reserves and it was at this
time that official announcements as to the possibility of government
imposed depletion controls began to be reported in the Press.
The Committee of Public Accounts in 1973 received evidence from the
Department of Trade and Industry who for the first time suggested
that the government was considering the possibility of phasing out its
rapid exploitation policy and that they could foresee circumstances in
( 11 )which there would be an "advantage in delaying the exploitation" 
of North Sea oil reserves.
The international oil market during the winter of 1973-4 was subjected 
to considerable upheaval and confusion. The OPEC oil embargo and 
the subsequent quadrupling of the price of oil thrust UK domestic oil 
policy to the forefront of public awareness. Media coverage of the 
'oil crisis' was extensive and had the effect of focusing attention 
on the activities of oil companies (many of which were foreign owned 
multi-national corporations) operating in the North Sea and in the 
role of the government in 'safeguarding' the nation's natural 
resources. With respect to depletion policy, the events in the world
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oil market of 1973-4 were of considerable and specific importance.
On 1st October 1973, the crude marker, Arabian Light, was priced at
$3,011 per barrel F.O.B. By 1st January 1974, the price was $11,651 
(12)per barrel F.O.B. This price increase had a significant effect
both on the economics of North Sea oil and on the UK government's 
attitude towards it.
In July 1974, the Labour Government published an oil and gas policy 
(13)White Paper which attracted attention chiefly due to the
Government's proposals concerning state participation in the North
Sea and the establishment of BNOC (see Chapter Five). The Labour
Government stated that it would "take power to control the level of
(14)production in the national interest". Although the Government
was keen to encourage exploration and development it felt that in the
future depletion controls would become necessary and therefore the
powers needed to impose controls should be established as soon as
possible. These announcements were made at the same time as more
controversial participation plans,but declaration of the acceptance
in principle of the need for depletion controls was not a contentious
issue in itself. The need for depletion controls was accepted by all
the major political parties, although there were differences as to
the method by which any controls should be implemented. For example,
the Scottish Nationalist (who at that time were very important to
national politics) favoured a slowdown of development plans and a
(15)production ceiling of 50 million tonnes per annum. The
Conservatives argued for an Oil Conservation Authority to control
* 4-* (16>production.
This agreement can be explained by various political and economic
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factors, and is crucial to the analysis of this chapter. The central
(17)thesis of Down's economic theory of politres 'states that
politicians (and political parties) adopt policies to maximise votes
and not necessarily because of the desirability of the outcome of
the policy. In the context of depletion policy this is closely
(18)related to Breton's concept of an individual voter's 'coercion
threshold' (see Chapter Three). Downs maintains that the consti­
tutional structure of a representative democracy acts to remove those 
in power from direct contact with voting citizens and knowledge of 
their preferences and wants. Thus any hint of interest in, or 
concern for an issue that politicians can clearly identify is 
likely to be siezed upon and developed into the basis of some policy. 
The media attention bestowed on the 1973-4 international 'oil crisis' 
and its implications for the UK's indigenous reserves thus acted to 
raise the public consciousness with regard to North Sea oil, and also 
to lower the individual's coercion threshold. The public had become 
relatively well informed on the subject and the cost to the 
individual in obtaining this information had been minimal. It thus 
became a political necessity for political parties to formulate oil 
policies.
(19)Furthermore, Downs argues that politicians adopt policies in order 
to hold office because of the intrinsic rewards of holding office.
This concept can be extended, in a two party system, to include 
Tullock's a n a l y s i s o f  the effects of inter-party competition on 
the adoption of a policy by a political party. There is a desire by 
the two major political parties to adopt a policy that will not allow 
the opposing party to adopt a more popular policy. As there is 
already a perception of need for a depletion policy, both parties
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are keen to formulate a policy which will be at least as popular
as the opposing party's policy. Due to the lack'of explicit
knowledge the parties have of individual voter's preferences, their
policies will tend to converge on each other. Caution results from
the lack of accurate information in the possession of the political
parties and also the high cost (in terms of lost votes) of developing
(2 1 )and adopting a 'wrong' policy. It has been postulated that the 
incumbent party is able to gather a greater amount of information 
- which is of better quality - than the Opposition is able to 
accumulate, due to its greater resources.(i.e. in the Civil Service). 
This does not necessarily result in the incumbent party always 
adopting the 'best' (in terms of vote maximization) policy but it 
is quite possible for the 'wrong' policy to be adopted by both 
parties. If, for example, the Department of Energy advises the 
government to employ some depletion policy because the Department 
will benefit from the existence of that policy then the government, 
dependent on the Department for information and advice, may formulate 
a policy based on that advice. The Opposition, assuming the 
government is able to identify the 'correct' policy, copies it. The 
result is that both parties may adopt a 'wrong' policy. Thus there 
will always be an element of 'policy imitation' by one party if it 
feels the other party is better able to gauge public opinion on an 
issue and this will again tend towards both parties adopting similar 
policies.
In the case of depletion policy both major political parties have 
accepted in principle the need for government at least to have the 
ability to intervene and control production. The method by which 
this is to take place, although unclear in detail, differs between
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parties. This difference can be explained, to an extent, by Downsian 
type analysis whereby politicians are constrained in their attempts 
simply to maximize votes by intra-party rivalry, ideology, macro­
political priorities and external pressures. These factors prevent
the political parties formulating a policy with the sole purpose of
(22)maximizing votes. Added to this is the 'fog of uncertainty1 
in which political advisors function which makes the vote maximizing 
policy itself unclear; thus the probability of both parties adopting 
'wrong' policies is relatively high. This can lead to the 
establishment of a third party which feels it can identify voter 
preferences more accurately.
Because the major political parties receive similar information with 
regard to what is politically required in order to maximise votes 
there tends to be a degree of agreement in principle - in this case 
- for a depletion policy. The implication is that political parties 
may adopt policies that are contrary to party ideology because of 
the perception of popular support for that policy. In lacking a 
discernible policy the political party risks the possibility of 
allowing the opposing party to capture an unacceptable number of 
votes.. In the context of present day depletion policy it would be 
expected that on the basis of ideology the Conservatives would tend 
to dismiss the idea of a depletion policy as it is interventionist. 
However, due to perceptions of political need the Conservatives 
have accepted the existence of the machinery for the implementation
of a depletion policy in order to maximize votes. But, because of
lpressure from idealog,ues within the party, they are reluctant to 
enforce the policy as wholeheartedly as a Labour Government. 
Similarly, Labour's commitment to control has also been modified
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(see below) due to different governmental constraints.
The agreement between the parties on the principle of depletion
control can partly be explained by political expedience but also by
(23)an agreement on the economic factors which combine to make a 
depletion policy desirable in economic terms. Whether these economic 
considerations (for example, security of supply, self-sufficiency, 
flattening the production 'hump', etc.) are based on mistaken 
assumptions is not at issue at this point. What is relevant is that 
these factors were commonly perceived to be the economic reality and 
decisions were made from that basis.
Following the 1973-4 oil price increases the world oil market has 
been characterized by considerable uncertainty. This has resulted in 
the belief that the security of supply of North Sea oil is of great 
strategic importance to the domestic economy. Related to this idea 
is that, following the 1973-4 oil 'crisis', political parties reached 
the conclusion that it would be economically and politically 
undesirable for the domestic economy to be disrupted to such a degree 
in the event of another oil embargo or supply interruption.
Political pressure to be seen to adopt some policy which could prevent 
such disorder was made more intense by the well publicized 'excess' 
profits which accrued to the multi-national oil companies as a result 
of the world oil price increases of 1973-4.
There was also a general acceptance that oil prices would tend to 
increase over time, thus making it economically advantageous to invest 
in oil in the ground rather than extract it in the present form. This 
argument was enforced by the belief that oil company discount rates
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were high (relative to the government's) and therefore apparently- 
placed too little emphasis on the long term. Again, it is not the 
issue here whether or not these are valid assumptions; they were 
the perceived reality from which basis decisions were formulated.
These factors together with increased estimates of North Sea oil
reserves, led to an acceptance of the opinion that self-sufficiency
in oil should be maintained for as long a period as possible and that
there should then be a 'flattening of the hump* of domestic oil
(24)production. There is also a popular belief that oil should be
treated differently from other traded commodities because of its 
strategic importance to the economy.
The above factors directly influence the evolution and development 
of a government depletion policy and are political and economic 
signals which are received by both major parties. Due to these 
pressures on the formulation of government policy both parties have 
reached a certain consensus on the principle of depletion policy.
There are further factors which indirectly influence political 
parties' attitudes towards depletion policy and these are more general 
points which apply not only to depletion policy but to oil policy in 
general. The overall trend of increasing government intervention in 
the North Sea oil industry since 1974 can, at least partly, be 
explained by the economic theory of politics and the theory of 
bureaucracy. A popular belief has been that North Sea oil is too 
important to be left to the control of foreign oil companies whose 
interests may act against some sort of 'national interest'. The 
result has been that political parties can maximize votes by being 
seen to be adopting measures to control the activities of the oil
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companies and to oversee the exploitation of North Sea oil ensuring 
the 'national interest', however defined, is protected.
Niskanen-type analysis would support this pressure for increasing 
intervention because the Department of Energy would rationally attempt 
to expand in size and budget; therefore it would attempt to influence 
the government so as certain policies emphasising certain characteristics 
would be adopted. The government depends on the Department of Energy 
for a considerable proportion of its information with regards the 
domestic oil industry. The incumbent party, whether Labour or 
Conservative, would be subject to these very strong pressures in 
addition to the attraction, in political terras, of being seen to act 
to protect a 'valuable national resource'. Government intervention 
can tend to be self-perpetuating because of bureaucrats expanding 
their budgets and because of their opposition to attempts to reduce 
their budgets. Thus it would seem to be harder for a Conservative 
Government to enter office and reduce intervention than for a Labour 
Government to increase intervention. A characteristic of Mrs 
Thatcher's government has been the commitment to keeping departmental 
expenditure down. Thus it is possible for a Minister to achieve 
prestige and success by reducing the budget size (or at least 
controlling it) of his department. However, faced with opposition 
from senior bureaucrats this has proved to be a difficult task (see 
Chapter Five).
4. Government Behaviour 1974-1980
In the early 1970's the government began to further the extent of its 
control and influence in the North Sea and also to tighten the forms 
of licensing policy (Chapter Four) and the fiscal regime (Chapter
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Seven). One aspect of this trend was the consensus opinion on the 
need for a depletion policy. Although there has'-been agreement on 
the need for a depletion policy there has been a significant absence 
of explicit pronouncements and activity with respect to depletion 
control.
(25)The 1975 Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act which legislated 
to create BNOC also confers on the Energy Secretary extensive powers 
with respect to depletion controls. There was uncertainty with 
regard to the precise intentions of the government and as a result 
a set of guidelines, the 'Varley Assurances' (see Chapter Two) were
/q/*\
announced. These guidelines were designed to reassure the oil
companies as to the extent that the government would exercise its 
powers of depletion controls and its introduction of further powers. 
But still the government's intentions were far from clear and the 
Energy Secretary had virtually unlimited powers to control depletion 
in the vague interest of the ‘national good'. Oil companies could 
do little to contest his rulings. Pressure and lobbying from the 
oil companies had the effect of the government revising or withdrawing 
some sections of the Bill during its passage through Parliament.
Parts of the Bill which empowered the Minister to determine maximum 
and minimum production rates were withdrawn. However, the Energy 
Secretary still possessed extensive powers in the area of production 
rates. Producers were instructed to submit programmes detailing 
their capital investment plans and maximum and minimum production 
rates for oil and gas. The Energy Secretary had the power to reject 
programmes if they were not in the 'national interest' or were 
considered not to be consistent with 'good oilfield practise'. Both 
these criteria can be interpreted so as to encompass almost any '
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conceivable circumstances that the Minister may arbitrarily include. 
Furthermore, if the programme is approved by the'Energy Secretary, 
he can give the producer a 'limitation notice1 which specifies limits 
within which the Minister can, by using a further notice issued after 
some designated period, direct the companies to produce. Another 
notice may require either a speeding up of the producer's production 
plans in the case of a 'national emergency', or a slowing down, in 
order to advance the 'national interest1. Although the producers 
have the benefit of pre-specified production limits it is up to the 
discretion of the Minister as to how to define what exactly consti­
tutes a 'national emergency' or the situation which requires
(27)intervention in the 'national interest'. Furthermore, the 1976
Energy Act gives the Minister for Energy further powers to control
oil and gas depletion and it is uncertain as to whether the 'Varley
Guidelines' apply to controls exerted through the Energy Act rather
(28)than the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act.
With respect to government depletion policy, the Petroleum and 
Submarine Pipelines Act and the 'Varley Guidelines' are consistent 
with the Downsian and Niskanen-type analysis outlined previously. 
Although the depletion policy intentions, as stated in the Petroleum 
and Submarine Pipelines Act, are the policy of Labour politicians as 
a single entity within the government, there are pressure groups and 
factions within the Labour Party and elsewhere in the policy process. 
Decision-makers at Cabinet level, the Energy Secretary and junior 
Ministers, would be heavily reliant on the Civil Servants in the 
Department of Energy for information and guidance. Obviously there 
are political and ideological constraints imposed on the Department 
of Energy outside which their recommendations would be unacceptable
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to a Labour Government and there would be the views of other Ministers 
and political factions within the parliamentary and national parties 
to consider. However there are very powerful groups within the 
Labour party who would be sympathetic towards policies that attempted 
to increase the influence and control of the government in the 
economy generally. The bureaucrat in the Department of Energy would 
attempt to expand the budget size of his department (by expanding its 
capacity for control in the North Sea and for the introduction of 
further controls in the future), thus fulfilling his maximand by 
supporting policies which accord with Labour Party ambitions with 
regard to the role of the state.
Therefore the Department of Energy keen to increase its sphere of 
influence in the North Sea, might well support the type of depletion 
'policy' outlined in the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act and the 
1976 Energy Act. The Energy Secretary, because of the extensive 
powers granted to him by these Acts, would be heavily dependent on the 
Department of Energy for advice and information. This would not only 
give the Department of Energy a continuous duty to considering 
depletion policy rather than for more general purposes of regulation 
- but the Department would also be required constantly to update and 
revise plans for the oil sector and the energy sector as a whole.
Breton gives examples of what he calls "typically bureaucratic
(29)behaviour" and it can be seen that the structure of depletion
policy put forward in the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act 
fulfills many of the properties that government bureaucrats desire in 
a policy. These characteristics of policy include the introduction 
of elaborate machinery, systematically re-defining the objectives and
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purpose of a policy to ensure it remains up-to-date and favouring 
economic planning. It should be noted however, that the Department 
of Energy itself is not a monolithic structure with a single set of 
ambitions. Divisions within the Department may have contradicting 
objectives; for example, the Oil Division has the closest contact 
with the oil companies and thus may tend to favour the company 
viewpoint and prefer fewer detailed controls. The Energy Secretary 
would view the extensive powers given to him in the Petroleum and 
Submarine Pipelines Act as increasing his personal stature,and his 
bargaining power within the government would be strengthened. Thus 
by expanding the influence (and budget) of his department the Energy 
Secretary is indirectly enhancing his own 'ranking' on the government 
front bench. This trend would have been gathering momentum as energy 
- oil specifically - became of significant political and strategic 
importance in the 1970's. Thus the Energy Secretary could exploit 
this trend by taking the opportunity to widen his sphere of control.
Reaction to these depletion plans from oil companies was, at this 
stage, somewhat muted. The oil companies were prepared to accept the 
principle that the government needs the legal powers to control 
depletion rates in extreme circumstances, but their main concerns were 
the extent of the controls and the possibility of arbitrary 
implementation. This, as with BNOC's originally proposed functions, 
highlights a major difficulty faced by the government in developing 
policies to control the North Sea oil industry. In legislation of 
this kind, which attempts to construct the legal framework for 
government intervention at some time in the future, there is an 
intrinsic difficulty relating to industry confidence. The world 
oil industry is characterized by considerable uncertainty and the
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UK government, in attempting to legislate in order to be able to
react to any potential upheaval in the oil industry, can add
considerably to that uncertainty. The desire on behalf of the
(30)Department of Energy for flexibility in order to safeguard 
domestic oil supplies in the event of some national or inter­
national disruption conflicts with the industry's need for relative 
stability and certainty. This 'security of supply1 argument is 
often put forward by the Department of Energy as a reason for 
government control, or at least the power for control, in the off­
shore oil industry. However, this argument is similar to the 
'national interest' argument in that both are vague and unprecise 
terms which are popularly very appealing and thus, with respect to 
the politician, can ensure vote maximization. With respect to 
the bureaucrat within the Department of Energy, a flexible 
policy based on a politically attractive maxim gives the department 
a great deal of discretionary power and thus helps fulfil the 
maximization of budget size objective.
It is not in dispute that the central government must possess the 
legal and institutional capabilities to intervene in the offshore 
oil industry in the case of a genuine national emergency. However, 
the system of control outlined in the Petroleum and Submarine 
Pipelines Act (for example, to alter production rates in the 
'national interest') seem superfluous to the necessary requirements 
of the government to respond to a large-scale upheaval in the oil 
market. The 'Varley Guidelines' were specifically desgined to 
assure the oil companies that the government would not alter pro­
duction programmes outside the limits laid down. This did little to 
placate the fears of the oil companies (although it did postpone the
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implementation of any depletion measures until 1982 at the earliest) 
as the Minster's extensive discretionary powers femained.
The Labour Government's depletion plans published in the Petroleum 
and Submarine Pipelines Act were somewhat overshadowed by the inclusion 
in the same document of the Government's plans with regard to 
participation and the establishment of BNOC (see Chapter Five). These 
plans received a great deal of public attention because of the radical 
nature of the proposals. The Conservative Opposition and the 
private sector oil companies criticized the Act overwhelmingly on 
its plans for participation and the plans for depletion controls 
seemed to be given the tacit approval of the Opposition. This was 
largely because the Conservatives recognized the political need for 
the existence of a depletion policy even though their precise method 
of implementation might have been different.
Thus the 1974-9 Labour Government constructed the legal framework for
the introduction of a depletion policy although, as far as can be
known, they did not implement any aspects of it with respect to oil.
Following the election of Mrs Thatcher's Conservative Administration in
1979, there was apparently little change in the government's attitude
to oil depletion policy. A conspicuously non-interventionist
Conservative Government could, somewhat naively, be expected to reduce
state control in the oil sector as a matter of political principle.
(32)The Conservatives made it clear that they intended to dismantle 
BNOC and reduce state control in the North Sea. However, the 
Conservative Government continued with the existing policy which 
effectively was one of 'no-policy1, i.e. the Conservatives had a 
very similar perception to the Labour Government as to the political
(31)
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- in vote maximizing terms - value of a depletion policy. It was
not until July 1980 that the Energy Secretary made an explicit
(33)policy statement on depletion policy.
In this statement it was made clear that the government's objectives
were to "prolong the high levels of UKCS production to the end of
(34)the Century". This was to be achieved by increasing exploration 
and at the same time enforcing some kind of depletion control. Again 
the precise method of depletion control was not yet clear, although 
Mr Howell, the Energy Secretary, stated that both production cutbacks 
and development delays were being’considered (possibly with respect 
to the Clyde and 'T' Block projects). The overall content of the 
statement was such that the government did little more than express 
its very general intentions with respect to depletion policy. The 
statement outlined the government's overall attitude to depletion in 
that it publicly emphasised the government's concern over depletion 
policy and demonstrated that the depletion debate within government 
was continuing. Thus the statement fulfilled an important political 
function in that although Mr Howell did not outline specific policy 
proposals, he made it clear that the government considered the 
concept of government controlled depletion to be an important aspect 
of energy policy. This retained public support and attention and 
avoided giving the Opposition an opportunity to capture votes by 
formulating its own policy. It also highlights the quandary facing 
successive UK governments since the mid-1970's in that the government 
appreciated the political necessity for announcing the existence of a 
depletion policy but appeared to be unable to formulate a policy 
consistent with other economic objectives which satisfied the 
ambitions of the powerful groups within the government which help
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develop the policy. This was especially difficult for the 
Conservatives because of ideological opposition within the Party to 
control. The statement illustrates the difficulty the government 
experiences in attempting to reconcile various interested groups,- 
and it is possible to identify references to some of these groups 
in the statement.
The justification given by the Minister for a depletion policy
throughout this statement is overwhelmingly political. The reasons
presented are that vague general conditions will be fulfilled, i.e.
the 'national interest*, 'security of supply' and 'good oilfield
practice'. It has been emphasized that all these terms, whilst
being popularly attractive, unless explicity defined are somewhat
nebulous. They are open to considerable interpretation which
effectively places a great deal of discretionary power with the
Minister, allowing almost any policy to be subsequently developed
and justified as desirable on the basis of its being consistent with
the 'national interest'. Similarly, unless the government gives a
detailed explanation and definition of what it considers to be
( 3 5 )'strategic security of supply grounds' this can also be used as 
a justification for almost any future intervention. To an extent 
the Minister is also keeping all options for future controls open, 
whilst at the same time ensuring popular political support by 
referring to 'optimum oil and gas recovery in the national interest'. 
Although 'optimum oil and gas recovery' has precise economic 
implications, unless these are made explicit it can again be 
interpreted in many ways. Because the 'optimum recovery' is to take 
place 'in the national interest' the likelihood is that bureaucratic 
and political objectives may supercede economic considerations.
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The bureaucratic pressures within the political system are evident
from the references to the need for firstly, a 'flexible approach'
and secondly, for continuous 'supervision' and scrutinization of
(38)licence applications. These functions are both consistent with
bureaucratic ambitions for maximizing budget size. The Minister is 
thus careful to consider the views of the powerful pressure groups 
within the government policy process, and also the overall objectives 
of the Conservative Party and Government. Viewed in this context it 
is perhaps not surprising that the Conservative's attitude towards 
depletion policy was, under Mr Howell, largely a continuation of the 
previous Labour Government's attitude.
5. A Policy of 'No-Policy' - 1980 and the Future
A fundamental problem confronted in any discussion on depletion policy 
is to identify clearly what is actually being discussed, i.e. what is 
meant by the term 'depletion'. Related to this definitional problem 
is the issue of the purpose of a depletion policy. If groups or 
individuals involved in discussions on depletion have an interest in 
the outcome of the debate, then it is possible for them to bias the 
discussion towards their objectives.
Since the mid-1970's, debate on the depletion of UKCS oil and gas 
resources has been primarily concerned with the downward control of 
production or, more specifically, with a flattening out of the 
so-called 'hump' once expected in the mid-1980's. Depletion policy, 
however, is about the rate of extraction of a non-renewable resource 
and thus it is not axiomatic that it should be concerned with the 
reduction of the rate of extraction. Recent discussion concerning
( 3 7 )
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depletion policy has focussed on reducing extraction rates in the
North Sea but this, as pointed out to the Energy-Select Committee
(39)is a 'narrow interpretation' of depletion which fails to
consider associated issues. Thus it often happens that when 
depletion is discussed, the related issue of 'repletion' is 
neglected.
In the area of depletion, oil companies are primarily concerned with 
a two-fold objective; 'depletion of existing reserves and repletion 
of those resources as they are depleted'. In the physical 
extraction of oil, the operating companies possess a great deal of 
technical expertise to which the Department of Energy does not have 
direct access. However, from the evidence presented over a period 
of eight months to the Energy Select Committee on North Sea depletion 
policy in 1981-2 it seems that the secondary aspect of repletion has 
been given little attention by the Department of Energy, with 
discussions concentrating on the relatively narrow issues of reducing 
production levels or delaying development.
A strict definition of depletion is important because, to an extent, 
it determines the nature and direction of the whole debate. The 
desires of government bureaucrats and political advisors for a 
depletion policy may implicitly bias and prejudice the depletion 
debate. Moreover, if oil companies expect the government to introduce 
some sort of depletion policy, the evidence may be formulated on 
the basis of the government having decided, according to its own 
political criteria, on the introduction of a depletion policy largely 
irrespective of oil company opinion. Thus there may be elements of 
strategic behaviour by the oil companies when giving evidence to the
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Energy Select Committee, perhaps by concentrating on how a depletion 
policy might be implemented rather than the merits of a depletion 
policy per se. The discretionary licensing system may be used to 
secure oil industry co-operation by the government (see Chapter Four) 
and oil companies may be reluctant to lose the goodwill of the 
government by arguing too forcefully against the principle of a 
depletion policy.
(41)The Select Committee on Energy Report on depletion policy
emphasised this need to include repletion in the debate. The Committee
suggested there is a need to maintain and to encourage exploration in
the North Sea into the 1990's as by this means greater knowledge of
the resource base can be gained. Without a high degree of knowledge
of the existence and location of oil reserves (with respect to
commercial accessibility) on the UKCS, it is very difficult to discuss
depletion proposals in detail. Restrictions on production in the
short and medium term can cause detrimental longer-term effects with
(42)regard to production and knowledge. Thus the overall discussion
of depletion needs to include aspects of policy designed at least to 
encourage the most complete exploratory activity on the UKCS as well 
as narrower aspects of reducing production or delaying development.
The government is in a position to create a commercial and economic 
climate which does not inhibit activity on the UKCS by, for example, 
introducing disincentives to investment in the oil tax system 
(Chapter Seven) or by introducing further political uncertainties to 
the oil industry (Chapter Six).
Lack of information and knowledge is a serious problem in the 
introduction of a depletion policy. Inherent uncertainties in the
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oil sector arise out of a lack of knowledge of the size of potential 
reserves, the rate of production per time period? and the price of 
oil. Thus, even before any instrument of depletion is explicitly 
considered, the uncertainties involved are already very extensive 
and cast doubt on the government's ability to alter depletion rates
to achieve an optimal outcome - even if one was theoretically
obtainable. In examining the possible instruments of depletion 
control, further uncertainties and inconsistencies can be highlighted 
within the policy process.
Production cutbacks and development delays are the two most obvious 
instruments for government action to reduce the rate of depletion. 
Although there is broad agreement on the side of the oil companies 
as to the net effects of government depletion controls, there is a
divergence of opinion concerning which of the two methods is
preferable. As far as the government is concerned, the main advantage 
of production cutbacks over development delays is that production 
cutbacks can have an immediate impact and are more susceptible to 
'fine-tuning'. Nevertheless, from the politicians' viewpoint, 
production cutbacks postpone revenues which would have accrued in 
the immediate future and are therefore politically undesirable 
(especially to the Treasury). Development delays postpone revenues 
which would not have appeared for a period of years and.are thus 
less important to the politician now in office. Furthermore, all 
forms of downward controls risk passing on revenues to a government 
of another political party.
The oil companies' main objections to production cutbacks arise from 
their implications for company plans and finances (although this
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effect can be reduced if the timing and extent of cutbacks are known 
in advance). Plans made by companies would necessarily consider 
predicted cash flows and if production was subsequently disrupted, 
this could cause serious cash flow problems for oil companies. In 
addition, inefficiencies could result from idle capacity which oil 
companies could, in the short term, do little to offset. Although 
Esso were adamant that their 1 interests are not served by production
(43)cutbacks' they maintained that when compared to the likely 
alternative of development delays their preference was for production 
cutbacks. Because of the very long lead times in the oil industry, 
immense problems of forecasting exist with respect to the implementation 
of development delays. By examining depletion policy in the context 
of the economic theories of politics and bureaucracies, it is possible 
to see how the government justifies imposing development delays when 
in doing so it implicitly assumes that it is superior in its ability 
accurately to forecast prices, cost and demand conditions in the 
1990's. The government is also assuming that the oil companies, in 
response to market signals, will not react by altering their 
production profiles, irrespective of government directives. Once 
the development delay has been announced there can be little flexibility 
due to the long lead times. Idle capacity may accrue, but not 
necessarily in the form of underused rigs or other capital equipment, 
but in the form of highly skilled human capital. Expert teams of 
geologists and engineers may, for instance, be split up or re-deployed 
away from the North Sea. These factors, cumulatively, could result 
in a serious loss of momentum with respect to the exploitation of 
North Sea oil. Moreover, fears of further possible intervention 
would mean that oil companies would not be keen to come back into 
the North Sea after they have started to phase out their operations on 
the UKCS.
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Shell favoured development delays rather than production cutbacks 
because they are the least disruptive in the sense that the
(44)development costs would not be incurred in the first place.
(45)Esso, however, argued that the loss of momentum of exploration 
and development where there are development delays outweighs the 
drawbacks of production cutbacks. This difference within the oil 
industry may not be significant given Shell and Esso's overall 
attitude to depletion controls. It is misleading to consider each 
potential depletion instrument in isolation as direct depletion 
controls are inter-related with other aspects of North Sea oil policy 
which have an indirect effect on depletion.
Shell's preference for development delays is argued alongside a
criticism of the licensing system. Although licensing is not
explicitly employed as a tool of depletion control, the nature of
the discretionary system is such that the Department of Energy can
offer certain blocks, or accept certain projects, on the basis of
very general criteria. More importantly, the licensing rounds have
been very irregular in both size and frequency which has impaired
the ability of oil companies to plan into the future (see Chapter
Four). The Department of Energy favours a discretionary system of
licensing and oil companies do not object to this sytem. Oil
companies operating in the UK sector of the North Sea have learnt
how to use the system effectively and there are also bureaucratic
tendencies within oil companies which would favour a discretionary
system (see Chapter Four). With a more formal structure to licensing,
(such as yearly rounds as proposed by Mobil and Esso, or two-yearly
rounds as proposed by Shell and with special terms to promote
(47)the development of frontier areas) plans could be made with a
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greater degree of certainty. Thus the total effect of various 
government policies in the North Sea which create an overall 
environment is what the oil companies attempt to change rather than 
one policy in isolation. In the 1960's and early 1970's, the 
British Gas Corporation was used as an instrument of gas depletion 
policy. A re-nationalized BNOC could be used by a future Labour 
Government to control depletion. Thus the existence of policies 
which indirectly affect depletion add to the discretionary powers 
of the Department of Energy and also may be employed by government 
bureaucrats in tactical bargaining with politicians, other departments 
and with the oil industry.
A similar argument can be put forward with respect to taxation and how 
it relates to depletion. The Department of Energy is consistent and
explicit in emphasising that the fiscal regime in the North Sea is
■/\ (48)designed to have a neutral role with regard to depletion. Although
the oil tax system may not have been intended as a depletion control
device, there has nevertheless been an impact on oil companies'
expectations and this has resulted in plans being revised or shelved.
The tax system in the North Sea, since the introduction of Petroleum
Revenue Tax, has been subject to continual change and alteration
(see Chapter Seven). This has again resulted in considerable
uncertainty. Whether bureaucrats within oil companies would
actually prefer a relatively simple, stable tax system, is not at
all certain. But a system which allows the oil industry 'to plan
(49)its long term investment programme with reasonable confidence1 
would, ceterus paribas, in terms of economic efficiency, be desirable. 
Secondly, because PRT is not based solely on excess profits it does 
not work as a progressive tax (Chapter Seven). This can act as a
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disincentive to the development of marginal fields (with long lead 
times and high risk) where taxed profits are greater than excess 
profits. It has been reported that oilfield development projects
have been shelved (the Tern Field) evidently because of 
dissatisfaction with the tax system. Although these decisions could 
be tactical manoeuvres by oil companies (in order to exert pressure 
on the government to alter the oil tax system), the result is 
nevertheless a delay in development; i.e. an effect on the rate of 
depletion.
Thus the evidence presented to the Energy Select Committee by oil 
companies was not solely concerned with direct measures to influence 
depletion. The oil companies took the opportunity to voice their 
dissatisfaction at the overall policy of the government towards North 
Sea oil. If depletion is defined in its broad sense as including 
repletion and encouraging the acquisition of knowledge of the 
resource base, then oil taxation and licensing policy do have an 
impact on depletion. This reasoning is consistent with the conclusions 
made by the Energy Select Committee whose main criticisms of
/ c i \  f  69 )government policy are of licensing and oil taxation.
Other possible instruments of depletion control such as royalty 
banking or keeping BNOC equity oil underground, can be seen as unlikely 
methods to be implemented. This is not because they are inefficient 
or impractical, but because by employing these methods the full costs 
(in terms of revenue foregone in the short term by the Exchequer) 
fall on the government or a state corporation. As it is the 
government that is implementing the policy, it seems doubtful that 
it would be sympathetic towards these methods. Equally, the oil
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companies would favour them, although it would involve the
re-nationalization of Britoil and an increased political role for
the national oil corporation, to which oil companies would be
strongly opposed. The Energy Select Committee's Report maintains.
that royalty banking is the preferable method of depletion control
in the short term as if 'intervention is deemed essential in the
national interest, ... it is right for the Government to bear the
risks and that royalty banking is therefore preferable to production 
(53)cutbacks.1 If the government is able to forecast that the rate
of world oil price increases would in the future exceed its own 
discount rate, the government would be better off keeping its oil 
underground. Thus it could employ a method of royalty banking and 
profit in doing so. However, the oil companies, who probably possess
(54)superior expertise, would do this anyway without government directives.
Thus within the area of government depletion policy,there are many
differing pressures exerted on the policy process. The 'national
interest' objective is interpreted by various groups within the policy
process so as, at least, not to conflict with that group's ambitions
and if possible, actively to further that group's objectives. This
phenomenon, highlighted by the role adopted by the Treasury, seriously
undermines the theoretical case for government depletion controls.
The Treasury and the Department of Energy are adamant that policy
decisions of this nature are made at Cabinet level and that in
advising their respective Ministers and providing them with
(55)information, the two departments are equal partners. Given that 
the overriding objective of the Conservative Government's macro- 
economic policies is to reduce the rate of inflation, a major 
consideration is the control of public expenditure. In this context
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Cabinet decisions would be more inclined to be sympathetic to 
Treasury recommendations which would be made with regard to 
maintaining government oil revenues whilst the Department of Energy 
may be keener for some sort of oil conservation policy. The 
strength of bargaining power of the Treasury can, at least in part, 
explain why no oil depletion policy has as yet been implemented.
With respect to the postponement of BNOC's (now Britoil) Clyde 
development programme,^56  ^ this can also be viewed not as a Department 
of Energy inspired oil conservation measure, but an example of the 
Treasury's reluctance to provide finance for the project in the 
short term. This emphasises two factors with respect to government 
oil policy which are especially significant to depletion policy.
First, the government is prepared to subjugate any 'national interest'. 
depletion objective it considers may exist in response to other 
economic objectives. Also, the government's time horizons do not 
necessarily seem to be longer than those of private sector oil 
companies, although far-sightedness is often given as a reason for 
government intervention. Second, inter-departmental rivalry and 
bargaining are important in 'guiding' ministerial decision-making.
It seems the present Administration's depletion policy of 'no-policy' 
stems from its being consistent with the Government priority of 
controlling inflation and with its non-interventionist beliefs.
The Treasury, in its opposition to a depletion policy that would 
diminish its North Sea oil monies (and especially to the method of 
royalty banking), is behaving consistently with Niskanen-type theory 
(Chapter Three). This also seems to be the case with respect to 
other groups active in the policy process such as oil companies, 
politicians and government bureaucrats. Each group is attempting to
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steer government policy so as to protect or further its self-interest 
objectives. Changing economic and political circumstances constantly 
alter the relative bargaining power of these groups (for example, a 
forceful personality as Energy Secretary replacing a weaker one) and 
therefore creates uncertainty as the policy is continuously subject 
to review and modification.
These uncertainties inherent in the government policy process are in 
addition to the vast inherent uncertainties of the oil sector. It 
seems doubtful whether the Department of Energy is able to forecast 
more accurately than the oil companies. Even if it could, it is not 
certain that its recommendations would be implemented if they clashed 
with Treasury objectives, or even with other objectives of the 
Department of Energy. Oil companies regard depletion as-"an integral 
part of government oil policy in general and their major concern is 
the overall effect of oil policy on their activities. For this 
reason, oil companies concentrated their criticism, in evidence to 
the Energy Select Committee, not on depletion control but on oil 
taxation. In June 1982 a further minor change was made to the oil 
tax system followed by more major changes in March 1983 (see Chapter 
Seven). This demonstrates that constant pressure exerted on the 
government has some effect, and that government policy is a constantly 
changing process.
Given the various different interests within the policy process it
seems unlikely that the present Government will implement a direct
depletion policy. An expedient solution (as the Energy Select
(57)Committee recommends) would be some sort of extension of the 
Varley Guidelines' with a great deal of discretionary power remaining
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with the Department of Energy and the Energy Secretary. On 8th June 
1982, Nigel Lawson - then Secretary of State for'Energy - announced 
in the House of Commons that production cutbacks would not be imposed
/ C O  \
before the end of 1984. Thus, effectively, the existing 'policy*
has been extended for a further two and a half years. This enables
senior politicians to maximize votes by appearing to be making
decisions about depletion rates, the Treasury retains its short-term
revenues and the Department of Energy keeps its extensive functions
of acquiring, up-dating and analysing information from the offshore
oil industry. In other words, an extensive apparatus of depletion
control is in being but its effect on oil company decision-making is
probably minimal, thus reflecting the unresolved conflict between a
non-interventionist government and a budget-maximizing department.
Government attempts to flatten a 'hump* of production can only add
to the already present uncertainties in the oil sector and at the
very minimum, knowledge of the size of the 'hump' (and if it still 
(59)exists) is necessary prior to any debate on the desirability of
a depletion policy. Even if the government can accumulate knowledge 
of UKCS oil resources, uncertainties within the policy process, as 
outlined above, significantly distort policy proposals. When 
highlighting all the 'imperfections' involved in formulating and 
implementing depletion policy, it becomes apparent that the effects 
of such a policy are likely to be quite different from what they would 
be under the perfect government of welfare economics.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
TAXATION POLICY
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1. Introduction
The following chapter attempts to analyse the development of North 
Sea oil taxation over the last decade. A complicated tax structure 
has evolved and the emphasis of this chapter is on the reasons why 
the system has become so complex and why it has changed so frequently, 
rather than on the effects on company profitability or government 
revenues of the various tax rates and allowances. The economic 
theories of politics and the theory of bureaucracies are applied to the 
changing tax system in order to provide some explanation of the 
rationale behind the changes. The extent of the changes is considerable. 
For example, Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) was introduced in 1975 at a 
rate of 45%. Since then, it has.been increased to 60%, 70% and 
currently is 75%. A Supplementary Petroleum Duty (SPD) was introduced 
in 1981 and subsequently abolished in 1982, Advance PRT (APRT) was 
introduced in 1980 and is now to be phased out, and the tax free oil 
allowance after being halved, is now to be restored to its 1978 level 
for fields granted development consent after 1st April 1982. Many 
more changes in the tax system have been made. By highlighting the 
main pressures and influences on the governmental policy-process an 
understanding of the directions of likely pressures and the relative 
strength of these pressures may be acquired.
The first section of the chapter concentrates on the .'First Report
( 1 )from the Committee of Public Accounts, Session 1972-3' (hereafter 
the PAC Report). This influential document was highly critical of 
the existing tax system and one of its proposals was for the 
introduction of a specific oil production tax. Following the 
publicity surrounding the publication of the 'FAC Report' and the
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world oil price increases of 1973-4, the Labour Government introduced 
the basic tax structure for the offshore oil industry in the 1975 Oil 
Taxation Act (OTA). The impact of the OTA is examined in the second 
section. The 1975 OTA is crucial to the analysis of this chapter 
because it sets down the original taxation framework in the light of 
which all the later proposals and recommendations occur. The third 
section is concerned with the present Conservative Government1s 
record as regards oil taxation. This has been characterized by 
numerous modifications and amendments to the system.
Various pressures from within government bureaucracies and political 
parties can be seen to have affected the development of the tax 
system. Extraneous factors such as changes in the world price of 
oil are similarly important, as are perceptions of instability and 
expectations of change. Industry pressure groups and independent 
analysts also have their roles in influencing the policy process.
These and other factors have contributed to the formation of the 
present day North Sea oil taxation system.
The final section attempts to summarize these effects and draws 
attention to the uncertainties and inefficiencies created by a 
constantly changing tax regime.
2. The PAC Report
As previously stated .(Chapter Two) two factors in the early 1970's 
combined to make North Sea oil a major political issue. The discovery 
of sizeable oil reserves on the UKCS from 1970 onwards and the 
fourfold increase in the world price of oil in the winter of 1973-4
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necessitated the formulation of comprehensive domestic oil policies 
by all the major political parties. Both these factors were necessary 
conditions for the politicization of North Sea oil. If sizeable oil 
reserves had been discovered and world oil prices had not risen as 
they did in 1973-4, or if oil had been found in significantly 
smaller quantities and the world price of oil had increased substan­
tially, then in both cases it is unlikely that political parties would 
have considered North Sea oil a sensitive vote-capturing area.
(2)Prior to 1973, concern with the tax system was focussed on the
practical functioning of Corporation Tax and Royalties. In the 1960's
and the early 1970's governments in the UK were keen to create an
attractive environment which would encourage foreign oil companies
to commit resources to the UK sector of the North Sea. In the early
1970's once significant reserves had been found the 'rapid 
(3)exploitation' policy remained. Governments were still attempting
to encourage oil companies to invest in the North Sea and were
reluctant to impose conditions which might firstly act as a
disincentive to the companies and secondly, might lead to OPEC
retaliation in some form. The PAC Report found these considerations
(4)to be exaggerated in their importance.
The system of taxation was strongly criticized in the PAC Report on 
the basis that Corporation Tax, as it functioned, had many loopholes 
and anomalies which could result in future tax revenues from the 
North Sea being unacceptably low. The Committee of Public Accounts 
maintained that, compared to other oil producing countries, the taxes 
imposed by the UK Government were low and company profits would be 
higher than elsewhere.^
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The PAC Report noted that tax losses (of around £1.5 billion for 
the nine major companies) had so far accrued and-losses could 
continue indefinitely. This loss to the UK Exchequer had resulted 
chiefly from two factors. Firstly, oil companies in the Middle East 
used a posted price for tax calculations and this price had become 
greater than the market price. Because oil companies used this 
posted price as a transfer price, the companies' profits on oil 
production tended to be inflated, whilst profits from their downstream 
activities in oil consuming countries were correspondingly under­
stated. Trading losses thus accumulated in the UK and the Exchequer
did not receive tax revenues from profits of production companies
(7)where the profits were offset against the payment of tax abroad.
Further criticism of the tax system was that a company operating and
making profits in the North Sea could offset these profits against
(8 )its other activities outside the North Sea. The PAC maintain in
(9)their Report that these 'artificial tax losses' arising out of 
loopholes in the system were unacceptable in terms of the direct 
revenue lost to the Exchequer and also in terms of the harmful effect 
on the balance of payments.(10}
In their recommendations, the PAC advocated that considerable changes
be made to the existing tax system in order to 'substantially improve
the effective tax yield from operations on the Continental Shelf'
The PAC recommended that changes be made which would prohibit UKCS
monies being pre-empted by taxes elsewhere and also that capital
(12)allowances for extraneous activities should be controlled. A
further and very significant suggestion made by the PAC was for the 
introduction of a specific oil tax 'the Government ... will consider
( 6 )
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among other methods the possibility of imposing a system of quantity
(13)taxation, e.g. a barrelage tax'.
Evidence received by the PAC highlighted fundamental shortcomings
of the system of government control. Witnesses from the Department
of Trade and Industry (DTI) maintained that under the existing
taxation regime substantial revenue would accrue to the Government
At the same time, the Inland Revenue estimated that the revenue likely
to accrue to the Government up to 1980 would be, due to the method
of transfer pricing and capital allowances, significantly less than
(15)the DTI estimates, and would probably be negligible. Discrepancies
such as this illustrate a lack of communication between government
departments which inevitably detracts from the efficient functioning
of government. Niskanen-type analysis (see Chapter 3) suggests that
government departments may withhold (or select) information from the
sponsor, i.e. the politicians, in order that the bureaucrats' utility
function may be maximized. However, with different government
departments performing overlapping functions, the departments may
tend to withhold information from each other in order to maintain
their exclusive, and therefore crucial, expertise. Thus planning
decisions may be made by departments with very imperfect knowledge
or with inaccurate information. On this basis, senior Civil Servants
advise and inform Ministers and political decision-makers. The
PAC noted that the DTI lacked information (specifically with respect
(16)to costs) but this is a criticism not so much of a lack of 
communication between departments as of a lack of co-operation between 
government departments and offshore industry.
(17)The PAC Report itself was criticized by the industry because no
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industry witnesses were invited to submit evidence to the Committee.
This lack of communication between a parliamentary body and the
offshore industry resulted in the industry not being able to explain
(18)the tax system from its standpoint. It has been argued that had
the industry been invited to present evidence to the Committee it
would have been able to contest the Inland Revenue evidence and
(19)would also have outlined important cost expectations.
The recommendations of the PAC implied considerable criticism of the 
government departments responsible for the North Sea oil tax system. 
Nevertheless, the types of changes favoured by the PAC would have 
been broadly consistent with government bureaucrats' ambitions. 
Extensive modification to the existing tax system as well as the 
introduction of an oil tax would mean an expansion of departmental 
work and responsibility. The PAC Report did seem to have an impact 
on the policy-process?^however world oil price increases during 
the winter of 1973-4 pre-empted any government action based on the 
PAC Report. The concern was not so much with the technical 
functioning of Corporation Tax on which the PAC Report concentrated. 
In 1974 the vote-maximizing potential of North Sea policy became 
the priority consideration of the government.
This change of emphasis can be analysed within the framework of the 
theory of bureaucracy and the economics of politics. Government 
bureaucrats in the Treasury . and the Inland Revenue attempt, within 
certain constraints, to maximize, taxation revenue from any.specific 
industry. It is possible that the bureaucracy's desire for taxation 
revenue, in order to expand its budget size, is greater than the 
politicians' desire for a specific sura to be raised to meet specific
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expenditure plans. Whilst the politician attempts to extract
revenue in order to finance certain economic and'financial projects,
the bureau may be simply attempting to maximize taxation revenue
(2 1 )contrained only by what it is practically able to extract. This
distinction becomes less important in times when politicians1 
economic policies enforce the raising of considerable sums by the 
Government; both political and bureaucratic ambitions would then 
tend to coincide. Prior to the 1973-4 price increases the amount of 
potential taxation revenue that could be captured from the offshore 
oil industry, within political and economic constraints, was not 
being reached!22^
The term 'taxable capacity' refers here to that amount of taxation
revenue the government could appropriate from a given industry or
sector. The 'taxable capacity' of an industry is determined by
various political and economic factors and the perception of these
factors by the voting public and by politicians and bureaucrats.
Thus prior to 1973-4, the 'taxat&Mt capacity' of the offshore oil
industry, as perceived by the PAC, was approximately determined by
(23)the taxation paid by oil companies in other oil producing regions.
This amount was not expected to be captured by the existing taxation 
system. The PAC proposals were designed to ensure that the tax 
take was approximately equal to the oil industry's 'taxable capacity'. 
The world oil price increases of 1973-4 had the effect of increasing 
the 'taxable capacity1 of the offshore oil industry. The perception 
of the world oil market was such that the government, by reacting to 
this general perception, could increase its oil tax revenue. Oil 
companies operating in the North Sea were expected to earn 'windfall' 
profits. UKCS oil became strategically very important to the domestic
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economy and it was necessary for political parties to develop 
comprehensive oil policies. The popular attitude towards the oil 
companies operating in the North Sea was generally unsympathetic 
and the government was under considerable political pressure to . 
ensure that it had close control of oil company activities and 
avoided their earning 'excess' profits.
3. The 1975 Oil Taxation Act
Thus the 1974 Labour Government was keen to act swiftly with regards
(24)the oil taxation system. The Government's White Paper presented
to Parliament in July 1974 outlined the Government's overall
intentions with respect to North Sea oil policy (Chapter Two). The
government intended to take measures in order to 'secure a fairer
share of profits for the nation' and to 'assert greater public 
(25)control'. The taxation proposals fell into two categories.
Firstly, the White Paper outlined technical changes to Corporation 
Tax so that loopholes highlighted by the PAC Report would be closed. 
Artificial losses arising out of the multi-national oil companies' 
transfer pricing policies would be eliminated and a ring fence would 
be constructed in order that 'receipts from the North Sea should not 
be at the mercy of allowances and losses resulting from extraneous 
activities'.
Secondly, the White Paper proposed 'an additional tax on the companies'
(27)profits from the Continental Shelf. This was intended as a
specific tax on companies operating on the UKCS designed to 
recapture economic rent transferred to the oil companies via the 
discretionary licensing system (see Chapter Four). The government's
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intentions towards North Sea oil as stated in the 1974 White Paper 
were to control North Sea activities and to increase the Government's 
tax take. In the context of the economic theory of politics, the 
proposed oil tax was one important aspect of an overall oil policy, 
the development of which had, by 1974, become a priority government 
objective.
In November 1974, an Oil Taxation Bill (OTB) was published which
outlined the new oil tax, the Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) as it was
originally conceived. Although both the 1974 White Paper and the
1974 OTB contained many of the recommendations of the 1973 PAC Report
the PAC's tentative suggestion of a barrelage tax was not considered
viable. A barrelage tax, a tax similar to the 12^% production
royalty, on the quantity of oil produced, was thought to be
detrimental to marginal (low profit) fields as it would not take
account of costs. Fears from the oil industry concerning some form
of quantity tax were that since it was unrelated to profits the
government would increase the tax if profits were to rise, whilst
(28)the reverse would not hold. However, PRT did have elements of a
barrelage tax in the sense that it was imposed on production revenues 
from each fie Id
The form PRT took in the OTB was different from that made law in the 
subsequent 1975 Oil Taxation Act (OTA). As stated above, the 
government's overwhelming priority with respect to the North Sea oil 
tax system was essentially political. The government needed to be 
publicly seen to be taxing the ' un co ven anted'pro fits of multi­
national oil companies operating in the North Sea. During the report 
stage of the 1975 OTA negotiations took place between the government
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and the oil industry. In response to oil industry disquiet many
changes were made to the 1974 OTB before it became an Act. The
success of the oil industry, as a pressure group within the policy
process, was at least partly a consequence of the uncertainties
present in the offshore oil industry (for example, with respect to
price and cost expectations and production estimates). The industry,
in possession of expertise and information not available to the
(31)government, was in a relatively strong bargaining position.
However, the Government was very keen to pass an Act in order to
maximize the vote-catching potential of offshore oil. This, to an
extent, explains the haste (because the modified proposals
concerning an oil allowance and an annual limit on tax payable, did
(32)not function as expected) in which the modifications to the OTB
(33)took place. The OTB was publised on 19th November 1974 and on 
25th February 1975 Mr Edmund Dell, then Paymaster General, announced 
various modifications.
The structure of PRT as a flat rate tax remained in the OTA. Because
the taxable unit was the field rather than the company, it was not
possible for an oil company to offset an unattractive field against
(34)a more profitable field. It was ostensibly the disincentive effect
(3 5)on marginal fields of the originally proposed system to which oil 
companies were chiefly opposed. During discussions with the companies 
the government introduced various changes to the tax system designed 
to diminish any disincentive effects of its original proposals. The 
modifications outlined by the Paymaster-General fall into two
categories of discretionary and non-discretionary provisions.
Firstly, the discretionary method granted the Secretary of State for
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Energy, with the consent of Treasury officials, powers to 'defer,
(37)waive or refund royalties in the whole or in part'. Any refund
would be exempt from Corporation Tax and PRT. The non-discretionary
provisions included increasing the 'uplift' on capital expenditure
for tax purposes from 50% to 75%, the introduction of an Oil
Allowance and the introduction of a tapering divii safeguard provision
to limit PRT payments. The 75% Uplift was designed to 'give the
industry a further element of front-end loading that is free of PRT^08^
Postponing the payment of PRT has a significant effect on development,
since due to the discounting of cash flows, the early years of a
field's life are very important in determining the commercial viability 
(39)of that field. The Oil Allowance was for half a million tonnes of
oil per six monthly period free of PRT, subject to a cumulative total
of 10 million tonnes per field. Although this allowance was designed
to benefit marginal fields it applied to all fields. The intention
was to benefit smaller fields more than proportionately^40  ^ but with
a production period so short that the cumulative total of 10 million
tonnes was not reached (once the 75% Uplift had been recovered) the
benefit to some marginal fields might not be as significant as
(41)originally perceived. The Safeguard provision provided a limit
on PRT chargeable and the Tapering provision was to ensure that the 
PRT payment did not exceed a proportion of capital expenditure. 
Together, the Tapering and Safeguard provisions (generally accepted 
as one measure) limited the payment of PRT to 80% of net revenue 
minus 30% of cumulative capital expenditure. If this was less than 
the PRT calculated in the normal way then the Tapering and Safeguard 
limit applied. PRT was introduced at a 45% rate in February 1975.
In addition, included in the OTA was a restriction on Corporation Tax.
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A 'ring-fence* around a company's North Sea operations was constructed.
As explained above, the object of this measure was to ensure that
Corporation Tax payable on profits from North Sea oil production
would not be diminished by losses in other areas of a company's
activities. The second proposal concerning Corporation Tax changes
outlined in the 1974 White Paper, i.e. with respect to 'artificial'
losses arising out of transfer pricing policies of multi-national
(42)oil companies, was also implemented in the OTA.
The swift passage of the OTB through the House of Commons and the 
characteristics of the subsequent Act emphasized many of the main 
features of the economic theories of bureaucracy and politics. The 
political and economic framework of North Sea oil had changed 
significantly between 1972 and 1975. In 1973-4 the national political 
scene was uncertain, political parties were keen to identify political 
issues which were high in the public consciousness? North Sea oil was 
thus an obvious target. As with depletion policy (see Chapter Six) 
there was a high degree of consensus as to the concept of PRT. PRT 
was an extremely complex system of taxation, it would be implemented 
by the Inland Revenue and overseen by the Treasury. Government offices 
in these departments, as with those in the Department of Energy, would 
be, ceterus paribas, in favour of a complex system as their expertise 
and understanding would be vital to their policy decision-making 
superiors. Government bureaucrats would expand their powers by 
developing a politically important and growing function. Furthermore, 
their positions would be protected by their possession of information 
and expertise about the tax system making their bargaining position 
relative to the politicians' (sponsors') stronger. Independent 
commentators and academics would also have difficulty in examining
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the system and providing a check because of its complexity and the 
imbalances of information.
Oil industry opposition to the OTB concentrated not on its complexity 
but on its stringency. This concern resulted in various amendments 
being incorporated in the OTB at committee stage. However, mainstream 
economic theory would predict that oil companies would prefer a simple, 
more straightforward tax regime in order that plans and forecasts could 
be made with greater certainty. This would apply at the most senior 
level in oil companies where policy decisions are taken and where 
simplicity would be advantageous. Similarly, within the Civil Service 
some senior bureaucrats may favour a simple tax system, for example 
to reduce uncertainty in overall economic planning. If the theories 
of bureaucracy are applied to the oil companies (and to their lobby 
organizations such as The United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association, 
UKOOA, and The Association of British Independent Oil Exploration 
Companies, BRINDEX) it becomes apparent that bureaucrats within oil 
companies are likely to favour a complex tax system for reasons similar 
to those of government bureaucrats. A complex and unstable tax 
system is in the common interest of tax experts in the Civil Service 
and in oil companies. Such complex tax systems may be manipulated 
by these tax experts to their advantage; moreover, such a system is 
good for employment and status. Hence,suggestions for capturing rent 
by auctioning licences (see Chapter Four) or for a simplified tax 
system are not well received by bureaucrats in government or in oil 
companies. In addition, officers within industry pressure groups 
attempt to justify their own positions, the existence of their 
organizations and their status within the industry. A complex tax 
system which is perpetually in a state of flux facilitates the
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The Paymaster-General, Edmund Dell, maintained that PRT would
be received and adjusted over time. Constant up-dates and reviews
of policies are consistent with ambitions of tax experts in the
government and also in industry. Since the bureaucrat is able to
maintain his position and expand his budget over time. The speed
at which the amendments to the OTB were introduced illustrates the
desire of politicians to capture as much political advantage as
possible from the OTA whilst North Sea oil was still at the forefront
of popular awareness. It also clearly shows the unwillingness of
government bureaucrats to abandon a 'bad' policy and instead to
(44)modify and amend the policy; again this in line with Breton's 
bureaucratic behaviour characteristics (see Chapter Three). This is 
a recurring theme with regard to domestic oil taxation policy.
Agreement between the two major parties on the need for a comprehensive
offshore tax system was enforced by official statements designed to
assure the industry that the Government and the Opposition were
concerned with the long term. The tax was intended to be 'a stable
(45)tax and not used as a short term regulator'. This sentiment was
echoed by the Opposition spokesman, Patrick Jenkin: "there is no 
intention here that this should be anything other than a stable tax, 
which will not be used for demand management purposes nor as a short 
term regulator"J40  ^ In the context of the economics of politics 
these statements can be seen to be designed to capture votes. Both 
parties are perceived to give priority to long term stability and the 
Conservative Opposition is popularly seen to be placing the long term 
interests of the oil sector above party-politics by supporting the
fulfilment of these ambitions.
( 4 3 )
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tax system.
Policy statements and proposals made in the raid-1970's can now be
examined in the context of the historical development of domestic.
oil policy. The techniques of the theories of bureaucracr# and
politics may be employed to understand and explain this development;
here with respect to the offshore oil tax system, Yor example, in
(47)a Treasury Press Release, Edmund Dell maintained that "the
Government will stand ready to review and adjust the incidence of
PRT in the event of a sustained and significant change in the price
of oil in real terms". This, seemingly, would be interpreted to
mean that if oil prices were to rise in real terms, PRT would be
increasedi^Y However, because of successive Government's desires
to finance rising public expenditure there would be expected to be
a 'ratchet effect' with regard to PRT changes. As oil prices have
risen in real terms, Governments have been prepared to increase the
tax rate consistent with Mr Dell's statement. But when real oil
(4 9)prices fell (e.g. by 18% between 1975 and 1978) the reverse did 
not happen. The 1983 oil tax changes were partly a response to a 
real price fall but the ratchet effect was still there because the 
tax reduction did not compensate for lower price expectations.
A further example of the predictive powers of the economics of 
politics and bureaucracies can be seen with respect to the 
discretionary safeguards included in the OTA. The Secretary of State 
for Energy was able to use discretionary powers to refund all or 
part of the royalty payments made to the Government. Royalty 
revenues were to be made available to BNOC via the National Oil 
Account.and it would be expected that both the Government and BNOC
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would object to the investment capabilities of BNOC being constrained 
by royalty refundsf88  ^ Whilst BNOC was funded by'the National Oil 
Account (prior to its privatization - see Chapter Five) refunds of 
royalties to oil companies did not occur.
4. 1978 to the Present Day
The 1975 oil taxation package was constructed at a time, it has been 
(51)argued, when there were considerable uncertainties as to the
future profitability of North Sea oil operations. By August 1978
(52)the Government view was that 'though many uncertainties remain 
we are in a position to take stock and it is apparent that companies 
are obtaining very large profits from the natural resources of the 
nation. We believe that the public share of these profits can and 
should be increased ...1 . The Labour Government proposed three 
fundamental alterations to the offshore tax system.
Firstly, PRT would be raised from 45% to 60%; secondly, the Uplift 
on capital expenditure would be reduced from 75% to 35%, and thirdly, 
the oil allowance would be reduced from 1 million long tons per 
annum to i million tonnes per annum.
These proposals were announced before the Iranian Revolution, before
the Iranian oil workers strike in October 1978 and before the world
oil price increases of 1979-80. Nevertheless, these proposals can
in part be seen as defensive measures. The 1975 oil taxation package
was implemented at a time when oil prices were expected to fall in
(53)realterms. Thus it can be assumed that had oil prices in 1975
been expected to rise, or at least remain constant in real terms,
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the basic rate of PRT would have beer, higher than 45%. In 1978 it
had become apparent that world oil prices, in real terms, were not
going to decrease significantly as a long term trend and would
probably increase as demand had started to increase after the initial
post 1973-4 decreases. Thus in terms of the domestic oil industry's
'taxable capacity', in 1975 the Government had been mistaken in its
oil price forecasts and was therefore not extracting revenue up to
this capacity. In 1978 oil companies were seen to be obtaining large
(54)profits from their North Sea oil operations, and with a General 
Election imminent political parties were keen to maximize votes on 
clearly identifiable policy issues.
It is significant, in the context of the economics of politics, that 
the Conservative Opposition were in agreement (in August 1978) with
(55)the proposed tax changes. It is difficult to predict how effective
oil company opposition to these proposed changes would have been had 
the world oil price increases of 1979-80 not taken place. By the 
time the proposals had been included by the new Conservative 
Government in the 1979 Finance Act (in July), the spot price of the 
Saudi 'marker' was $33.13 per barrel (from $12.70 at the end of 1978)
/ r /* \
and the trend was sharply upwards. Thus the oil company bargaining 
position would have been relatively weak. Strong public antipathy 
towards multi-national oil companies would have enabled the new 
Conservative Administration to increase oil taxation revenue with 
little effective opposition from the oil industry.
There was also minimal intra-party opposition to these measures, at 
least partly reflecting the overall economic needs of the Government 
to increase its revenue. The North Sea oil tax system could be
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employed, within certain political and economic constraints, to 
increase Government revenue thus acting as a means to an end and 
also as an end in itself in maximizing votes on a major policy issue. 
The Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Gulf War in 1980 and the world 
oil price increases of 1979-80 resulted in North Sea oil becoming, 
as in 1973-4, a key political issue. Costs of information, because 
of constant media coverage, were low and individuals were relatively 
well informed. There would be popular pressure on the Government to 
act, which in this instance would be in line with the Government's 
existing plans for raising revenue.
Thus the tax changes made in July 1979 (which also included a change 
in licensing regulations so that Royalty payments would be 
accelerated) were not in direct response to the 1979 world oil price 
increases but in response to a change in oil price expectations 
which occurred between 1975 and 1978. That oil prices rose 
significantly in the first half of 1979 would have strengthened the 
resolve of the Government to increase the tax take. It would also 
have made the passage of the legislation through Parliament easier 
due to popular support and the weakening of the oil companies' 
ability to pressurize the Government into modifying, or introducing 
concessions into,their proposals. The desire of the Government to 
increase its oil tax take in order to maximize votes by controlling 
the activities of multi-national oil companies and responding to the 
public perception of OPEC-inspired price increases was consistent 
with the Government's ability to implement the policy due to the 
perception of oil company 'windfall' profits.
(57)In March 1980 the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that PRT
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would be increased to 70% for the bi-annual chargeable period ending
after 31st December 1979. In addition, advance payments of PRT
would be due in the first two months of each chargeable period. The
Chancellor maintained that these changes were in response to the
world price of oil increasing 'dramatically' in the previous year,
a change which 'has greatly favoured the oil companies' and 'greatly
(58)strengthened the industry's cash position'. Thus, again in 
response to the perception of 'windfall' oil company profits, the 
Government increased the tax rate.
In November 1980 the Chancellor announced his intention to introduce
(59)a further tax on UK offshore oil. This new tax, the Supplementary 
Petroleum Duty (SPD), and other changes to PRT were formally 
introduced in the 1981 Finance Act in much the same form as they 
were originally proposed in November 1980. In announcing SPD, and 
thus subjecting North Sea oil companies to a four tier tax system, 
the Chancellor invited suggestions and proposals for alternative tax 
systems which would leave the Government with a broadly similar taxi
take from offshore oil. SPD was to operate from January 1981 to June 
1982 when the overall tax regime would be reviewed.
In his 1981 Budget, Sir Geoffrey Howe outlined the full changes to
the North Sea tax system. SPD was set at 20% of gross revenues less
an annual allowance of one million tonnes. The tax would be
collected monthly thus maximizing the adverse effect on company cash
f l o w s ( a n d  emphasizing the Government's desires for short-term
revenue). Moreover, two changes to PRT were announced. Firstly,
the 35% Uplift on capital expenditure was to be restricted to the
period up to PRT payback 'when an operator's cumulative incomings
(61)from a field exceed his cumulative outgoings 1 (and later extended
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to include outstanding APRT liability). Previously, this Uplift 
applied to capital expenditure whenever it was incurred. Secondly, 
with respect to the tapering and safeguard provisions, they were now 
only to apply from the commencement of production for a length of 
time equal to 1.5 times the period from the start of production until 
PRT payback.
Thus, against the background of the oil price increases of 1979-80, 
the Government considered it possible to increase its tax take from 
North Sea oil operations. The Chancellor's invitation for proposals 
for a completely new tax system strengthened expectations as to 
future changes in the system. The changes to the Uplift and the 
tapering and safeguard provisions were largely technical changes 
because of the possibility of tax relief on capital expenditure 
reaching 100% which would encourage inefficient capital expenditure. 
With respect to the tapering provision, with an increased rate of PRT 
(in the previous Budget from 60% to 70%), more fields would have been 
pushed into the tapering limit, possibly enabling the companies to 
receive tax relief by increasing capital expenditure in any one year.
The main criticisms of these changes concerned SPD. Because SPD 
was based on gross revenues and was unrelated to profits, it was 
considered adversely to affect high cost fields UKOOA^"^
considered that the net effect of these changes would cause serious 
cash flow problems to companies during the declining years of a 
field which could lead to premature abandonment. The tax changes 
were seen as being 'dominated by the need to procure extra revenue 
very q u i c k l y ' s e e m i n g l y  a view supported by the Government's 
subsequent willingness to abolish SPD. In terms of the economics of
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politics, the Government, by the introduction of SPD, had exceeded 
the perceived 'taxable capacity' of the offshore'oil industry. In 
response to the Chancellor's invitation for proposals for alternative 
tax systems both the oil industry (e.g. UKOOA^08  ^ and BRINDEX^08^  
and independent analysts (e.g. the Institute for Fiscal Studies) 
recommended the abolition of SPD. Concerted criticism of the overall 
tax system, and specifically of SPD, combined with a significant 
slowdown in development activity during 1981 (due in part to falling 
world oil prices) and resulted in further tax changes being announced 
in the 1982 Budget.
The strength of the industry as a pressure group by 1982 had increased
relative to the Government's position. In the 1982 Budget, alterations
to the tax system1were announced and although 'the tax changes are no
more than a tinkering within an unchanged tax structure' 8^8  ^ the
Government did abolish SPD and there was estimated to be a small
reduction in tax payments over tirae^89  ^ The IFS proposals for a new
tax system were found unacceptable by both Government and oil
industry for reasons which seem explainable in terms of the economic
(70)theories of politics and bureaucracies. The IFS proposed
fundamental structural changes to the oil tax system. A Petroleum 
Profits Tax (PPT) would replace the existing four tier tax system and 
would be levied on a field by field basis with a 'ring-fence' around 
each field. 'PPT would be levied in three tiers, each related to
(71)successively higher rates of return on investment' and thus would
be a progressive tax with fields having a higher rate of return 
bearing a higher average tax rate. To accept this new tax system 
Government bureaucrats would be implicitly admitting their original 
policy had been 'wrong'. A simplified tax system might result in a
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loss of jobs in both government and industry and thus would be 
opposed on this basis. Tax experts in government and in oil 
companies had accumulated skill in manipulating the existing system 
and a new, simple tax system could diminish their relative expertise 
and thus their relative power and job security. The introduction 
of a completely new system would also reflect on the sponsors of 
the existing system ( i.e. the Government and the relevant Ministers) 
and could result in the danger of losing votes to a competing policy.
The main proposals outlined in the 1982 Budget were that SPD be 
replaced by Advance PRT (APRT) and to compensate for the resultant 
lowering of Government take the rate of PRT was raised from 70% to 
75%. APRT operates similarly to SPD in that it is a 20% tax on 
gross revenue with an oil allowance of one million tonnes each year. 
However, APRT is allowable against PRT,- .thus it does not affect the 
total amount of PRT paid but only the timing of the payments. Timing 
of payments is an important consideration to the Government and 
illustrates its strong preference for receiving tax monies as soon 
as possible. A further measure proposed in the 1982 Budget was that 
advance payments of PRT were replaced by a system of spreading PRT 
payments on a monthly basis.
Industry criticism was immediate and minor adjustments were made to 
the Budget proposals. The main criticism that APRT adversely affects 
early cash flow (reducing the attractiveness of all fields) and that 
it should therefore be abolished, was not accepted by the Treasury. 
The first concession, however, was that fields would only incur APRT 
for five years. Secondly, for a field where PRT is not paid because 
profits are not great enough, instead of APRT being refunded at the
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end of the field's life in a lump sum (which amounts to a long terra 
interest free loan to the Treasury) the companies would be repaid 
after five years.
The major North Sea oil taxation changes announced in the 1983
Budget fell into two categories. Firstly, where development approval
was granted after 1st April 1982 (except for onshore fields and
Southern Basin fields) royalty payments were to be abolished. In
addition, the oil allowance was to be restored to its 1978 level of
1 million tonnes per year subject to a cumulative limit of 10 million
tonnes per field. Secondly, applying to all fields, APRT was to be
phased out over a period of four years and abolished after 31st
December 1986. Also, PRT relief could be claimed on all future
exploration and appraisal expenditure and restrictions on PRT relief
for shared assets was to be eliminated. These proposed tax changes
(72)were met with 'surprise and jubilation among the oil companies'
and were specifically designed to stimulate exploration and
development activity. The Government's perception of the oil
industry's 'taxable capacity' had been exceeded and the Government
acted to ensure that activity on the UKCS would continue into the
1990's at a level acceptable to the Government. The lack of orders
for the UK oil supply industry added to the government's concern of
losing votes. It is not until the mid-1990's when most of the
new generation of oilfields are producing oil that there becomes a
significant divergence between Government oil revenues on the pre-
and post-1983 Budget tax system, and if new discoveries come on-stream
in the 1990's because of the tax change this will offset reductions
(73)in Government tax revenues. In the context of past oil tax
changes the 1983 Budget was significant as it introduced a new
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type of structural change.. By differentiating between, 
fields under production or development (old fields) and projects 
granted development consent after 1st April 1982 (new fields), the 
Government has set an important precedent. It is now able to treat 
the North Sea tax regime as two distinct systems.
On the more mature,old fields, production is relatively insensitive
to oil price changes. Thus in the future a fall in oil prices could
result in increased tax rates on old fields. Whilst for new fields,
whose development is sensitive to oil prices, the tax system could
remain unchanged. If oil prices strengthen and increase during the
next decade the Government might consider that it is not extracting
revenues to the ’taxable capacity' of the oil industry. Thus it
would be expected that in the 1990's the Government may increase its
(74)take from the new fields. The dual tax structure gives the 
Government further flexibility of taxation policy, a factor consistent 
with tax specialists' ambitions both in government and in the oil 
industry. However, uncertainty concerning future tax changes (most 
importantly in the medium and long term) is unlikely to have 
diminished as a result of the 1983 Budget.
5. A Changing Tax System
The encouragement to development which the Chancellor hoped to bring
about by the 1982 tax package did not occur. Oil companies'
strategic bargaining in response to the tax system may partly explain
(75)the well publicized development delays such as the Tern Field (by
Shell and Esso). This illustrates the possibility of tactical 
behaviour which may result in non-optimal allocation of resources over
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time. Oil industry pressure, in the form of lobbying and tactical 
bargaining, was a significant factor in bringing'about the 1983 
Budget tax changes which gave an immediate and considerable boost 
to North Sea activity.
Oil companies now expect tax changes which alter the economics of 
a project after the investment decision has taken place. The 
constantly changing tax system adds considerably to the uncertainties 
surrounding offshore oil. However, the Government believes it is 
important to have a degree of flexibility in its tax policy in order 
to be able to respond to unforeseen shocks. Flexibility may be 
achieved through changes in rates of taxation or changes in various 
concessions and allowances but constant changes in the structure of 
the tax system have been seen to result in instability and arbitrary 
effects on oilfield projects.
There are two ways in which, on the basis of rational expectations 
with respect to a changing tax system, fields may not be developed or 
development may be postponed. First, if the tax system is expected 
at some time in the future to become much more onerous. Second, if 
oil companies attempt to pre-empt an increase in the tax system by 
postponing or abandoning development plans. In addition, expectations 
of tax increases will also give an incentive to accelerate depletion 
of fields already in production in order to produce as much as possible 
while tax rates are relatively low.
The overall tax regime in the North Sea, as explained in this chapter, 
has been changed many times since 1975. The considerable instability 
of the system reflects its unsuitability as an oil tax. A simple tax
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system would be advantageous to industry (and Government) planners 
and it would also facilitate independent monitoring of the system. 
However, as has been argued in this chapter, a policy which is complex 
and is frequently amended is generally favoured by some bureaucrats 
within the Government, within oil company pressure groups and by 
certain tax experts within oil companies. Decision-makers in oil 
companies in many circumstances may favour simplicity and stability 
and some bureaucrats in Government (e.g. in the Department of Energy's 
Oil Division) may also be averse to an unstable system. However, the 
theories of bureaucracies suggest that in the policy process bureau­
crats have numerous methods by which they can protect and further 
their interests.(see Chapter Three). The relative power of 
bureaucrats whose self-interest is fulfilled by an unstable, complex 
system evidently outweighs that of the bureaucrats who may favour 
stability and simplicity.
Government bureaucrats' ability to influence the development of the 
oil tax system has been greater than with regards other policy issues 
because the bureaucrats' ambitions have been broadly consistent with 
those of the politicians in government. Whilst the politicians are 
concerned with the taxation system as part of North Sea oil policy 
and with the effects of that policy, the concern of Government 
bureaucrats (e.g. in the Treasury, Inland Revenue and some parts of 
the Department of Energy) is overwhelmingly for the taxation package 
per se. Niskanen-type analysis (Chapter Three) suggests that 
bureaucrats specializing in oil taxation are likely to maximize their 
utility functions by acquiring characteristics of oil tax policy 
associated with the structure and implementation of the oil tax. Thus 
for these bureaucrats taxation of North Sea oil is an end in itself
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rather than a means towards an end.
The Government's desire to obtain short-term revenue as part of its 
broader economic objectives has resulted, since 1978, in annual - 
changes to the tax system. These constant changes tend to distort 
the link between prices and the development of North Sea oil 
resources. If oil companies assume that as oil prices rise, even 
in nominal terms, the tax rate will increase, this can act as a 
disincentive to investment. Oil companies consider the possibilities 
of future losses due to oil prices falling against future gains due 
to oil prices rising. If the companies expect profits resulting from 
oil price increases to be negated by an increased tax rate this 
leaves only the possibility of losses if prices fall. This acts 
against the desirable economic effects of a price rise, i.e. that as 
oil prices rise, producers are encouraged to develop more costly 
fields.
In response to world oil price increases the Government has been seen
to be taking action over a 'national asset' and at the same time has
been seen to be controlling multi-national oil company activities
in the North Sea. The 1981 tax changes apparently over-shot the
industry's 'taxable capacity'. In 1981 the trend in world oil prices
was downward, North Sea activity had slowed down considerably and
industry opposition to the tax system was at its most vociferous. The
overall effect of the 1982 Budget changes was to reduce the marginal
(77)tax rate very slightly from 90.28% to 89.5%, but this did little 
to stimulate activity. Thus the 1983 Budget changes may be viewed 
in the context of activity in the North Sea and in oil related 
industries being unacceptably sluggish. Considerable concessions
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applicable to 'new' projects announced in March 1983 had the desired
effect of stimulating exploration and development activity (e.g.
Shell's announcement of plans to spend £800 million a year to
(78)1990) and boosted industry confidence. The economic theories- of
politics and bureaucracy would suggest, however, that when these 'new' 
fields commence production the Government may tighten the fiscal 
regime considerably.
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C H A P T E R  E I G H T
AN OVERVIEW
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Preceding Chapters attempt to identify some of the major problems 
associated with the development of various aspects of offshore oil 
policy in the UK. The economic theories of bureaucracies and 
politics, as outlined in Chapter Three, provide the theoretical 
and conceptual framework in which specific problems of UK oil 
policy are analysed.
By making assumptions as to the behaviour and motives of bureau­
crats and politicians within the government policy process a 
positive evaluation of present policy may be achieved. Knowledge 
of the presence, direction and relative strength of influences on 
government policy contributes to an understanding of the policy 
process. Given certain assumptions as to future trends of key 
economic variables affecting North Sea Oil, (for example, world 
oil prices and exchange rates), potential bureaucratic and 
political pressures can be recognized. Although forecasting 
bureaucratic and political pressures in isolation is speculative, 
when seen in the context of other economic factors potential 
bureaucratic and political pressures assist in the interpretation 
of policy and the determination of policy trends. At the very 
least it may be possible to rule out certain policy developments 
where bureaucratic or political interests exert a particularly 
strong influence.
In providing an overview of North Sea oil policy and government, 
the second section of this Chapter briefly summarizes some important 
points of the four aspects of oil policy discussed in previous
1. Introduction
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chapters. The third section outlines some conceptual problems 
involved in applying the economic theories of politics and 
bureaucracies to North Sea oil policy.
A central theme throughout the analysis of North Sea oil policy 
in previous chapters is that distortions and pressures on the 
policy process caused by political and bureaucratic self-interest 
are problems inherent in the UK system of representative 
government. The fourth section brings together the various 
aspects of North Sea oil policy and argues that once the inherent 
problems of the government policy process are considered the case 
for extensive government intervention in the oil industry becomes 
doubtful.
The fifth and concluding section examines the general role of the 
government in the North Sea oil industry. Principles for 
effective intervention are established and suggestions for improving 
the policy process are outlined. Areas for further research are 
encountered in the final section. Most importantly these include 
the development of a characteristics approach to policy 
determination and changes to the policy process itself.
2. Summary of Oil Policies
Licensing Policy (Chapter Four)
The decision in 1964 to adopt a discretionary system of licence 
allocation has had a considerable impact on the government's policy 
towards North Sea oil. Frederick Erroll, the Conservative Minister
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for Power, in 1964 made a statement outlining the criteria on 
which the government would base its allocation decisions. These 
criteria showed a strong element of nationalism which subsequently 
remained in all licensing rounds as political and bureaucratic 
considerations in licence allocation increased. In choosing a 
discretionary system in preference to an auction system the 
government bureaucrats were able to increase their administrative 
powers and scope of control. An important reason for the
(2)development of the offshore taxation system was the realization 
that the discretionary licensing system was enabling oil companies 
to capture economic rent from their North Sea operations. The 
oil tax regime was designed to recapture economic rent for the 
government.
Irregularity in the size and timing of licensing rounds adds to 
confusion and uncertainty in the oil industry. Licensing Rounds 
have tended to be used by the government to speed-up or slow-down 
activity on the UKCS, often for political reasons or as a result 
of other economic objectives.
Nationalistic policies which favour domestic over foreign companies 
in licence allocation are politically attractive though for a 
country dependent on international trade, they are of doubtful 
economic value. The discretionary licence system enables 
politicians and government bureaucrats to pursue their own 
objectives. In a discretionary system government bureaucrats 
gather information, continually appraise oil company activities 
and generally regulate the industry. These functions enable 
government bureaucrats to 'steer' policy and tend to result in the
(1)
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superoptimal size of government output (see Chapter Three). In 
contrast, an auction system utilizes the price mechanism ensuring 
that the lowest cost producer is the recipient of the licence 
and at the same time, in a competitive system, captures economic . 
rent for the government.
Participation Policy (Chapter Five)
The major reasons put forward for the creation of BNOC were that 
it would facilitate security of oil supplies, permit control over 
the disposal of North Sea oil and be an effective instrument by 
which a national oil policy could be implemented. However, the 
establishment of BNOC by a Labour Government was overwhelmingly 
a political action. Active and direct participation in North Sea 
activities enabled the Labour Government to fulfil a socialist 
policy and attract votes by protecting a 'national asset'. In 
addition, the Government was seen to be controlling multi-national 
oil company activities at a time when oil policy was at the fore­
front of public consciousness.
BNOC's terms of reference were not precise; a public corporation 
whose relations with the Government and with the industry were 
unclear had the effect of contributing to a lack of industry 
confidence in government oil policy. An example of the 
politicization of North Sea oil policy creating instability in 
the oil industry may be seen by the Conservative Government's 
privatization of the exploration and production section of BNOC in 
1982. A policy which becomes an important aspect of a political 
party's platform is liable to be changed by a subsequent
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government keen on differentiating its policies. The Labour
(3)Opposition in 1983 pledged its commitment to the re-nationalization 
of Britoil.
Moreover, the establishment of a national oil company added a 
further bureaucracy active in the policy process with its own 
ambitions and interests.
Depletion Policy (Chapter Six)
Successive governments in the UK have acted ambivalently towards 
offshore oil depletion policy. Whilst accepting the political 
importance of the existence of a depletion policy both the major 
parties, when in government, have felt unable to implement such 
a policy. The postponement of the Clyde development project was 
a special case in that BNOC would have used monies from Treasury 
finances. As a result of the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines 
Act, 1975, extensive depletion controls are in existence and the 
Secretary of State for Energy has considerable personal powers 
with respect to oil depletion. These powers increase the Minister's 
authority and stature and similarly are consistent with bureaucratic 
objectives. It seems the major reason for the non-implementation of 
a depletion policy has little to do with the economic wisdom of 
such a policy but because of the short run revenues which would be 
foregone by the government if production controls were imposed on 
oil companies.
Both bureaucratic and political factors have influenced UK oil 
depletion policy and the result has been uncertainty as to future
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government plans. Assurances as to Government intentions concerning 
development delays and production cutbacks by Erirc Varley (in 1974) 
and Nigel Lawson (1982) alleviate company planning problems only 
in the short term; the fundamental uncertainty surrounding 
government depletion policy and its precise form remains.
Taxation Policy (Chapter Seven)
The oil taxation system in the UK is characterized by its complexity 
and instability. Since 1975 there have been numerous changes and 
modifications to the tax system. Government bureaucrats and tax 
experts in oil companies have ambitions which may be fulfilled by 
the existence and maintenance of a complex, changing tax system.
Thus to certain bureaucrats the structure and method of enforcement 
of the tax system is the major consideration of policy rather than 
the effects of the tax policy on the oil industry. The Inland 
Revenue's Oil Taxation Office itself was created as a result of 
the 1975 Oil Taxation Act.
Discontinuity of tax policy has led to anomalous situations, 
specifically with regard to high-cost marginal fields and the 
erosion of early cash flow (due most importantly to SPD and APRT). 
Tax policy is a crucial element in the economics of oilfield 
development and the uncertainty created by a constantly.changing 
system necessarily affects company expectations and harms their 
decision-making.
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3. Conceptual Problems
In attempting to identify influences and pressures within the 
policy process major conceptual difficulties arise. The 
government policy process involves numerous groups and 
individuals whose ambitions are not necessarily consistent with 
political objectives or economic efficiency. Furthermore, 
government bureaucracies cannot be seen as single entities with 
a single set of priorities and ambitions. Within government 
departments there are smaller, specialized groups and sections. 
The interaction of these groups within the overall bureaucracy 
is an important source of bureaucratic strategic behaviour. 
Conflicts may arise within a government department, between 
departments and with bureaucracies in oil companies. In applying 
the economic theories of bureaucracies to North Sea oil policy, 
conceptual difficulties occur largely because of the nature of 
government bureaucracies in the UK.
First, government bureaucracies are perceived to operate at a 
distance from the public. There is a general lack of knowledge 
surrounding the precise functions and terms of reference of 
government bureaucracies. This accrues partly from a tradition 
of official secrecy and as a result of bureaucratic strategic 
behaviour. Lack of information and secrecy tend to protect 
government bureaucrats from outside criticism and accountability. 
In addition, the power and influence of the bureaucracy is 
protected because of its possession of superior information.
Second, the relationship between government bureaucrats and
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politicians is one in which the bureaucracy is intended to be 
an objective and apolitical advisor to senior politicians.
However, government bureaucrats as individuals inevitably have 
political opinions and make political judgements. Bureaucrats 
advising Ministers may bias their recommendations to be 
consistent with personal opinions or viewpoints. Government 
bureaucrats advise and make decisions based on a set of 
conditions which are often unknown. One can speculate about 
what these conditions are, but the priority or weighting given 
to the various considerations is information kept strictly 
confidential by the bureaucrat. Because the criteria for 
bureaucratic decision-making are unknown there is no objective 
or benchmark to judge the success or failure of bureaucratic 
output against. Again, the bureaucrat is protected against 
criticism. Since 1979, the reformed Select Committee system has 
tended to make senior bureaucrats more accountable for their 
actions and has provided information concerning activities of 
bureaucrats. Nevertheless, official confidentiality may still 
be used as an argument to protect the positions of government 
bureaucrats. Furthermore, when a policy is the concern of more 
than one department, which is often the case, priority of 
interests between departments is difficult to ascertain.
A third conceptual problem involved in examining bureaucratic 
and political influences • in the policy-process, and a reason 
why these influences are often under-stated, arises from the 
public perception of the Government as an omniscient guardian, 
protecting all members of society. This can lead to a willingness 
to allow Civil Servants and senior politicians to decide which
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actions and policies are in the interests of society. If
governmental officers are viewed as individuals attempting to
maximize personal utility functions the perception that their
(4)behaviour is altruistic becomes very doubtful. Bureaucratic 
and political pressures influencing policy are not immediately 
obvious and are difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to identify sources of conflicts of interests and 
recognize their relative strength and their directional influence
Traditional economic theory tends to regard the government as 
a single, homogeneous structure. Thus, in response to market 
imperfections, the government may act in order to correct any 
imperfections and approach a Pareto efficient solution. This 
clearly will not occur unless there is support for such a policy 
from groups within the government policy process.
4. Government and North Sea Oil Policy
The development of North Sea oil policy has been characterized
by statements from politicians of major parties which have been 
designed to maximize votes on important policy issues. Policies 
have been presented as being in 'the national interest', 
'protecting a national asset' and 'guaranteeing security of oil 
supplies'. These statements have little precise meaning because 
they can be arbitrarily interpreted in numerous ways; but they 
are politically appealing sentiments. A policy developed as a 
response to public perceptions of a 'crisis' and argued for as
being in the 'national interest* may achieve the object of
capturing votes. However as crises pass and public perceptions
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change,the initial policy is also likely to change, so that a 
stable policy is unlikely. The policy, whilst satisfying 
political and bureaucratic ambitions, may have little to do 
with promoting economic efficiency.
The four aspects of North Sea oil policy outlined above are 
inter-related to a degree, notably the oil tax system and the 
licensing system. However, the four policies have developed 
separately, often controlled and implemented by different 
departments, and successive governments have tended to maintain 
this separation. Oil companies consider the effects of oil 
policy as a whole and thus are inclined to trade-off the effects 
of one policy against those of another policy. This has led to 
oil companies, and to a lesser extent governments, adopting 
tactical methods of bargaining and strategic behaviour. Oil 
companies negotiate or bargain with the government in order to 
change or modify policies. In return for the government, say, 
making tax concessions, the oil industry may attempt to speed-up 
development activity. The participation negotiations (see 
Chapter Five) highlight the extent of tactical bargaining that 
has occurred between government and industry concerning 
government policy. Tactical behaviour and strategic bargaining 
(outlined in Chapter Three) exist in an imperfect industry where 
there are bureaucracies within oil companies. However, because 
of the politicization of North Sea oil, the extent and importance 
of tactical decision-making and strategic behaviour increase 
considerably as government intervention in the offshore oil 
industry increases. As oil companies attempt to coerce the 
government into making policy concessions the degree to which oil
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companies are able to make decisions and plans on commercial 
or economic criteria is reduced. North Sea oil policies have 
been subject to political pressures which oil companies must 
then include in their decision-making process. A fully integrated 
national energy policy would increase the possibilities of 
inefficiencies as the size and complexity of the policy 
increased. Similarly, uncertainty in the oil industry would 
increase as political and bureaucratic intervention increased.
As the tendency for inefficiencies arising from political and 
bureaucratic behaviour increases as the government's involvement 
in the oil industry increases, the converse is also likely to 
occur. With government's functions in the offshore oil industry 
restricted to some sort of 'overseer' or 'protector' role, the 
potential for bureaucratic and political distortions is limited. 
Clearly defined limits to government policy would at least 
partly control the bureaucratic ambitions of expanding budget- 
size leading to a self-perpetuating increase in the influence 
and power of the bureaucracy.
Evidence in preceding chapters suggests that differences in oil 
policy between Labour and Conservative Governments have been 
limited. In a two-party system of government, if one party 
identifies a policy with vote-maximizing potential it is likely 
that the second party, (for instance, due to inferior information) 
will adopt a similar policy. The danger of losing votes because 
of a 'wrong' policy is a major consideration of political parties. 
Political consensus (for instance, with respect to depletion 
policy) may at least partly be explained by economic theories of
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politics as outlined in Chapter Three.
A Conservative Government succeeding a Labour Administration
may be expected to reduce state intervention in industry. With
respect to the offshore oil industry, the Conservative's success
in this area has been limited. An incoming Secretary of State
for Energy may not be eager to reduce the powers of his own
department because in doing so he may also diminish his own
standing in the government. Existing powers of control are
likely to prove useful to the government in order to influence
the oil industry. Personal powers granted to Ministers (e.g. by
(5)the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act with regards 
depletion controls) are often favoured by government bureaucrats 
because of the potential for steering policy and the achievement 
of other bureaucratic ambitions. A weak or inexperienced Minister 
can thus increase uncertainty and speculation concerning policy 
expectations by hesitancy and indecision. The greater the extent 
of personal powers granted to the Minister the greater is the 
success of policy dependent on the personal ability and strength 
of that Minister. The delay in the privatization of BNOC may 
be partly attributable to expedience, but also reflects on the 
skill and competence of the Secretary of State in controlling a 
government bureaucracy and implementing policy. An additional 
reason for the failure of Conservative Governments to reverse 
interventionist policies is the existence of a 'ratchet effect1.
A Conservative Government may intend to reduce state intervention 
in the oil industry but because of bureaucratic opposition and 
tactical behaviour (Chapter Three) it is unable to restore the 
initial policy circumstances. Again, citing BNOC as an example;
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its privatization in 1982 created Britoil but the trading sector 
of BNOC remained in public control.
5. The R6le of the Government in the North Sea
The existence of oil policies in the UK implies that the 
government is able to improve upon the situation of an imperfect 
oil market. For this position to be justified the government 
must be capable of fulfilling certain conditions^ whereby 
government policies and the ability of government to implement 
those policies may be seen to achieve a preferable (to the 
public) outcome than a non-interventionist policy.
First, the government must be able to forecast the outcome of 
a policy of no intervention in the oil industry. If intervention 
already exists any changes in policy must also be considered by 
comparing the outcome resulting from policy changes to the outcome 
of no policy changes. Unless this condition can be achieved it 
is not possible to gauge whether a government policy will improve 
the existing situation. Due to characteristics of the inter­
national oil market, forecasting in the oil industry is an 
extremely uncertain process. The government is dependent on its 
Civil Service for gathering information and constructing 
forecasts of future trends in the oil market under various key 
assumptions. Intrinsic shortcomings of the government system, 
whereby bureaucrats may select or withhold information from 
politicians in order to steer or influence government decision­
making can result in policy recommendations being accepted on the 
basis of bureaucratic self-interest rather than their being
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based on objective forecasts.
Second, the government must have a clear idea of the policy 
preferences of society in order that the government's perception 
of the 'national interest1 is consistent with society's 
'national interest' objectives. Downsian theory and other 
aspects of the economic theories of politics, (Chapter Three) 
highlight the difficulties of politicians and political parties 
within the UK system of representative democracy being able to 
identify voter preferences. Individuals must have considerable 
information made freely available to them if they are to have 
clear policy preferences. Even then, because of distortions 
in the voting system, individuals may not be sufficiently 
motivated to indicate their preference and it is unlikely that 
voter preferences on a single issue (within a package of issues) 
will be revealed to political parties.
Third, once 'national interest' objectives have been identified, 
specific oil policies must be developed which fulfil these 
objectives and are at least preferable to the existing situation. 
The problems here are twofold; the government must be able to 
formulate a policy consistent with society's 'national interest' 
and then must be able to implement that policy in its originally 
conceived structure. In the formulation and implementation 
stages of the government policy process, many bureaucratic and 
political pressures influence the development of policy. 
Politicians and government bureaucrats must be willing to 
subordinate personal ambition and self-interest objectives to the 
interests of society. This may, for instance, involve government
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bureaucrats implementing policies which reduce their powers and 
reduce the bureau's budget size. Similarly, politicians may be 
required to implement policies from which tangible benefits 
only accrue after that government's lifetime whilst costs are 
incurred in the short term.
In applying the economic theories of bureaucracies and politics 
to the development of UK oil policy since 1964 it is evident 
that the above conditions have not been fulfilled. Whether these 
conditions are likely to be fulfilled in the future depends 
largely on the structure of the policy process in the future.
A crucial factor in the development of North Sea oil policy was 
its elevation to the forefront of public awareness by media 
attention at the time of the world oil price increases of 1973-4. 
The inherently unstable nature of the international oil market 
and the importance of oil revenues to the UK Treasury throughout 
the 1980's will tend to preserve North Sea oil policy as an 
important political issue. Groups and individuals active in the 
policy process bargain and negotiate for characteristics of 
policy. Pressures on the policy process derive from many 
sources which, although they may change in their relative 
bargaining strength over time, are likely to influence the oil 
policy process in the future.
Oil industry lobby organizations and oil companies exert influence 
on the oil policy process from outside government as do service 
and supply industry pressure groups and specialist groups such as 
the Institute for Fiscal Studies. Inside government the Foreign 
Office has an interest in North Sea oil policy to ensure that any
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government action is internationally acceptable (notably with
regards to the European Community) and is not likely to provoke
retaliation affecting British interests abroad (notably with
regards to OPEC). The Treasury is primarily concerned with
the macro-economic implications of oil policy and thus would
have an interest in all aspects of oil policy, in particular
with taxation and depletion policies. The Inland Revenue's
direct concern with taxation policy is largely to do with the
implementation of the tax system rather than the outcome of
tax policy. The Department of Energy was created in January
1974 at least partly as a result of public attention surrounding
(7)the world oil 'crisis'. Thus the existence of the Department 
of Energy can itself be seen as an aspect of oil policy whereby 
the government promoted energy to a higher status than had 
previously prevailed. The various groups and sections (see 
Chart 1) within the Department of Energy have specific duties 
and responsibilities and thus cannot be viewed as possessing a 
single set of objectives and priorities. The analysis of 
government oil policy since 1964 highlights the importance of 
political and bureaucratic pressures on the oil policy process.
In providing an overview, it is important to note that groups 
active in the policy process desire characteristics of policy 
and derive utility from characteristics inherent in policy rather 
than solely from the policy output. For instance, some 
government bureaucrats (in the Treasury) may be primarily concerned 
with the output of oil taxation policy (the government take), 
whereas other government bureaucrats, say in the Inland Revenue, 
may be concerned with the policy input (the administrative 
complexity of the oil tax system). Both 'revenue' and 'complexity*
231
are characteristics of oil taxation policy.
In order to analyse oil policy development using the intrinsic 
characteristics of policies it is necessary to distinguish 
between two broad stages in the policy process. Although the 
policy process is a continuous, dynamic process the two stages 
are employed as approximations for ease of presentation. The 
first stage refers to situations arising from the demand for 
'new' policy. Demand for policy generally arises due to the 
political perception of need (see Chapter Three). In the very 
early stages of policy determination the politician is heavily 
reliant on the advice of government bureaucracies. The 
politician's reliance on the bureaucrat for information is 
especially important in technical and specialized areas where 
the decision-making politician is essentially a layman. The 
nature of the relationship between the sponsor (politician) and 
the bureaucrat (see Chapter Three) is such that the bureaucrat 
may have the ability to 1 steer' the policy process. By 
selecting and withholding information the government bureaucrat 
may acquire characteristics of policy which are consistent with 
the bureaucrat's ambitions. Bargaining between the politician 
and bureaucrat takes place on the basis of characteristics of 
oil policies. At the initial policy formulation stage of the 
policy process the bureaucrat desires characteristics of oil 
policy which enable him to maximize budget size in the future, 
(if that is the bureaucrat's objectives) i.e. the bureaucrat 
attempts to create the potential for budget maximization. In 
stage two, when the policy framework is in existence, the 
bureaucrat may then attempt to maximize budget size (as Niskanen
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asserts; Chapter Three). The main difference between the two 
stages is that in stage one the budget size of a"policy is a 
constraint on the bureaucrat's ambitions whereas in stage two 
the budget is itself a characteristic which the bureaucrat 
attempts to acquire more of.
In stage one the bureaucrat and the politician create the basic 
structure of the policy and it is within this structure that 
subsequent discussion and bargaining occurs. Initial policy 
discussions crucially affect the direction and nature of further 
policy developments. With respect of UK oil policy the 
decision in 1964 to adopt a discretionary licence allocation 
system had a considerable impact on oil policy decisions taken 
over a decade later. Thus the bureaucrat, in stage one of the 
policy process, attempts to introduce and emphasise character­
istics of policy which create precedents and build a legal and 
institutional framework for future control and intervention. 
Functions and positions are created in order that over time 
flexibility will enable bureaucrats to take advantage of 
changing circumstances to acquire characteristics which directly 
maximize budget size or achieve other desirable bureaucratic 
objectives. UK oil depletion policy is characterized by the 
existence of the framework for depletion controls which have yet 
to be used extensively (see Chapter Six). Only since the legal 
potential for depletion controls came into existence have 
discussions concerning the implementation of controls occurred 
with lobby groups and independent analysts.
Thus in the short term (stage one of the policy process) the
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bureaucrat may attempt to alter the politician's perception of 
policy characteristics in order to maximize the potential for 
increases in budget size. In the longer term, the bureaucrat 
may attempt to alter the politician's perception of policy cost - 
(the position of curve C in Figure 1) and the marginal value of 
policy (curve V) so as to move Line df to the right and increase 
the size of Areas E and F. Throughout the bargaining process 
groups may thus emphasise or overstate key characteristics of 
policy for tactical purposes.
In stage two of the policy process a characteristic approach 
may, at least partly, explain the adoption (or non-adoption) 
of a new or differentiated policy. For a new policy to be 
adopted it must possess at least some of the characteristics 
desired by the major groups in the policy process. The non­
adoption of the IFS oil tax proposals in December 1981 (see 
Chapter Seven) could be partly explained in terms of their lack 
of characteristics (for example, administrative complexity) 
favoured by some government bureaucrats. A policy reducing 
administrative control and complexity could result in a decrease 
of budget size or workload for the bureaucrat thus, ceteris 
paribc.s, the bureaucrat is likely to oppose its introduction 
unless compensated by the inclusion in policy of another 
favourable characteristic.
In the consideration of more than two interest groups, 
characteristics and policies, the bargaining process becomes 
increasingly complex. At any point in time it may be possible 
to predict types of policy characteristics desired by
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FIGURE I
THE EQUILIBRIUM OUTPUT OF A BUREAUCRACY
where, V denotes the marginal valuation of the policy to the 
politician;
C denotes the marginal cost of the policy to the 
politician (sponsor)
Area E equals area F
Source: W Niskanen, 'Bureaucracy: Servant or Master?1
(London; IEA, 1973), p.29
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various groups, and in the framework of the economic and political 
climate, forecast policy trends. At least it may be possible to 
predict that a policy is unlikely to be adopted because of certain 
characteristics of that policy being opposed by powerful groups 
in the policy process.
It is important to note that pressures are exerted on a policy 
during its passage through the policy process which may result 
in a final policy being an amalgam of a selection of policies. 
These pressures do not necessarily act as a restraint on 
extreme or unacceptable policies or activities of government. 
Bureaucratic and political influences on the policy process 
are not designed to achieve balance or moderation although this 
may occur. Pressures during the policy process are more 
likely to distort or bias policies rather than restrain policy 
output. Self-interest objectives are fulfilled through 
relative strength in bargaining and in influencing the policy 
process. Bureaucrats and politicians involved in developing 
policy are generally more aware of arguments put forward by 
producer pressure groups than those of consumer pressure groups 
(see Chapter Three). Thus because of their relatively powerful 
position in the policy process, producer pressure groups are 
more likely to achieve success (relative to consumer groups) in 
influencing the development of a policy. Moreover, the 
characteristics approach to policy development highlights the 
importance to various groups (particularly government bureaucrats) 
of the policy per se rather than the effects of the policy when 
implemented. Balance or restraint would be directed at policy 
output.
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The intrinsic deficiencies of the government policy process cast 
doubts on the government's ability to intervene effectively in 
the oil industry. Irrespective of whether the government's 
policy intentions are desirable in terms of economic efficiency, - 
preceding analysis suggests government intervention is unlikely 
to fulfil the government's own objectives. It is accepted that 
there is a need for controls and state involvement in order to 
influence areas of the economy where the market system neglects 
certain social costs and benefits. Thus, the question arises; 
to what degree and in what form should government intervention in 
the offshore oil industry occur? Although this is essentially a 
normative question, a positive appraisal of North Sea oil policy 
may contribute to an assessment of the government's rSle in the 
offshore industry. Conflicts and inefficiencies may be understood 
and recognized as being inherent in the policy process thus 
assisting the development of forecasts and project evaluation.
A major virtue of the competitive market system is that it combines 
a tendency towards economic efficiency with a degree of individual 
freedom.- At the same time, a drawback of the free market system 
is that over time it has been shown to lead to exploitation and 
abuse unless the government takes action to protect various 
sectors of society. Market rewards attract factors to produce at 
the lowest cost those goods which consumers most desire. Thus a 
desirable characteristic of North Sea oil policy is to attempt to 
create an environment in which, within certain constraints, 
restrictions on the operation of free competitive markets are 
reduced to a minimum. A stable oil policy that does not create 
disincentives to investment reduces uncertainty in the oil industry.
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Clarity of policy, with regard to the intentions and purpose of 
policy and the method of policy implementation, reduces uncert­
ainty in the oil industry. Simplicity of policy structure 
enables policy to be monitored outside the government system, 
for instance, by independent academics or study groups, and in 
addition facilitates accountability within government.
The oligopolistic structure of the offshore oil industry in the 
UK, whilst encouraging the speedy exploitation of offshore 
resources, has given rise to various situations which the 
government has a clear function to rectify. Because of the 
strategic importance of North Sea oil both nationally and 
internationally the government must have access to information 
concerning the oil industry. The problem of gathering and 
interpreting information is a central issue in the theories of 
bureaucracies. A government bureaucracy with the function of
gathering company and oilfield information for the purpose of
r c< ensuring 1 good oilfield practi^fe1 may tend to increase its power 
and influence by selectively using its expertise to steer policy. 
Thus it is crucial for governments to state explicitly the limits 
of policies and the purposes of gathering information in order to 
constrain bureaucratic strategic behaviour. A degree of 
flexibility in policy is necessary in order to be able to respond 
to large-scale extraneous shocks to the oil market. Structural 
changes to policy in response to say, increases in the world oil 
price, are indications of an unsatisfactory policy (an example 
is oil taxation policy, Chapter Seven). However, unless the 
circumstances in which the government may invoke emergency powers 
are clearly identified in advance, their existence alone creates
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With respect to the UK oil industry, there seems little evidence 
to support the view that the market mechanism cannot be expected - 
to deal adequately with planning for the uncertainties of the 
future. The private sector has the expertise and experience to 
plan into the medium and long term. Past attempts by UK 
governments to influence the market have tended to distort market 
signals thus complicating and confusing oil company planning. 
Government intervention in the oil industry involves a movement 
away from employing the price mechanism in the allocation of 
scarce resources.
The UK system of representative democracy creates bureaucratic 
and political difficulties in the development of policy which 
are not obviously overcome within the existing system of 
government. North Sea oil in the 1970's became an important 
political issue and in the future politicians and political 
parties may be expected to use political and personal criteria 
in the continuing development and implementation of oil policy. 
Similarly, without radical constitutional reform the influence of 
the government bureaucrat in the policy process is likely to remain 
very powerful. Nevertheless, there are measures that may be 
introduced to control and constrain the activities of government 
bureaucrats.
Freedom of access to government information can make the bureaucrat
more accountable to the public but the problem of measuring the
(8)efficiency of government output remains. More importantly,
uncertainty.
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freedom of information can increase competition in the government
policy process. By giving independent organizations and
individuals outside government access to information alternative
policy proposals and their effects may be made clearer to
politicians and to the public. Furthermore, a degree of
duplication of policy within government similarly creates
competition. Competition between government bureaucrats can lead
(9)to bureaucrats bidding for policies. Bidding would be based on 
the characteristics of policy and competition would encourage 
the bureaucrat to include less of those characteristics that are 
directly designed to maximize the bureaucrat's utility function 
in policy p r o p o s a l s M o r e o v e r ,  by minimizing the extent of 
government intervention in the offshore industry the potential 
and scope for political and bureaucratic self-interest to distort 
the market mechanism is reduced. In the area of the government 
policy process, two clear areas for future research are apparent 
as a result of the analysis in preceding chapters. First, a 
characteristic approach to the determination of policy may be 
developed in order to illustrate the bargaining process between 
interest groups within the government policy process. Second, 
there is large scope for examining the structure of government 
in the context of the economic theories of politics and bureaucracies.
In conclusion it is important to emphasise two points concerning 
government and North Sea oil policy. First, preceding analysis 
does not imply advocacy of the total withdrawal of government 
from the domestic oil industry. The government has many duties to 
perform in the North Sea as it does in all other sectors of the 
economy. These duties include safety control, pollution control,
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to guard against improper business practi/es and to protect
( 11 )offshore installations.
Second, the government has a multiplicity of objectives to fulfil- 
which include political, social and economic ambitions. On many 
occasions there may be a trade-off between various objectives and 
it is crucial to understand how, for example, economic objectives 
may be subjugated for political or ideological objectives. It is 
not suggested that economic efficiency in the strict sense should 
always take precedence over other objectives. However, a politician 
or political party favours ideological or other commitments over, 
say, economic efficiency it is vital for governments in a 
democracy to make as explicit as they can what the economic costs 
and implications of policy are.
In highlighting the existence and sources of bureaucratic and 
political distortions in the policy process the shortcomings and 
deficiencies of government action may be recognized. UK North Sea 
oil policy since 1964 illustrates the practical limitations on 
the ability of governments to intervene effectively in the oil 
industry. Extending the rules and methodology of neo-classical 
economics to an examination of government oil policy contributes 
to an understanding of the nature of the imperfections in the 
government policy process. At least the potential for future 
distortions and the direction of those distortions may be 
estimated, thus assisting in forecasting and planning in the 
North Sea oil sector.
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